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LEC TURES 


ON 


aO¥EENMESNT, 


y 

By HENRY St. GEORGE TUCKER, 


Professor of Law, in the University of Virginia, 


A 



CHARLOTTESVILLE, 
Published by James Alexander 

1844 . 



























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A 














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h 


LECTURES ON GOVERNMENT, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 


LECTURE I. 


In entering upon the course of lectures on govern¬ 
ment and constitutional law which has been prescrib¬ 
ed as one of the duties of this professorship, I feel the 
most unfeigned distrust of my own ability to fulfil the 
task with advantage to those, whom it is always my 
pleasure to address. I should therefore, without he¬ 
sitation, have adopted the work of some other author 
upon the subject, if one had presented itself that seem¬ 
ed to me in any degree adequate to our purposes. I 
have not been so fortunate however as to meet with 
any, to which some serious objection did not lie ; ma¬ 
ny of the essays upon the subject of government with¬ 
in our reach, being from the pens of British writers 
enamoured with their own system, and bigoted in their 
antipathy to every other; while on the other hand 
those which are imbued with the spirit of liberty, are 
too speculative and theoretical, or have issued from 
the American press during the throes of the French 
Revolution, and have been tinctured by that violence 
of political feeling to which it so eminently gave rise. 
Others, indeed, of our own writers, have been unhe- 
1 








2 

sitatingly charged with as devoted an admiration 
of the British government, as the most faithful Bri¬ 
tish subject; nor would the charge seem to be with¬ 
out foundation, in relation to him, who pronounced 
it to be the “ most stupendous monument of human 
invention.” This war of political pamphleteering, it 
must be confessed, is not the best calculated to elicit 
political wisdom. It is perhaps more likely to be 
attained, in the calm shades of academic retirement, 
where philosophy takes the place of passion, and our 
principles are traced up to the pure fountains of 
truth, instead of being drawn from the foul and turbid 
stream of party collision. In the views which I shall 
venture to present to you, I shall therefore avail my¬ 
self of light wherever it may be found ; and shall ga¬ 
ther here and there from all the labourers in this in¬ 
teresting field, whatever of their productions may 
seem worthy of our acceptance : conscious as I am 
that I shall thereby more successfully promote your 
advantage, than by relying solely on my own more 
limited resources. 

In the commencement of our course, I had occa¬ 
sion to remark that “the natural state of man has 
ever been and ever must be a state of society rude 
indeed, if you please, and confined to the narrowest 
limits, but still coeval with created man. Take the 
holy scriptures for our guide, and the fact is proved 
at once. Reject them and give the reins to reason, 
and whither will our unbridled fancies run ? Do 
they point to an eternity behind us ? Our mental 
eye will never penetrate the mists that hang around 
it. The keenest vision reaches not beyond a date, 
far, far within the period when countless millions 
mingled in society. It is the bible only that tells of 
the time “ when man was found alone,” when even 
woman was not found to keep him company. But 
yet if we reject that record of his early history, our 
conclusions still must be the same. Whenever man 
teas first created, if there was a beginning to our 


3 


race, the state of things presented by the sacred wri¬ 
tings must have had existence. If, as some scep¬ 
tics (the Elian sect, I think,) have imagined, the 
world itself has been eternal, and the race of man 
without original, then society always has existed ; 
and it can only have existed upon the principles 
which we are about to shew are essential to its struc¬ 
ture and constitution. The subject is indeed alto¬ 
gether speculative but not without interest or in¬ 
struction, and I beg leave to introduce it by a few 
remarks of a celebrated writer on the nature, the 
objects and origin of civil society. 

“ A civil society, or, as we usually call it, a state, 
has already been defined to be a complete assembly 
of men of free condition, who are united together 
for the purposes of maintaining their rights, and of 
advancing a common good. These two purposes, 
which civil society has in view, point out to us the 
mutual claims of such society and of its several 
members. 

“ Each individual, who associates himself with 
others, so as to form with them one civil society or 
body politic, does it with a view of obtaining their 
assistance in the maintenance and support of his 
rights ; that is, he proposes to himself the advantage 
of being protected against such injuries, as he might 
have been exposed to, if he had continued in a state 
of nature. On the other hand, the body politic, to 
which he joins himself, that is, the other individuals, 
with which he associates, expect in return, that, as 
he is protected by them, he shall agree with them in 
whatever is necessary or conducive to their common 
benefit. 

“ Now as these are the known purposes, which the 
body and each of its members have respectively in 
view, in associating with one another; the very act 
of associating, though there should be no express 
stipulation between them, implies, that the society, 
considered as a body, agrees to the terms, upon which 


4 


each individual joins himself to it; and that each in¬ 
dividual agrees to the terms, upon which the society 
admits him as a member. And thus the society 
obliges itself to protect its several members; and 
each member obliges himself to pay allegiance to 
the society, that is, to conform himself to whatever 
such society shall judge to be for the common good. 

“ What has been already shewn, in the former 
part of this work, concerning the natural rights of 
mankind considered as individuals, will serve to teacli 
us by what means civil societies must be formed, in 
order to make them consistent with those natural 
rights. Every man has naturally a right to think 
and to act for himself. The law of nature has in¬ 
deed restrained him from doing what is unjust, and 
has subjected him to proper checks to prevent him 
from causelessly hurting others, and to proper pun¬ 
ishment, if he does causelessly hurt them : it has 
obliged him likewise to advance the happiness of 
mankind, as he has ability and opportunity ; but then 
it leaves him to judge and determine for himself in 
what instances he can conveniently advance their 
good, and to choose for himself the means of doing 
it. When he becomes a member of a civil society,^ 
the public or body politic claims a right of pointing 
out to him w hat is just and what is unjust, and ofdirect- 
ing him likewise what good he is to do, and in what 
manner he is to do it. There is no way of making such 
a claim as this consistent with his natural right of 
thinking and choosing for himself; unless by his own 
consent, either expressor tacit, he has waived this right 
and has voluntarily agreed to be so guided and "di¬ 
rected. Every man has naturally a right to make 
use of his own force, either for his own defence, 
when he is in danger of being injured, or to obtain 
reparation and to inflict punishment, when he has 
been injured. But the civil society, to which he is 
joined, claims a right to judge both upon w'hat occa¬ 
sions any force is lawful, and what force is lawful 


5 


upon these occasions. And as it takes him and all 
its other members under the protection of the com¬ 
mon force, and considers him as a part of the pub¬ 
lic ; it does not allow him to exert his own force, but 
in concert with the public, and requires him so to ex¬ 
ert it, whenever it is wanted. Here again the claim of 
civil society, upon the individuals, that compose 
it, cannot be reconciled with the natural rights of 
mankind, unless each individual has, either by ex¬ 
press or tacit, by explicit or implied consent, parted 
with such rights, and agreed, that, where the public 
force can defend or redress him, he will never make 
use of his own, but in such manner, as the public 
shall direct. Thus the liberty of individuals is 
abridged in a state of civil society : the community 
has such a claim upon them in respect both of the 
rules, which they are to follow, and of the manner 
in which they are to make use of their force, as 
the same men, that compose the society, would not 
have had, either several or jointly, if they had con¬ 
tinued unassociated, or had remained in that state of 
equality, in which all mankind are naturally placed. 
And as it would be an injury to take any part of 
their natural liberty from them without their consent; 
the consequence is, that civil societies could not be 
formed, consistently with natural justice, by any 
other means, than by the joint consent, either ex¬ 
press or tacit, of those, who compose it. 

“ Each individual, who thus consents to give up a 
part of his natural liberty, obtains however more than 
an equivalent for what he gives up. If he submits 
to be guided in his duty by the public understanding 
or general sense of the community, to which he joins 
himself; those, who are near him, and with whom 
he has the most frequent intercourse, submit in re¬ 
turn to be guided in the same manner. And as by 
this means he is less likely to transgress the duty, 
which he owes to others ; so he has good reason to 
expect, that others will be less likely to transgress 
2 


6 


the duty, which they owe to him; than if both thef 
and he had continued in a state of natural indepen¬ 
dency. As he parts with his independent right of 
using his own force according to his own discretion 
either to defend or to redress himself, and gives the 
public a claim upon him to join his force with theirs, 
who are associated with him, whenever his assistance 
is wanted; so in return he is assured of the protec¬ 
tion of the community, and has the advantage of a 
stronger force, than his own, to defend and to re¬ 
dress him, when he has a reasonable occasion for it.” 

After explaining at some length how the first ru¬ 
diments of society were paternal and patriarchal he 
proceeds to observe, “ It is not necessary to suppose, 
that all civil societies were increased, till they became 
as large, as we now find them, by the constant ad¬ 
dition of fresh descendants from the same original 
parent. As the sons of one common parent, and the 
families derived from those sons, who had consented 
to remain united together under the jurisdiction of 
such parent, as long as he lived, were at liberty after 
his death either to continue in a like union, or te 
separate from one another : so the sons of different 
families, and their descendants with them, in conse¬ 
quence of such a liberty as this, might join with one 
another and form larger bodies, which did not come 
originally from the same common stock. Such un¬ 
ions may frequently have been occasioned by the 
want of a settlement, or by the fear of unjust vio¬ 
lence. The fear even of just punishment has un¬ 
doubtedly sometimes increased the multitude in a 
society thus joined together : and Rome itself would 
have begun from smaller numbers than it did, if its 
founder had not opened an asylum to screen crimi¬ 
nals from justice. Nay there is some reason to be¬ 
lieve, that the first society which we read of, owed 
its original to such an occasion as this. The first 
city, that history makes mention of, was built bv 
Cain. And if Cain does not shew what motive led, 


Ihim to this undertaking, when he declares his appre¬ 
hension, that every one, who found him, would kill 
him ; yet we may learn it with some degree of cer¬ 
tainty from what Lamech is recorded to have said to 
his two wives. He did not chuse to be shut up with 
his brethren, but was desirous to live at large like 
the rest of mankind : and to encourage his wives not 
to fear, that the crime of their ancestor would be 
punished upon them, he clears himself from the guilt 
of it, and assures them that there was no danger in 
leaving their present way of life, and in trusting 
themselves abroad. This will be the most obvious 
meaning of what he says to Adah and Zillah, if we 
render the words, as they may be rendered—Have I 
slain a man to my wounding, and a young man to 
my hurt? If Cain shall be avenged seven-lold, truly 
Lamech seventy and seven-fold. 

“The condition of mankind is at present some¬ 
thing different from what it was formerly, when civil 
societies first began to establish themselves. Such 
societies are now established in almost all parts of 
the world, that are inhabited at all: they are no long¬ 
er in their first rudiments, as they were whilst sepa¬ 
rate families were making attempts to settle them¬ 
selves, and to collect a force sufficient to repel inju¬ 
ries, but are founded upon steady principles, and 
unite their several members together by firm and 
lasting ties. And yet even in the present circum¬ 
stances of mankind, numberless individuals have an 
opportunity of setting themselves free from these ties 
in such a manner, as to be at liberty either to found 
new civil societies, or to unite themselves to such 
new societies, as others have begun. 

“ It will be necessary, for the better understanding 
this matter to consider by what means men naturally 
become members of any particular nation or civil so¬ 
ciety ; and by what means, after they are so become 
members they may be at liberty to separate themselves 
from it again. Civil societies in general are willing 


8 


to consider persons, who are born amongst them, as 
members of those societies where they are born. It 
is plain, that they are considered in this light, because 
if they were looked upon as aliens, till they have been 
formally admitted to be members, they would, like all 
other aliens, be incapable of inheriting immovable 
goods. But then this is matter of favor in the society : 
and persons so born seem to be naturally at liberty 
either to make use of this favor or to refuse it. There 
does not appear to be any natural reason why a child, 
though he is born of parents, who belong to any par¬ 
ticular nation or civil society, and is born likewise 
within the territories of that nation, should be obliged, 
after he is come to years of discretion, to continue in 
it. Positive institutions may indeed have ordered it 
otherwise : but he appears to be naturally at liberty 
either to make himself a member of that society, if it 
will receive him, or to join himself to any other, or to 
begin a new one in any part of the world not yet in¬ 
habited. He may indeed part with this liberty, after 
he is capable of thinking and of acting for himself, 
either by express or by tacit consent. If any express 
stipulations for that purpose pass between him and 
the society, in which he was born, he makes himself 
a member of it, and is no more at liberty, after such 
stipulations, to leave this society, than he is to depart 
from any other contract, by which he has bound him¬ 
self. But without any formal or express stipulations, 
he may unite himself effectually to the society, in 
which he is born, by tacit consent. After he is arrived 
at maturity of judgment, if he continues to make use 
of the protection of that society, and to pay it such 
allegiance, as it requires of its members ; his conduct 
must necessarily be understood as an evidence on his 
part, that he is willing or consents to be a member of 
it, and on the part of the society, that it consents to 
receive him. Amongst other instances ot tacit con¬ 
sent we may reckon his taking and holding such im¬ 
moveable goods, as are in the jurisdiction or general 
property of the society. As aliens cannot naturally 


9 


take and hold such goods; it is plain, that the so¬ 
ciety by allowing a native to take and hold them con¬ 
siders or however is willing to consider, a native as a 
member. And whoever makes use of this favor de¬ 
clares by so doing that he is willing or consents, to 
be considered in the same light, in which the society 
considered him. And it may be worth the while to 
observe, that though he should afterwards relinquish 
his goods, or dispose of them by sale or by gift, he 
does not cease to owe allegiance to the society: be¬ 
cause the jurisdiction of the society over him did not 
arise merely from the possession of such goods, but 
from his consent to be a member of it, of which con¬ 
sent his so taking and holding these goods was an 
evidence.” 

The ingenious author has, moreover, in another 
chapter presented his views of the principles which 
naturally govern in the formation of every society. 
I offer them to the student for his consideration. 

6i In every society, where all the members are 
equal, that is where one has no more authority than 
another, whatever is determined by the whole, or by 
the greater part is binding upon each of the members. 

“ There can be no question, whether the act of the 
whole is binding upon each of the members: be¬ 
cause each of the members is naturally bound by his 
own act; and the act of the whole is only the joint 
act of each individual member. The chief doubt 
is,, whether the majority can naturally by any joint 
act of theirs bind, not only themselves, but the 
whole society, even those, who are in the minority, 
and dissent from such act. This seems at first sight 
to be inconsistent with a well-known rule, that as 
all men are naturally equal, no person can be obliged 
by the act of another without his own consent. But 
it is to be remembered, that when a man joins him¬ 
self to a society, which is formed or instituted for 
the sake of carrying on some certain purpose, he ei¬ 
ther expressly consents, or must, by thus joining 
2 * 


10 


himself to such society, be understood tacitly to con¬ 
sent, that this purpose shall be carried on. He obli¬ 
ges himself therefore by his consent, either express 
or tacit, to whatever is necessary for carrying on this 
purpose in such a manner, as is consistent with rea¬ 
son and equity. Now there are but three ways, in 
which a number of persons can do business jointly : 
it must be managed, either according to the senti¬ 
ments of the whole body, or according to those of 
the greater -part, or according to those of the 
lesser part. In all matters of a doubtful nature, 
or of an uncertain event; especially where the num¬ 
ber of persons concerned is very great ; it is next to 
impossible for all of them to agree in the same senti¬ 
ments. The purposes therefore, for which a society 
is formed, could not be carried on, if nothing less 
than the full agreement of all the members was suffi¬ 
cient to determine wffiat was to be done, so as to 
bind each of them to concur in the same measure. 
But each member, when he joined himself to the so¬ 
ciety, consented, that this purpose should be carried 
on, and consequently consented to be bound in some 
reasonable and equitable manner; though the whole 
society should not happen to agree. This then be¬ 
ing the case; the next question will be, whether it 
is more reasonable and more equitable, that the mi¬ 
nority should be bound by the act of the majority, or 
the contrary ? The answer to this question is obvi¬ 
ous. It is plainly most consistent with reason, that 
the sentiments of the majority should prevail and 
conclude the whole : because it is not so likely, that 
a greater number of men should be mistaken, when 
they concur in their judgment, as that a smaller num¬ 
ber should be mistaken. And this is likewise most 
consistent with equity: because, in general, the 
greater number have a proportionably greater inte¬ 
rest, that the purposes of the society should suc¬ 
ceed well, and have more at stake, if those purposes 
should miscarry or be disappointed. This then be- 


11 


ing the most reasonable and most equitable way for 
a number of men to do business jointly, when they 
are not all agreed upon the same measures ; and 
each memher of the society having originally con¬ 
sented, that the purposes, for which it was formed, 
should be carried on in the most reasonable and the 
most equitable manner ; it follows that each member 
has consented to have the business of the society done 
according to the opinion of the majority; where 
there is not an unanimous agreement of the whole. 

“ From hence it appears, that, although no person 
can naturally be obliged but by his own consent, yet 
each person, who votes with the minority, is obliged 
by the act of the majority. He does not indeed give 
an explicit consent to such act at the time of voting: 
but there was a prior consent, from whence this ob¬ 
ligation arises : when he became a member of the 
society, he consented, either expressly or tacitly, 
that he would in all instances conform himself to 
what should be the sense of the greater part of that 
society, to which he joins himself, so as to become a 
member of it. 

“ Where the members of a society are equally di¬ 
vided in their opinions upon any point; there is no 
more weight of reason or of equity on one side than 
there is on the other. No business therefore can be 
done: and consequently all things must, upon such 
an equality of votes, continue in the same state, 
that they were in before, without having any change 
made in them. For this reason, says Grotius, where 
judges are equally divided in their opinions, as to ac¬ 
quitting or condemning a criminal, such criminal is 
acquitted. And in like manner, where they are 
equally divided upon a question of property, the pos¬ 
sessor keeps the thing in dispute.” 

“ But though naturally the business of the society 
must stop, where the society is equally divided in 
opinion ; yet by mutual agreement this case may be 
provided for several ways. Some one member of 


12 


the society either by express agreement, or by cus¬ 
tom, which is a tacit agreement, may have a casting 
voice. Or the business, when, for want of a ma¬ 
jority, it cannot be done by the whole society, may 
by positive institution devolve to some particular 
members of it: and where such institution gives 
these select members this power, their act, or, if it 
is so appointed, the act of the majority of them, be¬ 
comes binding upon the whole : because each per¬ 
son, when he consents to be a member of the socie¬ 
ty, is understood to agree to all the rules or institu¬ 
tions of it. In some lesser societies a farther provi¬ 
sion is sometimes made : when a majority cannot be 
procured within the society, the business devolves 
to some one or more persons, who are not members 
of it. And where such provision has been properly 
established, the determination of such person or per¬ 
sons is binding upon the society ; not because such 
a provision is naturally incidental to a society ; but 
because, when it has been made and established as a 
standing rule of the society, all, who become mem¬ 
bers of such society, if they do not consent to it ex¬ 
pressly, are understood by the act of making them¬ 
selves members to consent to it tacitly. 

“ From what has been already said the reader will 
easily understand, that the natural majority in a so¬ 
ciety, where no agreement has been made to the 
contrary, is a major part of the whole. A society 
may be divided into three or more parts of as many 
different opinions : and though there may be a great¬ 
er number of one opinion, than of either of the 
other two ; yet unless that greater number is a ma¬ 
jority of the whole society, it is not such a majority, 
as will naturally, or without some particular agree¬ 
ment conclude the whole. If the members , 1 who 
are of the other two opinions, when they are taken 
together, would make a majority of the whole socie¬ 
ty, neither the equity nor the reason is with the third 
party. The equity is not with them ; because this 


13 


third party has not a greater interest at stake: and 
the reason is not with them ; because this party is 
not more likely to judge rightly, than the other two, 
which differ from it. But as this may be urged 
equally against any one of the three parties ; in such 
circumstances all business must stop ; unless some 
method has been contrived and particularly settled 
for carrying it on. Some of the methods already 
mentioned, by which the business of the society may 
be carried on, when there is an equality of votes, 
may be made use of here. Or it may have been 
particularly provided, either by express consent or by 
custom, that whatever is agreed upon by the greater 
number whether such greater number is a majority of 
the whole or not, shall be conclusive. And though 
it is not naturally incidental to a society to be deter¬ 
mined by such a majority as this; yet an express 
agreement for this purpose, or long custom, which is 
a tacit agreement, are natural means of obliging the 
members to be concluded by such a majority.” 

Having thus laid before the student some of the 
views of an intelligent writer, as to the formation of 
civil society, and as to the principles which naturally 
prevail in its establishment, I proceed to remark that 
the very existence of such an association, necessarily 
implies the establishment of rules for its direction and 
government. Anarchy, more horrible than the fan¬ 
cied state of nature, would inevitably ensue, if masses 
of men were collected together without the necessary 
regulations for the protection of their rights, for the 
security of the strong against the weak, and for the 
defence of the whole society against other and diffe¬ 
rent associations. Having united for these purposes, 
they must be presumed to have designed to adopt, 
according to their views of what was best calculated 
to effect those objects, such regulations as on the one 
hand would ascertain, and on the other would pro¬ 
tect, the rights and privileges of each individual. But 
this would next lead, by necessary consequence, to 


14 


the prescription of duties, the denunciation of penal¬ 
ties, and to other regulations growing out of the va¬ 
rious relations in which the members of such a com¬ 
munity would stand towards each other. These rules 
or regulations constitute laws, and thus it is obvious 
that law must be coeval with society itself, or imme¬ 
diately spring out of it. It is the bond which holds 
it together and without which it would soon be re¬ 
solved into its original elements, after passing through 
the awful struggle to which its dissolution would 
give rise. Law therefore should be looked to as the 
guardian and protector, and not, as it is too often 
considered, as the scourge of society. But law with¬ 
out obedience is an empty show ; without enforce¬ 
ment it is brutum fulmen. Its essential attribute is 
power, its capacity to bless is derived from its autho¬ 
rity, and its only value consists in its energy, its vi¬ 
gor, and its supremacy. The sovereignty of the law 
is the fundamental maxim of every social state ; it is 
the foundation stone of all society. Law is our only 
king. He who disobeys it is an enemy to his race 
and a traitor to himself; he who defies it, is a rebel 
against the power, which he himself has contributed 
to call into existence and to make supreme. 

Hence it would seem that law implies government: 
or rather, government is law. It is the exercise of 
the power of the whole society in prescribing rules, 
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is 
wrong. It branches itself out indeed into several de¬ 
partments, which constitute altogether but one whole. 
The first and most commanding is that which makes 
the law; the next is that which applies it; the last, 
the power that executes it. The first is called the 
legislative , the second, the judiciary, the third the 
executive. And these are to be found in some form 
or other in every government upon earth ; sometimes 
indeed united in the same hands, and constituting 
then an unbridled tyranny; and sometimes, distinctly 
separated into various departments, and diffusing 


1 5 


their blessings like the dew of heaven, upon the happy 
people who enjoy the good fortune of sitting under 
their benign and salutary influence. But even when 
united, they are distinct exertions of the sovereign 
power ; and when distributed into different branches 
they nevertheless are but parts of the supreme autho¬ 
rity, constituting altogether but one great whole. 

Such then, young gentlemen, I take to be the ori¬ 
gin of government: and it would next be an object 
of amusing speculation, to trace, as far as recorded 
history and the annals of the human family will ena¬ 
ble us, its progress from the earliest times, and its 
rudest forms, to the complicated systems of the pre¬ 
sent day. But the nature of our plan will not enable 
us to go into so extensive an examination, and I must 
accordingly content myself with some general sug¬ 
gestions as to the earlier forms in which the exercise 
of authority, or if you please, of the powers of gov¬ 
ernment, has been displayed by our race. I shall 
scarcely be pardoned I fear for occupying our pre¬ 
cious moments by these matters of vain speculation. 
I shall do so, I assure you, from no partiality of my 
own for such inquiries, but in deference to the duties 
which have been prescribed, to this chair, and doubt¬ 
less so prescribed with a view to the manner in which 
the subject has been treated heretofore in the most 
celebrated schools. 

If we look to the beginning of all things as exhi¬ 
bited in the scriptures, we see the first germ of the 
exercise of power on the one hand, and of the duty 
of obedience on the other, in the connubial state; 
when the Lord said unto the woman, “ thou shalt be 
subject to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.” 
Gen. ch. 3, v. 16. And it is certainly a matter wor¬ 
thy of remark, that in perfect conformity with this 
command, whatever changes have occurred in the 
government of the world, no serious or successful ef¬ 
fort has ever been made to throw off this subjection, 
and to give to the gentler sex an equal influence with 


16 


man in the conduct of public affairs. The story of 
the Amazons is but a fable, and the rule of Semara- 
mis and Dido, of Maria Theresa, and Catharine, of 
Elizabeth and Victoria, are but exceptions to the ge¬ 
neral rule of woman’s subjection and of her unfitness 
to take part in political concerns. The reason of this 
distinction between the sexes is to be traced in their 
very natures, which fit them for different walks, in 
which each is calculated respectively to excel. 

For contemplation he, and valor formed, 

For softness she and sweet attractive grace ; 

His fair large front and eye sublime, declares 
Absolute rule; 

She as a veil, down to the slender waist 
Her golden tresses wears, 

* * in wanton ringlets waved. 

As the vine curls her tendrils, which implies 
Subjection. 

It is however to the parental authority that we 
should look, I think, for the first exhibition of the 
principle of government. Notwithstanding what is 
said by Mr Rutherforth, I think it clear, that if soci¬ 
ety ever had a beginning, “ parental authority and 
the order of domestic life,” as Mr. Paley observes, 
“supplied the first foundations of civil government.”* 
The condition of human infancy renders the authority 
of the parent indispensible on the one hand and the 
obedience of the child unhesitating on the other. Un¬ 
til maturity at least, this relation between them would 
naturally continue unimpaired. But the parent has 
many children, and a family thus would form a small 
community governed by the father as its head. Men 
were thus prepared for larger society by being placed 
from infancy under authority and control, and taught 
the duty of obedience and submission to the rules of 
their little communities. A family thus, as has been 
well said, contains the rudiments of an empire ! The 
authority of one over many and the disposition to 
govern, together with the habit of being governed, 


Paley 305. 1 Black. Com. 47, 48. 




17 


seems in this way incidental to the very nature, and 
coeval with the existence of the human species. It 
furnishes apparently the first steps, by which many 
extensive communities may have been created. The 
authority exercised by the parent in the infancy of 
the child, would naturally be retained, in no incon¬ 
siderable degree after his children had grown up 
and had formed families of their own. The obedi¬ 
ence, of which they remembered not the beginning, 
sustained by the ties of filial affection, and strength¬ 
ened by habitual confidence in that parental wisdom 
which had guided their early footsteps, would be 
generally considered as natural, and would scarcely, 
during the parent’s life, be entirely or abruptly with¬ 
drawn. And if this be so, (as would seem most 
probable,) we have at once the elements of a large 
community under patriarchal government. Such is 
the government of an ancestor presiding over his 
adult descendants. Such was the authority, accor¬ 
ding to scriptural history, of the ancient patriarchs 
over their respective tribes. In the beautiful story 
of Joseph and his brethren, (all of whom, when they 
went down into Egypt to “ buy corn for themselves 
and their little ones, that they might live and not 
die,” were full grown men with families of children, 
and the elder not a little advanced in life,) we see 
the venerable Jacob still retaining, without question 
his authority and influence over the whole. He first 
projects the journey into Egypt, and commands 
them saying, “ get you down into Egypt and buy 
for us corn from thence and through the whole of 
the affecting narrative,the aged patriarch is represent¬ 
ed as retaining over his seed the rights of a parent, 
and speaking to his generation as one having au¬ 
thority. Now if this be a just representation of 
the state of society in the early ages of the world, 
when men lived and flourished for centuries , the 
head of a tribe must, long before he was gathered 
to his fathers, have acquired a numerous body of de- 
3 


18 


scendants, all recognizing his authority and subject 
to his commands. In the nine hundred years of 
Methuselah, there would have been forty-five gene¬ 
rations, allowing 20 years to each, within which time 
his progeny might have reached to many thousands, 
after every allowance made for intermarriages among 
kindred : and though it is true the life of man was 
cut some centuries shorter after the deluge, yet the 
custom of patriarchal government which had com¬ 
menced before, would be still continued, though the 
progeny of the patriarch, accumulating in his life¬ 
time, would certainly have been less. Noah lived 
350 years or 17 generations after the flood, and his 
sons and his sons’ sons also lived for centuries, and 
they and their seed overspread the earth. Myriads 
may have sprung into existence even before his 
death, and his patriarchal government over the whole 
is not intimated to have been impaired, at least as 
far as it could extend itself. 

The death of the ancestor might indeed, on the 
one hand, have a tendency to split up and divide the 
families of his descendants, but on the other, there 
would be the strongest motives for continuing their 
association, of which experience and habit had 
taught them the very great advantages. 

“ Although the original progenitor therefore was 
the centre of the union to his posterity, yet it is not 
probable that the association would be immediately 
or altogether dissolved by his death. Connected by 
habits of intercourse and affection, and by some com¬ 
mon rights, necessities and interests, they would con¬ 
sider themselves as allied to each other in a nearer de¬ 
gree than the rest of the species. Almost all would 
be sensible of an inclination to continue in the soci¬ 
ety in which they had been brought up ; and experi¬ 
encing, as they soon would do, many inconveniences 
from the absence of that authority which their com¬ 
mon ancestor exercised, especially in deciding their 
disputes, and directing their operations in matters in 



19 


which it was necessary to act in conjunction, they 
might be induced to supply his place by a formal 
choice of a successor, or rather might willingly, and 
almost imperceptibly transfer their obedience to some 
one of the family, who, by his age or his services, 
or the energy and vigor of his character, superior or¬ 
der of his abilities, or by the part he possessed in the 
direction of their affairs during the lifetime of the 
parent, had already taught them to respect his ad¬ 
vice, or to attend to his commands; or lastly the 
prospect of these inconveniences might prompt the 
first ancestor to appoint a successor, and his posteri¬ 
ty, from the same motive, united with an habitual 
deference to the ancestor’s authority, might receive 
the appointment with submission. Here then we 
have a tribe or clan incorporated under one chief, 
and thus we have the germ of monarchy. Such 
communities might be increased by considerable 
numbers, and fulfil the purposes of civil union with¬ 
out any other or more regular convention, constitu¬ 
tion, or form of government than what we have de¬ 
scribed. Every branch which was slipped off from 
the primitive stock, and removed to a distance from 
it, would in like manner, take root, and grow into a 
separate clan. Two or three of these clans were 
frequently, we may suppose, united into one. Mar¬ 
riage, couquest, mutual defence, common distress, or 
more accidental coalitions, might produce this effect. 

“ A second source of personal authority, and which 
might easily extend, or sometimes supersede the 
patriarchal, is that which results from military arrange¬ 
ment. In wars, either of aggression or defence, 
manifest necessity would prompt those who fought 
on the same side to array themselves under one leader. 
And although their leader was advanced to this emi¬ 
nence for the purpose only, and during the operations 
of a single expedition, yet his authority would not 
always terminate with the reasons for which it was 
conferred. A warrior who had led forth his tribe 


20 


against their enemies with repeated success, would 
procure to himself, even in the deliberations of peace, 
a powerful and permanent influence. If this advan¬ 
tage were added to the authority of the patriarchal 
chief, or favored by any previous distinction of 
ancestry, it would be no difficult undertaking for the 
person who possessed it to obtain the almost absolute 
direction of the affairs of the community, especially 
if he was careful to associate to himself proper aux¬ 
iliaries, and content to practice the obvious art of 
gratifying or removing those who opposed his preten¬ 
sions ; and here is another germ of monarchy.”— 
Paley, 306, 307. 

But though military enterprise might thus lay the 
foundations of a government, it was not, it would 
seem, the only operative principle, upon which au¬ 
thority has been founded and power obtained over 
man. The priesthood appears to have succeeded 
among the Jews to more than the influence of the pa¬ 
triarch, until at last the restless and dissatisfied nation, 
tired and not without reason, of the nature of their 
institutions, besought the Lord for a king, who was 
granted to their prayers as a punishment for their fol¬ 
ly. Such indeed he was, and I shall have occasion 
elsewhere to recal to you the language of heaven 
through the lips of his prophet, as to the character of 
the scourge which they had sought for as a blessing. 

But though Saul was the first king of the Jews, 
yet the kingly government seems long to have exten¬ 
sively prevailed over the realms of Asia, before his 
accession to the throne of the people of God. Be¬ 
sides the numerous petty kings (who combined to war 
against Gibeon in the days of Joshua) and the kings 
of the Midianites and Mesopotamia whose people “lay 
along in the valley, like grasshoppers for multitude,” 
there were the kings of Syria and Assyria, whose im¬ 
perial cities were Damascus and Babylon, and whose 
history was intimately connected with that of the Jew¬ 
ish people. But profane history which carries us back 


21 


eiany centuries before, affords abundant evidence of 
the earlier establishment of kingly governments else¬ 
where, while here and there we find the germ of oth¬ 
er forms, in the institutions of commercial cities and 
insulated people. The first Assyrian empire, which 
terminated with the effeminate Sardanapalus, who 
fired his palace with his own hand and was consumed 
with his mistresses amidst its splendour, its luxuries 
and its perfumes, had existed more than a thousand 
years under a succession of powerful monarchs, before 
king David ascended the throne of Israel ; and out 
of its ruins had been formed the empire of the Assy¬ 
rians of Babylon and of Nineveh, and the empire of 
the Medes, some centuries before the days of Nebu¬ 
chadnezzar the great king of his day. Egypt too had 
had her kings coeval with Abraham with Isaac antk 
with Jacob ; and Sesostris her greatest monarch was 
anterior, I think, to the days of Moses. Yet all these 
are recent when compared with the dynasties of Chi¬ 
na, which that singular people profess to trace back 
100,000 years. The earth then has been for ages sub- 
jectedto the dominion of a monarch, and it is only here 
and there, that we see man asserting the prerogative of 
self government in comparatively small and insignifi¬ 
cant societies. The states of Greece upon the iEgean 
sea, although at one time following the example of the 
rest of mankind, in submitting to the dominion of a 
monarch, at length threw off despotic rule and esta¬ 
blished republican governments, though diversified 
into as many forms as there were commonwealths or 
cities. The archons of Athens who were elective 
officers were first appointed at an epoch anterior even 
to the reign of David king of Israel; while in two cen¬ 
turies afterwards, upon the borders of the Mediterra¬ 
nean and upon the shores of Africa, Carthage reared 
her head, and rose to wealth and power under insti¬ 
tutions partaking very strongly of republican charac¬ 
ter. In 700 years from her foundation she sunk be¬ 
neath the power of “ Earth’s great mistress, Rome 
3 * 


22 


who after passing through 200 years of monarchical 
government, had herself built up a republic on the 
coast of Italy, which was destined to overrun the 
world and then to suffer in its turn the horrors of a 
ruthless despotism. 

The history of the middle ages furnishes other in¬ 
stances of attempts to establish governments upon the 
principles of freedom. Florence, Genoa and Venice, 
all built up republics, which soon however degener¬ 
ated into haughty aristocracies ; while the larger 
states of Europe settled down with various mo¬ 
difications on the monarchical system which now r 
prevails throughout that continent. Driven from that 
interesting and powerful quarter of the globe, the flag 
of freedom has been unfurled upon the shores of A- 
merica, and our beloved country assumes to herself 
the glory of furnishing an asylum, to liberty within 
the bosom of our flourishing confederacy. It remains 
for us but to search out and to cultivate with care the 
genuine principles of well regulated liberty, that we 
may steer the vessel of state safe from the destructive 
breakers of monarchy on the one hand, and the no 
less fearful whirlpool of licentious and unbridled de¬ 
mocracy on the other. These considerations give a 
deep and abiding interest to political enquiries which 
cannot fail to secure for them your earnest attention, 
and bespeaks also your utmost candor and imparti¬ 
ality. With these enquiries we shall proceed in some 
subsequent lectures, before we enter upon the exami¬ 
nation of the organization and structure of our own 
forms of government. 


23 


LECTURE II. 


EFFECT OF STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY ON NATURAE 
RIGHTS. 

Before we enter upon an examination of the seve¬ 
ral forms of government, which we now see in the 
world, it may not be improper to consider the effect 
of the structure of society upon the rights of those 
who constitute it, whether it be regarded as arising 
out of actual compact, or consider it as only kept to¬ 
gether from a sense of its necessity, upon those prin¬ 
ciples on which alone its original organization could 
have been justly bestowed. 

And first let it be observed that the absolute rights 
of all men, or those which they derive from nature) 
are the same, and therefore equal. If inequality be 
ever found to have existence, it will be seen to spring 
from the institutions of society. I do not now bring 
in question the 'propriety of these distinctions. I only 
insist they cannot have place except in the artificial 
regulations of social life. Reason and the conces¬ 
sions even of the most zealous advocates for distinc¬ 
tions, equally sustain the position of the natural equa¬ 
lity of man. Upon what foundation in reason can a 
difference rest? Two children are born at the same 
time with the same appetites, the same wants, the 
same weakness, the same necessities. They grow 
up with the same rights of self defence, the same right 
to acquire the means of sustenance, and the same 
right of providing for their comfort and happiness. 
If one has superior right to the other which is it? What 
gives superior right ? Is it strength ? Can force give 
right? If it can, the labourer is superior to the lord. Is 
it beauty? If so, the mistress may be found inferior to 
the maid. Is it wit and intelligence ? If so, the clown 



24 


is oft superior to the noble. There is no foundation 
then in nature for inequality of rights. That inequality, 
where it does exist, has its foundation in the artifi¬ 
cial regulations of society. And thus it is, that even 
the courtly commentator remarks, that the mem¬ 
bers who compose civil society were naturally equal, 
and the “ absolute rights which are vested in all by 
the immutable laws of nature” are the principal aim 
of the protection of society.” Mr. Rutherforth too, 
(no little stickler for strong governments) admits, as 
a well known principle, that all men are by nature 
equal; and our forefathers, on the most important 
occasion which has ever occurred since the settle¬ 
ment of this continent by the Europeans, set forth 
in their memorable declaration of independence, the 
solemn truth “ that all men are created equal ; that 
they are endowed by their creator with certain un¬ 
alienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit, of happiness;” a truth which with us is 
no longer held to be debateable, but is placed among 
the aphorisms of politics, upon the footing of those 
axioms, which serve as the firm foundation of ma¬ 
thematical science. Thus it is that we find it at the 
head of our Virginia Bill of rights in the following 
emphatic terms ; “• That all men are by nature equal¬ 
ly free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of so¬ 
ciety they cannot by any compact divest their pos¬ 
terity ; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty with 
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” 

Next let it be remarked that the great end and aim 
and indeed the only legitimate object of the forma¬ 
tion of society is as we have seen, the security and 
protection of its members in the enjoyment of their 
natural rights and in the promotion of their welfare 
and happiness. As Mr. Blackstone well observes, 
Vol. I, 124, “ the principal aim of society is to pro¬ 
tect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute 


25 


fights which were vested in them by the immutable 
laws of nature ; but which could not be preserved 
in peace, without that mutual assistance and inter* 
course, which is gained by the institution, of friendly 
and social communities. Hence it follows that the 
primary end of human laws, is to maintain and re* 
gulate these absolute rights of individuals: and 
therefore the principal view of human laws is, or 
ought always to be, to explain, protect and enforce 
such rights as are absolute, which in themselves are 
few and simple.” And this must be considered 
equally the case, whether we adopt the inadmissible 
position that mankind ever lived in a state of na¬ 
ture, and from running wild, all at once entered, 
with well developed reflection, into the complicated 
agreement which constitutes society; or look upon 
society itself as “ aboriginal” and coeval with man. 
In either case the end and aim is just the same. 
The motive for the formation of society, and the 
motive which holds it together are identical. The 
happiness and protection of its members individu¬ 
ally is the end and aim of every individual. It is 
the end and aim of the creation of the state. The 
state is constituted for individuals ; to enable them 
to be all they ought to be, and to attain to all that 
happiness and perfection, of which their nature is 
susceptible. On the other hand the state is worthy 
of the sacrifice of life, of property, of every enjoy¬ 
ment and of every comfort; for it is the shield and 
protection of individual rights, and is formed upon 
the pledge of all that we have and all that we are, 
for its maintenance and support. Thus it is founded 
upon reciprocity of obligation between itself and its 
members, and if either fails, that obligation is dissolv¬ 
ed. If I break my engagement with it, I merit and 
receive its punishment; and if on the other hand it 
treats me as merely existing for it, demanding every 
thing and giving nothing, the bond is broken and it 
cannot complain if I pursue my happiness in other 


26 


climes and connect my destiny with other institu¬ 
tions. It no longer exists for me. It is not my 
state. 

Taking it then as true that the inherent, essential, 
absolute or primordial rights of all men (for by all 
these epithets have authors distinguished what are 
sometimes called our natural rights) are the same , 
and therefore equal , and considering that the end 
and aim of the institution of society was to promote 
their protection and enjoyment , it would seem to 
follow as a necessary consequence, that the equality, 
which would exist independent of society, cannot be 
disturbed by its formation. For supposing them 
equal, in their original, and supposing that there is an 
equal obligation on all upon associating together to 
maintain the rights of each, we cannot escape from 
the conclusion, that society cannot, consistently with 
the principles upon which it is founded, create an 
inequality in respect of natural rights among those 
who compose it. If bound to protect my rights, it 
is bound to protect my equality which is one of my 
rights. 

But society we must remember is not organized 
government. Society comes first, government suc¬ 
ceeds. Men first associate and finding government 
necessary, they constitute it by express action, or by 
tacit acquiescence in the exercise of power by one 
or more among themselves. Government, in fact 
would be an afterthought. Men did not originally 
congregate with a view to it, because they could not 
a priori be conscious of its necessity. But they 
came together by degrees and most probably formed 
their rude and simple governments by chance or 
tacit acquiescence. Were men indeed, with their 
present acquired knowledge, to be now thrown to¬ 
gether, their first act would probably be to form a 
government suited to their necessities. But few go¬ 
vernments in the world can trace their title to con¬ 
sent. Most have arisen from fraud or usurpation, 


27 


some from peculiar necessity, some from peculiar si* 
tuation. Superior prowess or superior talent places 
the chief at the head of his tribe or clan in the hour 
of danger, and the sweets of power tempt him to 
make that perpetual , which was designed but for the 
necessities of the occasion. But our business being 
to enquire into the legitimate principles upon which 
society may organize government, we must treat the 
matter as though there was a voluntary association 
of individuals in the act of forming a regular gov¬ 
ernment. In the exercise of this power each is en¬ 
titled to the enjoyment of that equality of rights 
which existed between men in the supposed state of 
nature; though as we shall soon see, that equality 
may in some degree be disturbed by the structure of 
government. As to the right of the majority to go¬ 
vern, see 1 Story’s Com. 299. 

The remarks of Mr. Rutherforth on this topic are 
so apposite and clear that they cannot fail to be ac¬ 
ceptable. 

“ When a number of persons who are equal to 
one another, that is, who are free, as all men natu¬ 
rally are free, from any jurisdiction or authority over 
one another, have united themselves into a civil so¬ 
ciety ; the natural result of such an union is a legis¬ 
lative power. But then there is originally no legis¬ 
lative body distinct from the collective body of the 
society. All and each are obliged to conform them¬ 
selves to whatever the whole or the major part shall 
ap-ree upon : but as no one person, nor any select 
number of persons, can have any right to prescribe 
to the rest; so neither is this collective body of men 
naturally obliged to elect or settle a number of repre¬ 
sentatives, who shall have authority to act for them, 
or to determine what is to be done and what to be 
avoided. Each member of the society has originally 
a right to act for himself, as a member, that is, to de¬ 
liberate with the rest, and to give his suffrage upon 
such points as come before them. It is necessary 


29 


therefore to look farther than the compact, by which 
men unite themselves into a civil society, in order to 
find out the origin of any other civil constitution of 
government, besides such an one as is popular or de- 
mocratical in the fullest extent of that word. 

“ There is indeed an original legislative power in 
every civil society ; but some farther act is necessa¬ 
ry, besides the mere union into such a society, be¬ 
fore this power can be naturally vested in any one 
part of the society exclusive of the rest; before a 
king, or the nobles, can have a right of making laws, 
which shall bind the whole; or before the people 
shall be obliged to act by representatives, or to be 
concluded by the sense of any part of the society, 
instead of acting in the collective capacity, so as to 
be concluded by nothing less than the general sense 
of the collective body. All men, before they are 
considered as members of a civil society, are equal 
to one another, and are likewise independent of one 
another ; each has naturally a right to think and to 
act for himself. This independency is in some mea¬ 
sure limited by their entering into civil society. If 
there is no express agreement, yet the very act of en¬ 
tering into such society is a tacit agreement, which 
makes them so far dependent upon the general sense 
and will of the whole body politic, that they are 
from thence obliged to conform themselves to that 
general sense and will. But if they are considered 
merely as members of a civil society ; if nothing more 
is supposed to have passed, besides that agreement, 
either express or tacit, by which they united them¬ 
selves into such a society; they would still have a 
civil equality: this union though it has produced a 
legislative power, has not lodged it in any particular 
hands ; it leaves each member as free to act for him¬ 
self in a civil capacity, as he before was in a natural 
capacity. From hence then it follows, that the obli¬ 
gation of being subject to a legislative power in any 
one man, or in any body of men, though this body is 


29 


within the society, if it is different from the whole 
collective body, is a farther abridgment of natural 
liberty, than what arises merely from the agreement, 
by which mankind unite themselves into civil soci¬ 
eties. But every abridgment of liberty, which is 
made without our consent, either express or impli¬ 
ed, is contrary to the law of nature. No civil con¬ 
stitution of government therefore, which is not pure¬ 
ly democratical, can be established consistently with 
the law of nature, without a farther agreement be¬ 
tween those, who are members of the same civil so¬ 
ciety : we may indeed say, that without such an 
agreement no constitution of government, that we 
know of, or read of, could have been formed : because 
there does not appear ever to have been any consti¬ 
tution so entirely democratical, as to allow every 
member an equal suffrage in all matters of legislative 
power. In the most popular forms of government, 
persons of no fortune, women, and such as are in 
their civil minority, whether they are in their natu¬ 
ral minority or not, are usually excluded from hav¬ 
ing any share in the exercise of the legislative power. 

“ There is no great difficulty in conceiving, that 
no single person can claim the legislative power in a 
civil society, in consequence of that compact only, 
by which the several members united themselves into 
one body, with a view of preserving their rights and 
of advancing a general good. An exclusive legisla¬ 
tive power in a king must plainly be the effect of 
some farther compact. Nor is it more difficult to 
understand, that there cannot without such farther 
compact be any such thing, as an aristocratical con¬ 
stitution of government. There is not naturally in 
any civil society, merely as a civil society, any select 
and standing body of men with an exclusive legisla¬ 
tive power. Whenever a power of this sort is lodg¬ 
ed in such a legislative body, it must, in order to be 
consistent with the natural rights of mankind, have 
been lodged there by some other act, besides the or- 
4 


30 


joinal agreement, tipon which the society was form¬ 
ed. The necessity of supposing such a subsequent 
act is not so apparent in democratical constitutions. 
But yet it will, upon enquiry, be found necessary to 
suppose such a compact; if we consider what con¬ 
stitutions are called democratical. In many consti¬ 
tutions, which are so called, the legislative power is 
vested in the representatives of the people, and is not 
exercised by the collective body. Here then we 
plainly find another compact besides that, which 
formed the society : at least we find an act of elect¬ 
ing such a representative body and of delegating the 
legislative power to it: which act is different from 
the original compact, that joins the several indivi¬ 
duals into one civil society.” 2 Rutherforth p. 81. 84. 

Let us then see how far society composed of in¬ 
dividuals having equal rights has power in the or¬ 
ganization and structure of its government to break 
down that equality by creating unequal privileges 
among its members. Now, the very act of entering 
into society supposes the right in man to surrender 
some portion of his natural rights in return for be¬ 
nefits received. To this extent then it would seem 
that natural rights are alienable and may be subject¬ 
ed to restraint: for the natural right of acting with¬ 
out control, is certainly surrendered by submitting 
to the control of society. And so of many other 
rights. Consent then is sufficient to limit and con¬ 
trol our rights, with some admitted exceptions, as 
the right to life and liberty ; and this consent it ig 
which each man gives when society establishes go¬ 
vernment. Each consents to the act of formation 
however he may dissent from particular provisions. 
For having, by the act of association, bound himself 
to abide by the decision of the majority, he is bound 
by that decision though in conflict with his own pe¬ 
culiar views. No government could be formed or 
could exist on other principles, for in no community 
could unanimity of rule or action be expected, and if 


31 


no provision could be adopted except what was ac¬ 
ceptable to every individual, nothing could ever be 
effected. 

Now in the organization of government very many 
provisions may be legitimately adopted which how¬ 
ever general and equal in their bearing, may never¬ 
theless in their operation seem unequal and oppres¬ 
sive. Acting for the general good of all, society in 
the formation of government must so provide as that 
the agents invested with its authority may be com¬ 
petent to the discharge of the responsible duties com¬ 
mitted to them. It must therefore in the selection of 
those agents require certain qualifications, and by 
this means some would be rendered incompetent 
while others would not be so. Yet this is no vio¬ 
lation of equality of rights. It results only from 
inequality of condition, inequality of talent, inequal¬ 
ity of moral qualities. This inequality of condition 
among men of unequal talent, unequal strength, un¬ 
equal capacities of acquirement, is the natural con¬ 
sequence of equality of rights. To keep all men 
by forced regulations ('agrarian laws and such like) 
in an equal condition would be to take away from 
the highly gifted, the vigorous, the prudent and the 
wise their natural right to enjoy these their natural 
advantages. Had they remained in a state of na¬ 
ture, their conditions would have been superior and 
it would be a violation of the legitimate principles of 
society to take away from them, that superiority. 
Pari ratione, it is evident that to preserve equality 
of rights it is not necessary that all should be equally 
elevated to responsible stations in society : for to 
put into office me who am unfit, equally with you 
who are fit for it, is to take away from you the ad¬ 
vantage of your superiority, and to place me on a 
level with you without half your merit. If A can 
write and B cannot write, is it a violation of equali¬ 
ty of rights that A may be a clerk but B shall not ? 
If A be a skilful jurist and B an ignorant clown, is it 


32 


y a violation of right that A may be elected Judge but 
B shall not? On the contrary would it not grossly 
violate equality of right, to provide that those who 
are not qualified for office may fill it equally with 
those who are qualified ? The truth is, society is to 
protect equality of rights by equality in legislation; 
by equal laws bearing equally upon every class; and 
by leaving open to all the fair opportunity of plac¬ 
ing themselves on an equality of condition, as well 
as of rights with others. And if there be some who 
cannot, and others who will not place themselves on 
such equality, it is their fault or their misfortune, and 
not the wrong or injury of society. 

But this is not all. The submission to the will of 
society in establishing such institutions as it may 
deem best calculated to promote the happiness of all, 
will bind its members to submit to that which is with¬ 
out question unequal, either because the inequality 
is otherwise compensated, or because the good of all 
demands it. Thus in the constitution of the United 
States we see the great states assenting to the une¬ 
qual power in the Senate of the smaller states with 
a view to reconcile them to the federal union. But 
no one looks on this as a violation of the rights of the 
larger states, since it was the voluntary act of all the 
contracting parties. So the provision which excludes 
the female sex from the privilege of voting, of hold¬ 
ing office, of mingling in the affairs of the state and 
of partaking those benefits which government scat¬ 
ters among the eager expectants of its favor, un¬ 
questionably trenches upon woman’s natural rights; 
for as has been truly observed women, as well as 
men, have a natural right to their liberty, before they 
join themselves to civil society, and have, as well as 
men, a right to act as members of such society after 
they have so joined themselves to it. The conse¬ 
quence of which is, that till some act of the society, 
subsequent to its formation, has by general consent 
excluded woman from a right of suffrage, they might 


33 


naturally claim it. So too with youth. The fun¬ 
damental law which denies them the privileges of 
electing or being elected to office while under twen¬ 
ty one, though the burden of military service is cast 
upon them at eighteen, is an apparent violation of 
the principle of equality. But no one questions the 
validity of these or other principles, which have 
found their way into the structure of government, 
however unequal they may seem in their operation. 
Women therefore can no more complain of their 
exclusion from the polls or from public office than 
men can complain that women are exempted from 
militia duty, and are thus relieved from the exposure 
of their lives, and the innumerable hardships of a 
military campaign. See 2 Leiber, 253-4-5-6. See 
also 1 Story 396. Minors have still less reason to 
complain, since they but submit now to a privation 
which all others have suffered before them. Paupers 
have no reason to complain, that places are denied 
to them ; for the right of society to choose its agents 
is complete, and it would be absurd to select those to 
manage its affairs, whose condition so conclusively 
proves their incapacity to manage their own. By 
parity of reason society has a right to prescribe in 
the fundamental law the qualification of a voter. If’ 
he is a felon shall he be permitted to mingle his pol¬ 
luted vote with those of freemen ? If he is a beg¬ 
gar shall he be invested with the franchise of a citi¬ 
zen, which his necessities may prompt him to sell to 
the highest bidder ? And is it a violation of natural 
right to refuse it? Is the inequality, an inequality 
of right, or an inequality of condition , for which he 
has no one to blame but himself ? The latter assu¬ 
redly, for as soon as he will remove that inequality, 
he is elevated to a level with those who exercise the 
suffrages of the country. However therefore I may 
have doubted the extent to which at one time the 
right of suffrage was limited, I never had a doubt of 
the legitimacy of the limitation. It is within the le- 
4* 


34 


gitimate sphere of the powers of society, to institute 
these and many other distinctions in the arrange¬ 
ment of political rights and social duties. For though 
all have equal title to the natural rights of life, liber¬ 
ty and property, yet it is as impossible that there 
should be a perfect equality of 'political rights in any 
system of government, as that there should be an 
equality of conditions. For as nature herself has 
declared the latter to be impossible, since phy¬ 
sical inequality of strength or of capacity must ne¬ 
cessarily lead to inequality of acquisition, so the in¬ 
stitutions of society declare the former to be impos¬ 
sible because women and children and other disqual¬ 
ified persons are unfitted to discharge the political 
duties which may be safely entrusted to others. The 
argument indeed may be cut short, by placing ex¬ 
clusion from political right upon the unquestionable 
right of exclusion from the body politic. 

But though in a few very peculiar cases, it is legi¬ 
timate in society to make distinctions which trench 
upon the great principle of equality of political 
rights, yet such distinctions should be rarely admit¬ 
ted ; as they are in their spirit subversive of the very 
object of the association. For all men were by na¬ 
ture free and equal. Neither had any pretension of 
superiority to another ; and even the child, born to 
day, of noble parents, derives from nature no higher 
privileges than the despised and destitute beggar’s 
brat. His only claims rest upon the artificial regu¬ 
lations of society which in this respect violates its 
obligation to protect equally the rights of all, save 
when the safety or the advantage of the community 
shall otherwise require; and this can never be truly 
affirmed of a distinction between infants in the cra¬ 
dle. If all men therefore were equal, and if on en¬ 
tering society the object was the maintenance of the 
rights of all, it never can be consistent with that 
object, to create inequality of rights and privileges 
among separate classes. 



35 


It is this outrage upon the rights of man which 
furnishes a just occasion for the censures of the just, 
and sooner or later will inevitably lead to resistance 
and rebellion by the oppressed. 


LECTURE III. 


OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND OF THE CONSTITUTION OR 
FORM OF GOVERNMENT. 

From what has been said in the preceding lecture 
I flatter myself it has sufficiently appeared that so¬ 
ciety was instituted on the one hand for the common 
benefit of all its members and on the other that eve¬ 
ry individual who entered into it must have been un¬ 
derstood to submit himself to such regulations as 
should be ordained for the benefit of the whole com¬ 
munity. This power of ordaining was of necessity 
in the society itself; for to its regulations submis¬ 
sion was engaged. But this power of ordaining 
what others are bound to obey, is the power of ma¬ 
king laws. For law is a rule of action prescribed by 
a competent power commanding what is right and 
prohibiting what is wrong. And the power which 
thus makes the law must be the supreme power in 
the state. For as I have elsewhere said it is of the 
essence of law to derive its force from a superior 
power: since if there be a power actually superior 
to that which declares the law, it is no law to that 
superior. In the first stages of society indeed, the 
body politic alone has no rival for that power. All 
men are supposed to have agreed to submit them¬ 
selves to its law and the supreme power by conse- 




36 


quence is vested in it. The legislative power how¬ 
ever could not conveniently be exercised by the 
great body of the community; and the first act of 
that body therefore would be, to ordain, constitute 
and appoint a portion of the society to exercise the 
duties of ordinary legislation and the various func¬ 
tions which it must have been at once foreseen were 
indispensable and yet could not be discharged by a 
mass. But this act of organizing an ordinary legis¬ 
lature, and distributing the different functions, which 
are rendered necessary by society, among various 
officers and departments, is the act of forming a con¬ 
stitution or form of government. And the act of 4 
forming the constitution, (which is to be a law to 
the lawgiver, a binding and obligatory rule for the 
government itself) is obviously an act of supreme 
and sovereign power. Nothing is above it! every 
thing is beneath it! nothing has legal existence but 
by its fiat! every thing is obliged to bend to its be¬ 
hests. What more is wanting to constitute supreme 
power ? 

Society then before it has organized government 
is supreme. After it is organized, has it parted with 
its supremacy ? Is its sovereign power transferred 
to the creature of its will, or does it retain its supre¬ 
macy notwithstanding it has vested the powers of 
ordinary legislation in a body appointed by itself? 
These are interesting questions which have long been 
the subject of controversy between the advocates of 
the different forms of government, but with us have 
ever been considered as settled in favor of the so¬ 
vereignty of the people. By the second and the 
third articles of the bill of rights of Virginia it is de¬ 
clared “ that all power is vested in and consequently 
derived from the people; that government is or 
ought to be instituted for their common benefit; and 
that when it is found inadequate to the great purpo¬ 
ses of producing happiness and safety, a majority of 
the community hath an unalienable and indefeasible 


37 


right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner 
as shall be judged most conducive to the public 
weal.” Here then is a distinct assertion of sove¬ 
reignty in the people ; of its continuation (notwith¬ 
standing the organization of government) and of the 
right to reform, to alter or abolish it, at their discre¬ 
tion. Whatever therefore may be the case else¬ 
where, government here has been established by the 
voluntary act of the people ; who have granted cer¬ 
tain specified powers to their agents for its adminis¬ 
tration, which agents are responsible for the manner 
in which they may discharge the delegated trust. 
The government itself thus constituted is but the 
agent, indeed, of the society or people. It is in¬ 
vested with all its authority by them, and the instru¬ 
ment by which it has been called into existence, is 
the constitution of the state. That constitution is 
antecedent to the government, and the government 
is but its creature. It is no act of the government, 
itself, but it is an act of the people, in the organiza¬ 
tion and structure of the government. It is there¬ 
fore not within the power of the government to alter 
it. They cannot change or abolish what was not 
the work of their hands, but the fiat of their supe¬ 
rior. An attempt to do so is treason against those, 
to whom they owe their authority and being. If it 
could succeed, the government would be felo de se, 
for they would with their own hands have destroyed 
the vital principle of their own existence. 

Hear what has been forcibly said by one of the 
luminaries of the bench of the Supreme Court, 
“ What,” says Judge Patterson, 2 Dali. 308 “is a 
constitution ? It is the form of government, deline¬ 
ated by the mighty hand of the people, in which 
certain first principles of fundamental laws are esta¬ 
blished. The constitution is certain and fixed: it 
contains the permanent will of the people, and is 
the supreme law of the land.” In whom then is 
the sovereignty, if not in those, by whom the su- 


38 


preme law has been enacted ; a law to which the pub¬ 
lic authorities must bow, and which the people only 
can alter or repeal; “for it is paramount to the power 
of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered, 
only by the authority that made it. The life giving 
principle, and the death doing stroke must proceed 
from the same hand. What are legislatures! Crea¬ 
tures of the constitution ! They derive their pow¬ 
ers from the constitution. It is their commission, 
and therefore all their acts must be conformable 
thereto, or they will be void. The constitution is 
the work or the will of the people themselves, in their 
original , sovereign and unlimited capacity. Law 
is the work of the legislature, in their derivative 
and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of 
the creator, the other of the creature. The consti¬ 
tution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative au¬ 
thority, and prescribes the orbit, within which it 
must move. In short, the constitution is the sun of 
the political system, around which all legislative, ex¬ 
ecutive, and judicial bodies must revolve. What¬ 
ever may be the case in other countries, yet in this, 
there can be no doubt, that every act of the legisla¬ 
ture repugnantto the constitution is absolutely void.” 

Nothing can be more clear, or more forcible, than 
this beautiful exposition of the theory of constitu¬ 
tions, and of the principles of those governments, 
which have been established by written constitu¬ 
tions, in the United States of America. I might 
therefore consider myself as wholly absolved from 
the necessity of discussing the question, whether 
any legitimate form of government can have exis¬ 
tence, upon any other principles ; yet I must beg 
leave to say, that my own convictions as to these 
fundamental truths rests not upon the authority of 
names however great, nor even upon the solemn de¬ 
claration of rights of this ancient commonwealth; 
but upon the plain and as I think incontrovertible 
principles of natural law. For we have already seen 




39 


that before government was established, society , that 
is the people, were confessedly supreme. See Ru- 
therforth andBlackstone,where before quoted. Ifthen 
they were once the sovereign, the act by which they 
disrobed themselves of supreme power must be 
clearly shewn, or the power must remain where it 
was originally vested ; even if we should admit, 
that it is within the competency of any people, to 
surrender irrevocably their liberties, and right of self 
government, into the hands of a master. Nay more, 
the act from which such surrender is inferred, must 
be distinct and unequivocal. It must admit of no other 
interpretation. For if it can be satisfied, by consider¬ 
ing the establishment of a government as the mere 
creation of an agent ,—to do that in limited assem¬ 
blies which'could not be accomplished by the mass,— 
upon every principle of fair construction the infer¬ 
ence cannot be carried farther. Again ; whatever 
may be the presumption of acquiescence, from the 
patient endurance of the people,—always more rea¬ 
dy to suffer evils, while evils are tolerable, than to 
assert their rights at the expense of the peace and 
harmony of society,—yet such presumption is not 
reasonable where the ingenious mechanism of arbi¬ 
trary power, sustained and enforced by standing ar¬ 
mies, suppress the freedom of will, and stifle the 
groans of an oppressed and afflicted people. In such 
cases we can infer nothing from silence, we can draw 
no conclusion from the submission of the slave. 
“ The waveless calm, the slumber of the dead,” af¬ 
fords but feeble evidence of contentment and sa¬ 
tisfaction, of free acquiescence in things as they are, 
or of unnatural approbation of the indescribable hor¬ 
rors of an iron despotism. For the Turk or the 
bashaw have at least as much quiet in their domin¬ 
ions as Victoria or her predecessors have ever had 
in theirs ; and if submission be evidence of assent, 
may challenge for their gloomy and unrelenting ty¬ 
ranny the approbation of unresisting slaves. Rome 


40 


was as quiet under the bloody Domitian from the 
dread of his ferocity, as in the palmy days of Titus 
from the admiration of his virtues; and the reign of 
the monster Nero was as little disturbed by open re- 
bellion as the benign dominion of the illustrious 
Trajan, or the gentle rule of the peaceful Antoninus. 
And coming home to our own institutions we have 
in the slave states an instance before our eyes of the 
facility and the security too with which the organiz¬ 
ed power of a few may hold in the most abject sub¬ 
jection thousands of living beings until they lbse the 
sense of degradation in the habits of servitude from 
generation to generation. Let it never be said then 
when we see man degraded and oppressed that he 
is contented and happy, because he is submissive 
and quiet. 

Now it seems to be very generally admitted that 
no government which now exists, except those of 
our own country, was ever ordained and organized 
by a written constitution. “ All the governments that 
now exist in the world” says Mr. McIntosh “ except 
the United States, have been fortuitously formed. 
They are the produce of chance not the work of art. 
They have been altered, impaired, improved, and 
destroyed by accidental circumstances beyond the 
foresight or control of wisdom. * * * They 

cannot be supposed to derive their existence from 
the free consent of the people. * * * It is the 

great, and I had almost said the peculiar happiness 
of the people of the United States, that their con¬ 
stitutions respectively rest upon this foundation.” 

“ The origin of all governments,” says the author of 
the rights of man, “ may be comprehended under 
three heads, superstition, power, and the common 
rights of man. The first were governments of priest¬ 
craft, through the medium of oracles; the second, 
being founded in power the sword assumed the name 
of sceptre; the third is compact;” and of this our 
own governments were his examples. So much for 


41 


the views of the advocates of free government. The 
most devoted admirers of monarchy stickle for the 
same opinion. Thus Mr. Paley treats the idea 
of the social compact as false in fact, and refers 
to our own revolution as furnishing the nearest ap¬ 
proach to it, of any of which history has preserved the 
account or memory.” And Mr. Blackstone, the 
great champion of the British form of government, 
rests the institutions of the state, not upon original 
contract, which he says, has in no instance perhaps 
ever been formally expressed, but upon an implied 
contract which must always be understood from the 
very act of association. 

If then, governments which now exist in the world, 
are not founded upon express compact, there can 
have been no express transfer from society, (or the 
people who constitute it) of that sovereignty which 
confessedly was originally vested in it. If it be 
transferred, that transfer can only be inferred from 
voluntary acquiescence, and we have already seen 
how little can justly be presumed from it . It can 
be scarcely necessary, farther to demonstrate this, by 
a reference to the gloomy despotisms of the Asiatic 
continent, or the absolute monarchies of civilized 
Europe. If in the comparatively free institutions of 
that country from which we sprung, it shall appear 
that no voluntary surrender of the sovereignty of the 
people can by any means be implied, if it shall ap¬ 
pear that the institutions of England are the offspring 
of force, if we shall find occasional smugglings 
among her gallant people for centuries, to diminish 
the weight of their fetters, and to reconquer from 
their masters, a portion of their natural liberties, we 
shall have little reason to conclude, I think, that 
there has been a voluntary surrender of their rights 
by the people; notwithstanding their acquiescence 
in the system of government which grew out of usur¬ 
pation and conquest, but which had been so far mo¬ 
dified by their efforts, as to be now deemed less in- 
5 


42 


tolerable than the throes of a revolution. Such is 
truly the state of facts. In the course of these lec¬ 
tures, I may possibly have occasion to treat of this 
matter more at large. At present it will suffice to 
remark that the government of England is distinctly 
in its original a government of force. Even before 
the invasion of the Normans, a monarchy of a very 
absolute character had existence, and though it is 
alleged that parliament existed, yet it is admitted 
that they were called together by the crown, and 
contained no infusion of the commons. r l he parli¬ 
ament was the magnum concilium regis, the con - 
ventus magnatum vel prccert m, though it is said 
to have been sometimes called, communitys regni 
Anglicce. 1 B. C. 148. But as there can be found 
no earlier traces of the summons of the commons to 
parliament than the reign of Henry III., in 1266, we 
may fairly infer, that previous to the conquest and 
for a long time after, the magnates only constituted 
this great council of the nation. The people, then, 
were subjugated, and held in slavery by the arbitra¬ 
ry power of kings and nobles. Be this as it may, 
the invasion of William the Conqueror was as com¬ 
plete a conquest as was ever recorded in the annals 
of the world. Mr. Blackstone indeed struggles hard 
to shew that this was not the case. But when we 
reflect upon indisputable facts in the history of that 
event, facts which are interwoven not only with the 
history, but with the civil polity of the nation, we 
cannot resist the force of this powerful evidence. 
Take but those facts which Mr. Blackstone's work 
itself has presented, and what must be your conclu¬ 
sion. He tells us, vol. 2, p. 45 in giving the consti¬ 
tution of the feudal system, that it had its original 
from the military policy of the northern conquerors,. 
who brought it from their own countries, and conti¬ 
nued it in their conquered colonies to secure their 
new acquisitions ; to that end large districts were al¬ 
lotted by the conquering general to his officers, w ho 


43 


dealt them out again to their inferiors. Thus it is 
clear that they not only conquered the country but 
also seized upon the lands, and granted them out to 
their followers. This polity had been even intro¬ 
duced before the conquest, as he tells us, but was 
never received, (at least not universally , and as 
part of the national constitution) till the time of Wil¬ 
liam the Norman, p. 48. Here then is a negative, 
pregnant with the affirmative , that in William’s 
reign it was universally received as part of the na¬ 
tional constitution. He tells us afterwards it was 
gradually established, bv the Norman barons, in 
such forfeited lands as they received from the gift 
of the conqueror. “ Certain it is” says he, “ the 
Normans began to gain very large possessions in 
England no doubt by the distribution of these for¬ 
feited lands which the conqueror seized by right of 
conquest. It seems too that those whose possessions 
had not been wrested from them, saved them only 
by consenting to surrendeCthem, and to take back 
a feudal gift with all the feudal consequences. In 
doing so they took the oath of fealty or fidelity, 
which, as the Commentator tells us, was a profession 
of faith to the lord by the vassal; besides which, 
upon investiture , he usually did homage to his lord ; 
openly and humbly kneeling , and being ungirt and 
uncovered, and holding up his hands, both together 
between those of the lord, who sate before him ; and 
there, professing, that he did become his man , from 
that day forth, of life and limb and earthly honor ; 
and then he received a kiss from his lord.” page 53. 
Add to this, that it became a fundamental maxim, 
and necessary principle, (though in reality says Mr. 
Blackstone a mere fiction) that the king is the uni¬ 
versal lord, and original proprietor of all lands in 
his kingdom, and that no man can, or doth possess 
any part of it, but what has, either mediately or im¬ 
mediately, been derived as a gift from him, to be 
held upon feudal services ; and that mind must be 


44 


strangely constituted which cannot see every feature 
of conquest in the transaction. In vain may Mr. 
Blackstone allege that this was but a fiction ; and 
that the English, whose estates were not seized as 
forfeited, were persuaded to enter into this arrange¬ 
ment. Were the feudal burdens but a fiction which 
were its inevitable consequence? Were the aids, 
and primer seizins, and wardships, and all the other 
vexatious appendages of feudal tenure, nothing but 
a fiction ? (See 2 B. C. 76.) Were the rents or 
services payable for their own lands, nothing but a 
fiction ? Was the degrading homage and the mili¬ 
tary subserviency it imposed nothing but a fiction ? 
Was pure villenage nothing but a fiction? B. C. 
vol. 2, 93. Unhappily for them, it was a sad real¬ 
ity, under which they groaned through many an irop 
reign ! And as to persuasion ! What persuasion is 
that which is urged by “ man and steel, the soldier 
and the sword ?” It was the persuasion of stern ne¬ 
cessity ; reluctantly yielded to by a conquered peo¬ 
ple, and enforced by the sons of rapine, eager to 
reap the harvest of their prowess, and the reward of 
their pseudo chivalry. 

There never was indeed a more complete and en¬ 
tire conquest than that of William and his barons. 
The most distinguished historian of the English 
monarchy, (see Mr. Hume’s England, chapter 4,) 
places this matter beyond any reasonable doubt; 
and since I prepared what has been already said 
upon the subject, I have had the gratification of 
looking into the work of a French writer, whose in¬ 
telligence and research leave no longer reason even 
for cavil. It is the history of the Norman conquest 
by M. Thierry, who sustains himself by references to 
Dooms-day book, and other sources of information, 
derived in a great degree from the early chronicles of 
England. From these it appears vol. 1,326, that the 
subjugation of the kingdom was complete ; that the 
lands and goods of all who had fallen in battle, or who 


45 


had borne arms against the conqueror and survived 
the defeat, or who had been delayed in repairing to the 
standard of their country,were seized and confiscated. 

The children of the former were declared to be disin¬ 
herited ; the surviving combatants were glad even to 
come off with their lives, and those who did not 
reach the battle, were despoiled, for their intention 
of being there. Nay more, every movement was 
made the foundation of new confiscations, until the 
greater part of the kingdom passed into the hands 
of the Normans. Those only who had tamely submit- ^ 
ted escaped the general destiny, and even those were / 
compelled to surrender their possessions to the 
crown or to a noble, and take them back upon con¬ 
dition of doing homage and fealty to their new and 
arbitrary masters. “ Tous les indigenes/’ says Mr. 
Thierry, page 330, “ furent desarmes, et contraints 
de jurer obeissance et fidelite au nouveau chef, s 
impose par la lance et Tepee.” The followers of 
the conqueror who had done homage to him for lands 
which ivere yet to be conquered , reserved those of 
the English who were dispossessed. The captains 
had vast domains, and castles and villages and en¬ 
tire towns. Peveril of the Peak, whose name has 
been revived in modern romance by the pen of Sir 
Walter Scott, (the hero of the novel, was of the time 
of -Charles IT. and in his day but little was left of 
these splendid possessions of his ancestor.) received 
for his share fifty five.manors in the province, (or 
shire of Nottingham,) and in the town itself. 48 Mer¬ 
chant shops, 12 houses of men at arms and 8 be¬ 
longing to the English farmers. From these exam¬ 
ples we may learn the severity of that tyranny which 
followed the conquest, and the entire subjugation of 
the English people by their Norman invaders. 

The inference which I would draw from this fact, 
in reference to the subject under examination, is. 
that the government of England did not originate in .J. 
voluntary acquiescence on the part of the people and 



46 


that of consequence there was on their part no sur¬ 
render or transfer of that sovereignty which we have 
seen originally belonged to them of right, and of 
which they could not be rightfully deprived without 
their assent. 

I proceed next to observe, that the progress of 
things, in the English nation, as little justifies the 
notion of the surrender of the right of the people to 
alter, amend, or to change their civil polity, as the 
original establishment of the government itself. 
That was an usurpation, by which the rights of the 
people were wrested from their hands. The course 
of things ever since, has involved the assertion of 
the sovereignty of the people, and of their right to 
control the harsh and tyrannical action of their ru¬ 
lers. The first great measure of this description, to 
which I will refer you, is the charter which was ex¬ 
torted from the fears of King John ; a monarch as 
dastard in spirit, as tyrannical in disposition. In 
that great charter were included provisions which 
placed certain definitive limits to the power of the 
crown, and protected the liberties of the subject, 
from the gross invasions which had been freely prac¬ 
ticed under arbitrary rule. The next instance which 
may be given is the change of constitution which 
brought Charles the I. to the block, and placed 
Cromwell in the protectorate ; and lastly the revolu¬ 
tion of 1688, which deposed the last of the Stuarts, 
and placed king William on the throne of England. 
In all these acts we see the exertion of a power by 
the people in whole or in part, to control the conduct 
of those who held the reins of public authority, and 
even to amend, to alter and to change, what had been 
considered as firmly established for centuries. 

Nor indeed do I understand these positions to be 
assailed except upon a ground which is altogether 
technical. See Paley,324. I understand even Mr. 
Hume, vol. 2, 90, as admitting, and asserting the 
perpetual and unalienable right of the people, to in- 


41 


sist upon the great objects for which society is found¬ 
ed, to wit, the equal distribution of justice, and the 
free and secure enjoyment of property ; rights, which 
he tells us, no time, nor precedent, nor statute, nor 
positive institution, ought to deter them from keep¬ 
ing ever uppermost in their thoughts and attention. 
And Mr. Blackstone, though he assumes unbounded 
power for parliament, and denies any legal rights, 
according to the British constitution, to alter or re¬ 
form the government, except by its authority, yet he 
does not contest the right of revolution; and this 
right of revolution is but the exercise of popular so¬ 
vereignty, in correcting the mischiefs and modifying 
the forms of the existing government. In our fu¬ 
ture speculations, therefore, we shall take it as suffi¬ 
ciently established, that the sovereign power is to be 
regarded as of right in the great body of the people. 

I may perhaps be considered as having devoted 
too much of our time to the establishment of the 
important principle of the sovereignty of the people. 
I have done so, however, first, because I conceive 
that principle to lie at the foundation of all our insti¬ 
tutions. Secondly, because in the course of a pretty 
long life, I have had occasion very frequently to hear 
the sovereignty of the people sneered at, if not open¬ 
ly denied ; and thirdly, because the proof of its exis¬ 
tence, its exercise, and the admission of it even by 
high toned British jurists, may (in the event of these 
crude thoughts ever being ushered into the world) 
have the effect of removing any doubt about the 
principle, in the minds of those who have entertain¬ 
ed the high estimate of the British constitution which 
Mr. Adams has set upon it. On the other hand let 
me observe, that no one can be more opposed than 
myself, to the indiscriminate and habitual resort to 
the exercise of this sanatory power, except in the 
modes prescribed by the constitution. It is—or at 
least it should be the ultima ratio —resorted to only, 
where mischiefs are no longer to be borne. It is 


48 


the medicine of the constitution, and I would not 
have that medicine for my daily bread. We must 
not however conclude that the sovereignty is always 
in those hands in which it ought to be. Force or 
fraud, have, from the beginning of the world to the 
present day, been most successfully exerted in de¬ 
priving man of his natural rights. When this is the 
case—where by usurpation the power de facto is in 
an absolute monarch, the sovereignty is indeed in 
his hands so long as his rule continues ; though be 
holds and exercises it not by right but by wrong. 
For as I have said elsewhere, Tuck. Com. Book 1, 
p. 4, in commenting on a criticism of Judge Tucker 
upon a remark of Mr. Blackstone, “It is of the es¬ 
sence of law to derive its force from a superior pow¬ 
er, for if there be a power actually superior to that 
which declares the law, it is no law to that superior. 
It is of no moment whether the power be dejure or 
not. If it be de facto , it possesses the power of 
enforcing obedience to its commands; and in this 
sense, it is strictly true, that sovereignty and legis¬ 
lature are convertible terms. Thus the parliament 
and king of Great Britain de facto hold the supreme 
power in that kingdom, according to the principles 
of their government, though the power de jure re¬ 
sides in the people. So the Russian autocrat holds 
de facto the sovereign power, and his ukase is a law 
to his subjects whether he exercises this sovereign 
and legislative power de jure or not. It does not 
follow, that those who have right on their side must 
be supreme, but that nothing can give law, which 
is not supreme, seems incontrovertible.” Nor are 
these views incompatible with the fact that the acts 
of our legislative body are binding on the citizens. 
It binds them as individuals , although they form a 
competent part of that mass, in which the sovereign¬ 
ty resides, and which is of course superior to the le¬ 
gislature itself. It binds them precisely on the same 
principle on which they would be bound, if the law 


49 


were enacted by the whole people in a primary as¬ 
sembly. Though forming a constituent part of that 
assembly, they would be bound individually by any 
law which it shall enact: and the legislature being 
its agent, its servant, its locum tenens, the laws, which 
it declares, are but the act of the whole body, and 
are obligatory therefore upon every member which 
composes it. 

I cannot quit this subject, however, without again 
adverting to the passages referred to in Blackstone, 
and remarking, that the great difference between 
the exercise of the supreme and ultimate corrective 
power of the nation in the United States and Great 
Britain, is, that with us the alternation, amendment 
and change of our constitution and forms of go¬ 
vernment is mainly provided for by the fundamental 
law itself; whereas in Great Britain those grievances 
for which there is no stated remedy or express legal 
provision, are only to be redressed by revolution; 
for they are to be left “ to the prudence of the times 
to provide new remedies upon new emergencies,” 
and to exert those inherent, though latent powers of 
society , which no climate, no time, no constitution, 
no contract, can ever destroy or diminish.” And 
herein may be discerned the very great advantages 
of our system of written constitutions; since, un¬ 
der them, the most vital changes may be made when 
necessary, without any material agitation of the po¬ 
litical body, whereas in England they can only be 
effected amid the throes of a revolution. 


50 


LECTURE IV. 


THE GREAT OBJECTS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS. 

If I have been successful in establishing that the 
great object of the institution of society is the pro¬ 
motion of the security, the happiness, and the pros¬ 
perity of those who compose it, it would seem to fol¬ 
low as a necessary consequence, that that is the best 
government, which is best calculated to promote 
these beneficent and salutary purposes. It unfortu¬ 
nately happens, however, that mankind have never 
been of one opinion on this important subject. Some 
are dazzled by the splendors of monarchy, others by 
the pride and noble bearing (as it seems to them) 
of a haughty aristocracy, while others have been 
enamoured with the charms of democratical govern¬ 
ment, in which the whole society exercise in person, 
the united powers of law makers, judges and execu¬ 
tive. Monarchy, indeed, seems to have prevailed 
most universally, and the most powerful and vigor¬ 
ous understandings, and the most glowing and ner¬ 
vous eloquence have been employed in sustaining its 
supposed superiority above all other forms of go¬ 
vernment. To it are attributed “ unity of council, 
activity, decision, secrecy, dispatch; the military 
strength and energy which result from these quali¬ 
ties; the exclusion of popular and aristocratical con¬ 
tentions ; the preventing by a known rule of suc¬ 
cession, of all competition for the supreme power, 
and thereby repressing the hopes, the intrigues, and 
the dangerous ambition of aspiring citizens.” The 
beautiful yet extravagant eulogium of Mr. Burke on 
the monarchial form of government are in the me- 



51 


mory of all, and the more tempered encomiums of 
Mr. Blackstone on the British constitution are yet 
fresh in your recollections. We shall hereafter have 
occasion again to refer to these topics, and to exa¬ 
mine not only the justice of their encomiums, but to 
enquire also whether most that is valuable in the 
boasted British constitution, is not derived from the 
large infusion of popular power, which the struggle 
of centuries has succeeded in introducing at length, 
into that complicated form of government. At pre¬ 
sent, however, let it be our business to come to some 
distinct understanding on the subject of the pro¬ 
motion of the general good, instead of indulging 
in mere generalities, which lead to no satisfactory 
conclusion. 

1. And first let it be remarked, that as all who 
constitute the society or body politic, are upon a per¬ 
fect equality as to rights, so far as that equality is 
unaffected by social institutions, and as all are sup¬ 
posed to have entered into society for the security of 
those rights, and the promotion of their happiness 
and prosperity, each surrendering an equal portion 
of the right of self government, and equally sub¬ 
mitting himself to the regulations which may be made, 
it would seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, 
that the great object of political institutions, should 
be the good of the whole , and not of apart only of 
of the people. If so, it is equally clear, that the good 
of all should be equally secured by the constitution or 
form of government; “that no man or set of men 
can be entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments 
or privileges ; and that government is or ought to be 
instituted, for the common benefit, protection and 
security of the people, nation or community.” 
These are the sublime truths promulgated by our 
bill of rights, and which are sustained and enforced 
by a recurrence to the fundamental principles, 
upon which alone legitimate governments can ever 
fairly rest. 


52 


2. From this view of the subject we must infeT 
that in the establishment of the constitution of a 
state, the greatest good of the great mass, and not 
the greatest good of a favored class, should be the 
governing principle. For if it were otherwise, we 
should break in upon that equality of rights, which 
has already been shewn to be founded in nature, and 
not impaired by association. God and nature made 
us equal ; for according to the Mosaic account God 
made man in his own image, and all the descendants 
of the first man are made so likewise : so that there 
is no foundation in religion for the notion of ine¬ 
quality ; and as to nature, she so often makes the 
poor child vigorous in body, and enlightened in 
mind, while the child of the noble is ricketty and a 
fool, that it is really inconceivable how the notion of 
a natural inequality of classes, ever should have 
found its way into human speculations. 

3. It may not be improper, however, here to 
guard against an error which may grow out of a mo¬ 
dified form in which the principle just announced is 
sometimes expressed. Thus we hear it occasionally 
remarked that the great object of government is the 
greatest good of the greatest number. If by this 
is merely meant, that the general interests of society 
are to be the objects of legislation, and not the inte¬ 
rests of particular classes, the position is in perfect 
conformity with the principle I have announced. 
But if, as is much to be feared, 1 Story’s Com. 2S9, 
it is understood to mean, that a majority is entitled 
to legislate for its own benefit, in utter disregard of 
the rights of the minority, then I think it may be 
safely affirmed to be an utter perversion of the le¬ 
gitimate principles of free government. Fora ma¬ 
jority may be a faction as well as a minority, and 
when it is so, is the more dangerous. However 
great the majority, if there is an invasion of the 
equal rights of the minority, it would lead to resis¬ 
tance and revolution, where the strength is sufficient,, 


53 


*md the wrongs are momentous enough, to justify 
such an appeal. For instance: In the state of Vir¬ 
ginia, the trans-alleghany country is in a minority. 
The country on this side of that mountain greatly 
preponderates in numbers, or at least in representa¬ 
tion. Yet who would say, that to relieve themselves 
from the burden of taxation, they should throw the 
whole charges of the state upon their western bre¬ 
thren ? But this would be to consult the greatest 
good of the greatest number ; unless indeed it be 
said, as well it may, that in the long run, it would 
prove most mischievous even to themselves. So in¬ 
deed it would : precisely because it always must be 
mischievous, even to the actors in iniquity themselves, 
to set at naught the immutable principles of justice 
and of right; to avail themselves of their power to 
oppress their brethren and to trample the rights of a 
minority under foot. Even handed justice would at 
some future day, return the contents of the poisoned 
chalice to their lips; and the precedent which they 
set, would sooner or later be brought to crush them 
by its weight. These important truths cannot be 
too earnestly impressed, young gentlemen, under a 
government in which the democratical principle has 
so decided a predominance as in ours. It is the 
weak side of our noble institutions, and it therefore 
requires to be particularly guarded by the wise and 
virtuous, and by all who love the principle of demo¬ 
cracy. There is indeed more reason for circum¬ 
spection in this regard, if it be true as has been said 
by one of the most acute observers of the present 
day that “ no political form has hitherto been disco¬ 
vered which is equally favorable to the prosperity 
and the development of all the classes into which 
society is divided. These classes continue to form . 
as it were, a certain number of distinct nations in 
the same nation; and experience has shown that it 
is no less dangerous to place the fate of these classes 
exclusively in the hands of any one of them, than 
6 


54 


it is to make one people the arbiter of the destiny of 
another. When the rich alone govern, the interest 
of the poor is always endangered ; and when the 
poor make the laws, that of the rich incurs very se¬ 
rious risks. The advantage of democracy does not 
consist, therefore, as has sometimes been asserted, 
in favoring the prosperity of all, but simply contri¬ 
buting to the well-being of the greatest possible 
number. 

“ The men who are entrusted with the direction 
of public affairs in the United States, are frequently 
inferior, both in point of capacity and of morality, to 
those whom aristocratic institutions would raise to 
power. But their interest is identified and confound¬ 
ed with that of the majority of their fellow citizens. 
They may frequently be faithless, and frequently 
mistaken ; but they will never systematically adopt 
a line of conduct opposed to the will of the majori¬ 
ty ; and it is impossible that they should give a 
dangerous and exclusive tendency to the govern¬ 
ment. 

“The maladministration of a democratic magis¬ 
trate is a mere isolated fact, which only occurs dur¬ 
ing the short period for which he is elected. Cor¬ 
ruption and incapacity do not act as common inte¬ 
rests, which may connect men permanently with one 
another. A corrupt or an incapable magistrate will 
not concert his measures with another magistrate, 
simply because that individual is as corrupt and as 
incapable as himself; and these two men will never 
unite their endeavors to promote the corruption and 
inaptitude of their remote posterity. The ambition 
and the manoeuvres of the one will serve, on the con¬ 
trary, to unmask the other. The vices of a magis¬ 
trate, in democratic states, are usually peculiar to his 
own person. 

“But under aristocratic governments public men 
are swayed by the interest of their order, which, if 
it is sometimes confounded with the interests of the 


55 


majority, is very frequently distinct from them. 
This interest is the common and lasting bond which 
unites them together ; it induces them to coalesce, 
and to combine their efforts in order to attain an end 
which does not always ensure the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number ; and it serves not only to 
connect the persons in authority, but to unite them 
to a considerable portion of the community, since a 
numerous body of citizens belongs to the aristocra¬ 
cy, without being invested with official functions. 
The aristocratic magistrate is therefore constantly 
supported by a portion of the community, as well 
as by the government of which he is a member. 

“ The common purpose which connects the inte¬ 
rest of the magistrates in aristocracies, with that of 
a portion of their cotemporaries, identifies it with 
that of future generations ; their influence belongs to 
the future as much as to the present. The aristo¬ 
cratic magistrate is urged at the same time, towards 
the same point, by the passions of the community, 
by his own, and I may almost add, by those of his 
posterity. Is it, then, wonderful that he does not 
resist such repeated impulses ? And indeed aristo¬ 
cracies are often carried away by the spirit of their 
order without being corrupted by it: and they un¬ 
consciously fashion society to their own ends, and 
prepare it for their own descendants. 

“ The English aristocracy is perhaps the most, libe¬ 
ral which ever existed, and no body of men has 
ever, uninterruptedly, furnished so many honorable 
and enlightened individuals to the government of a 
country. It cannot, however, escape observation, 
that in the legislation of England the good of the 
poor has been sacrificed to the advantage of the rich, 
and the rights of the majority to the privileges of the 
few. The consequence is, that England, at the pre¬ 
sent day, combines the extremes of fortune in the 
bosom of her society ; and her perils and calami¬ 
ties are almost equal to her power and her renown. 


56 


“ In the United States, where the public officers 
have no interests to promote connected with their 
caste, the general and constant influence of the go¬ 
vernment is beneficial, although the individuals who 
conduct it are frequently unskilful and sometimes 
contemptible. There is indeed a secret tendency in 
democratic institutions to render the exertions of the 
citizens subservient to the prosperity of the commu¬ 
nity, notwithstanding their private vices and mis¬ 
takes ; whilst in aristocratic institutions there is a 
secret propensity, which, notwithstanding the talents 
and the virtue of those who conduct the government, 
leads them to contribute to the evils which oppress 
their fellow-creatures. In aristocratic governments 
public men may frequently do injuries which they 
do not intend; and in democratic states they pro¬ 
duce advantages which they never thought of . 55 

“ I do not think,” says the same writer,* “ that it 
is possible to combine several principles in the same go¬ 
vernment, so as at the same time to maintain freedom, 
and really to oppose them to one another. The form 
of government which is usually termed mixed has al¬ 
ways appeared to me to be a mere chimera. Accurate¬ 
ly speaking there is no such thing as a mixed govern¬ 
ment, (with the meaning usually given to that word,) 
because in all communities some one principle of ac¬ 
tion may be discovered, which preponderates over the 
others. England in the last century, which has been 
more especially cited as an example of this form of go¬ 
vernment, was in point of fact an essentially aristo¬ 
cratic state, although it comprised very powerful ele¬ 
ments of democracy: for the laws and customs of 
the country were such, that the aristocracy could not 
but preponderate in the end, and subject the direc¬ 
tion of public affairs to its own will. The error 
arose from too much attention being paid to the ac¬ 
tual struggle which was going on between the nobles 


* De Tocqueville, p. 241 



57 


and the people, without considering the probable is- 
sue of the contest, which was in reality the impor¬ 
tant point. When a community really has a mixed 
government, that is to say, when it is equally divi¬ 
ded between two adverse principles, it must either 
pass through a revolution, or fall into complete dis¬ 
solution. 

“ I am therefore of opinion that some one social 
power must always be made to predominate over the 
others ; but I think that liberty is endangered when 
this power is checked by no obstacles which may 
retard its course, and force it to moderate its own 
vehemence.” 

If these speculations are correct, they furnish ob¬ 
viously the strongest motive to every lover of the 
democracy, for the cultivation of that spirit of jus¬ 
tice, forbearance, and moderation on the part of the 
majority, which, constitutes the most essential virtue 
in all popular forms of government. “ Virtue,” says 
Montesquieu, is the soul of a democracy and 
that virtue, which is, above all, required to uphold 
a system, into which its principles are liberally infu¬ 
sed, and to prevent its degenerating into an odious 
tyranny, is moderation. For although I do not al¬ 
together despair with Mr. De Tocqueville, of the 
possibility of presenting some check in the constitu¬ 
tion of the government to the unbridled career of a 
triumphant party, yet I am not insensible to the dif¬ 
ficulty of providing a just counterpoise to that power 
in the state, which, in the structure of the system, 
is made to predominate. Thus in our institutions, 
the principle is avowed, (though the state of the 
fact does not correspond with it) that the majority 
must rule: and how to restrain that majority, whilst 
in the exercise of its powers, from excesses destruc¬ 
tive of the rights of the minority, is the great pro¬ 
blem which, it would seem, is yet to be solved. For 
it must be confessed, however painful and humilia¬ 
ting the acknowledgment, that many recent occurs 
6 * 


58 


rences abundantly demonstrate, that we have hith¬ 
erto fallen far short of the great discovery. The sub¬ 
stitution of a representative body, for the great body 
of the people, has ever been looked upon by our 
sages as a certain security against the evils of popu¬ 
lar excitement, and the excesses of a dominant par¬ 
ty over their prostrate adversaries. In their delibe¬ 
rations were anticipated a calmness and moderation, 
a sense of justice and respect for right, which, it had 
been found by the experience of the ancient demo¬ 
cracies, were not to be expected in the heated and 
tumultuary meetings of an excited populace. Yet 
these expectations have not always been realized. 
In the political struggles which we have witnessed 
for many years past, it has lamentably occurred, that 
as the contending parties have alternately predomi¬ 
nated, the eagerness of the strife, and the exulta¬ 
tions of victory have silenced the dictates of justice, 
and drowned the whispers of moderation. The 
successful party has swept from office, as with a be¬ 
som, the adherents of its adversaries ; and even on 
the floor of the legislative assembly, the freedom of 
debate has been stifled on one side, by the harsh and 
improper application of the previous question, and 
on the other, by the adoption of that unprecedented 
novelty in parliamentary proceedings, familiarly call¬ 
ed the one hour rule. 

Happily however for the nation, this arbitrary 
spirit has only manifested itself hitherto, on ques¬ 
tions of general politics, on which every section of 
the nation has happened to be divided. Its oppres¬ 
sion therefore has not been very sensibly felt, since 
in our government, so long as the parties are com¬ 
pletely commingled, the majority can never very se¬ 
riously tyrannize over their adversaries, without in¬ 
jury to themselves. But when upon any great ques¬ 
tion, such as that of abolition, or the tariff, the in¬ 
terests and feelings of different sections of the union 
are found to be antagonizing, the strongest appre^ 


59 


hensions may well be entertained of the result ; un¬ 
less the majority, or at least a sufficient portion of 
them be restrained front a violation of tire rights of 
property, or the great and vital interests of the mi¬ 
nority, by a due respect to what is demanded by jus¬ 
tice, dictated by moderation, or suggested by an en¬ 
lightened and generous forbearance. 

4. I proceed next to observe, that in pursuing the 
only legitimate object of government, to wit, the 
general welfare and happiness of the whole society, 
our course is to be directed by enlarged and liberal 
views of what the lasting interest of the community 
requires, rather than by a confined and narrow atten¬ 
tion to the wants or the vexations of the moment, 
or the partial concerns of a particular branch of the 
public prosperity. Unfortunately however, as I have 
already observed, mankind have never been of one 
opinion, as to what was best calculated to advance 
the general good. The largest portion of our race 
appear to have been dazzled, by the power and the 
splendor which have attended monarchical institu¬ 
tions, under the direction of distinguished monarchs ; 
or they have been fascinated by the happiness and 
quiet which has sometimes reigned under the bene¬ 
ficent dominion of a “ patriot king.” They can 
forget in the contemplation of the virtues of a Titus 
or an Antonine, the fires of a Nero and the butch¬ 
eries of a Domitian. They shudder at the horrors of a 
conciergerie, and are therefore ready to fly to the oppo¬ 
site extreme—the sullen stillness of despotic power. 
They look upon the wealth and grandeur of the state, 
the power of its armies, the triumphs of its navies, 
the magnificence of its architecture, and the refine¬ 
ments of its literature, until they are incapable of 
perceiving the wretchedness and penury which too 
often follow in their train. They lose their recollec¬ 
tion of great objects of society, or delude themselves 
with the belief, that the true mode of attaining them, 
is to make the nation great. They are insensible to 


60 


the sad truth conveyed in the beautiful language of 
the moralizing poet : 

Ill fares the land to hastening ills a prey, 

Where wealth accumulates and men decay ; 

Princes and lords may flourish or may fade, 

A breath can make them as a breath has made, 

But a bold peasantry their country’s pride, 

When once destroyed can never be supplied. 

We shall have occasion hereafter, if time permits, 
to examine the pretensions of monarchical institu¬ 
tions to the admiration and love of mankind. At 
present we have only to advert to the fact, that that 
form of government has won largely upon the re¬ 
spect and affections of most nations of the world, 
both ancient and modern, in order to maintain the 
assertion, that societies have widely differed as to 
the principal aim of government, and the best mode 
of attaining it. For while some are advocates for 
monarchy and its attendant greatness, others have 
preferred an aristocracy and some among the an¬ 
cients, and ourselves among the moderns, decide in 
favor of the republican forms of government. The 
friends of aristocracy have always sustained it, upon 
the supposition that it secured superior wisdom and 
more elevation of character; while the republican, 
looking to the happiness of the whole as the main 
end of political institutions, is content to surrender 
some splendor and magnificence for the blessings of 
freedom. He takes the chance of the wisdom of a 
representation by election, in lieu of hereditary suc¬ 
cession ; and of securing the devotion of the law¬ 
giver to the general interest, by frequent elections, 
instead of trusting it to a body of nobles, whose 
power is independent of the people, while their in¬ 
terests are most usually adverse and conflicting. 

With these dilferent views prevailing in the world, 
let us endeavor on our part to discover, what 
ought to be the primary objects of political insti¬ 
tutions. When we have agreed upon these, we shall 


61 


be the better enabled to conduct the enquiry as to the 
form of government best adapted to attain them ; 
and thus we shall be brought to a consideration of 
the three principal forms, and of the mixed govern¬ 
ments which have been created by compounding 
them. 

The primary object of all associations or commu¬ 
nities of men, is the protection and defence of their 
persons and their rights, from all aggression. This 
aggression may either be from within or without : 
from within when our individual rights are assailed 
by other members of the same society ; and from 
without, when another nation or society attacks our 
own, and violates its rights and threatens its subju¬ 
gation. However admirably a government may be 
otherwise constituted, however perfectly its laws may 
be calculated to protect the rights and liberties of its 
people against each other , and to promote their in¬ 
ternal prosperity and happiness, it availeth nothing, 
if it is unable to protect itself against a foreign 
power. The lust of dominion is too deeply rooted 
in the human heart, to permit any nation long to 
maintain her independence, unless she has the abili¬ 
ty to defend herself, or can call around her the pro¬ 
tection of other nations against an invader. The 
first and most important end of every government 
therefore, is the capacity of self-defence ; and other 
things being equal , that would be the best, which 
is best adapted to secure that indispensable object. 

Now to the capacity of self-defence there are ma¬ 
ny things essential. There must be adequate phy¬ 
sical power or military strength, and of course an 
adequate population. There must be adequate 
wealth to meet the wasteful expenditures of war, to 
provide and sustain the necessary troops and to 
equip for sea the navies which are necessary in hos¬ 
tilities between maritime states; and lastly, there 
must be among the people energy and courage in the 
field; fortitude and generous submission to sacrifi- 


62 


ees, a devoted love of country, and a strong and 
abiding attachment to its institutions, and its laws. 

If these be essentials to the defence of nations, it 
will easily be perceived that without foreign aid, a 
diminutive state would be a prey to every invader. 
And hence it is clear, that pure democracies, which 
must be confined to narrow limits, can never be well 
calculated to attain this first and most essential end 
of government. They can never have the strength 
to sustain themselves, except by the aid of others on 
whom at length they will become dependent. To 
give sufficient power for self-defence therefore, there 
must be a territory extensive enough to furnish ade¬ 
quate population. This may indeed be less, where 
a country is impracticable, as among the Swiss, 
whose lofty mountains are in no small degree the 
barriers of their liberty. Moreover, it sometimes 
happens, that small states are protected by their in¬ 
significance, and by a poverty which offers no temp¬ 
tations to the rapacity of an invader. St. Marino 
in her lofty aiery, may remain for ages more, as safe 
as she has hitherto been from cupidity and ambition. 
She is defended by her poverty, even better than by 
her inaccessible cliffs—those lofty battlements, which 
nature herself has thrown around her diminutive 
territory. 

But population alone will not suffice. Wealth, 
the sinews of war, must also abound, to sustain the 
charges of war, and to keep on foot sufficient armies 
to meet the exigencies of the state. This, like a 
powerful population, can rarely be acquired in a very 
limited territory, though it is true commercial cities 
sustained by peculiar advantages have been occa¬ 
sionally seen, in the history of the world, to attain 
to a pitch of wealth and power, sufficient to en¬ 
able them to spread their conquests over distant 
lands. Still however, it is obvious, that a country 
of some extent is necessary, to secure the means of 
successful defence to any state, and that therefore a 


63 


pure democracy, which requires the personal atten¬ 
dance of every citizen in an assembly of the people, 
is altogether incompatible with its safety and inde¬ 
pendence. Some instances indeed may be cited, of 
democracies which flourished for a season, but it 
will hereafter be seen, that no conclusion can be 
drawn from their history in conflict with the posi¬ 
tions I have laid down. 

If indeed there can be any thing, which can sup¬ 
ply the deficiency of abundant resources and pow¬ 
erful population in a democracy, it is the possession, 
in its highest degree of excellence, of the third re¬ 
quisite to which I have alluded. I speak of patri¬ 
otic feeling, and a devoted attachment to the institu¬ 
tions of our country. These flourish with greatest 
vigor in governments of the people. The slave of a 
despot, follows a master to the field; the citizen of 
a republic fights for himself. Every blow struck by 
the former, but rivets his chains; every blow of the 
laitter is for his altars and fireside. Death strikes 
down both—yet how different their fates ! 

He strikes the poor peasant, who falls in the dark, 

Nor leaves e’en the wreck of a name : 

He strikes the bold patriot! A glorious mark ! 

He falls in the blaze of his fame ! 

“ It must be acknowledged,” says a writer by no 
means enamored of pure democracy, “ that every 
example of a government that has a large mixture 
of democratical power, exhibits something to our 
view which is amiable, noble, and I had almost said 
divine.” It exhibits man erect, self-governed, inde¬ 
pendent ! It exhibits the citizen strenuous in coun¬ 
cil, and intrepid in the field ; bold and fearless in 
maintaining the liberties of the state against domes¬ 
tic faction, and ever ready to pour out his blood in 
defending his country against foreign aggression. 
Finally, it exhibits him returning with laurels in tri¬ 
umph from the combat; or stretched upon the bat¬ 
tle ground like the brave Lochiel, 


64 


With his back to the field and his feet to the foe ! M 

2. The next great end of government is internal 
prosperity. It would extend these lectures far be¬ 
yond the limits prescribed, were I to undertake to 
enlarge upon this fruitful topic. I must content my¬ 
self therefore here, with a brief allusion to some of 
the most essential constituents of the prosperity of 
a people, in their internal concerns. 

And foremost in the catalogue is the prevalence 
of peace, quiet, good order, justice, obedience to the 
laws, and the faithful discharge of every public du¬ 
ty. In vain have we entered into society, in vain 
have we sought protection from the dangers of a 
state of nature, if by the transition we are plunged 
at once into civil war and bloodshed, and if our per¬ 
sons, our lives, and our property, are exposed to the 
dangers of mobocracy on the one hand, or the con¬ 
tention of domestic factions, or pretenders to a crown 
upon the other. The vices of man, alone, impel him 
to delight in broil and bloodshed. The virtuous 
man loves peace! Hobbes may have truly described 
the tendency of many to war. But yet he draws 
his portrait from the fiend-like portion of our race. 
The mass of mankind have no such propensities. 
To them, the great object of desire, is the permis¬ 
sion to pursue their own happiness in their own 
way ; to enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace, and 
to “sit beneath their own vine and fig-tree where 
there is none to make them afraid.” They may be 
misled by the ambitious, or roused to civil commo¬ 
tion by the arts of a demagogue, but the sound of 
the clarion never yet brought happiness to the 
homestead of the husbandman, or the cottager’s 
fireside. 

It can indeed require no train of reasoning, nor 
parade of historical examples to prove, how fatal to 
every interest of society are the wars of domestic 
factions, and the bloody struggles of contending as¬ 
pirants for the sceptre. These are among the rais- 


65 


chiefs of monarchy. The wars of the houses of 
York and Lancaster desolated England, for more 
than three-fourths of a century, and the scaffolds of 
revolutionary France, have flowed with the blood of 
her people whatever may have been the faction that 
has prevailed. But it is not to excesses of this enor¬ 
mous description that grow out of contests for a 
crown that we alone must look. There are other 
outrages of minor character, but still of great enor¬ 
mity which too often occur in republican states, that 
government must check, or it fails in the great ob¬ 
jects of its institution. I mean the excesses of law¬ 
less mobs, the setting at naught the laws of order, 
the trampling upon the rights both of person and of 
property, the destroying with vandal fury the pos¬ 
sessions of unoffending citizens, or taking the law 
into their own hands and punishing with death the 
wretched objects of their vengeance. Nay, more, 
'if the laws of the land are not respected, if crime is 
left unpunished, if even the judicial tribunals fail in 
their attempts to bring offenders to justice, it is ob¬ 
vious that there is something rotten in the system. 
The government is radically defective in purity, or 
in energy, or in wisdom, where evils such as these 
prevail; and men will, sooner or later, fly to some 
stronger power which can restrain the bad, and 
bring offenders against the law to condign punish¬ 
ment. 

Besides these great and important concerns, how¬ 
ever, it must be our object in selecting the govern¬ 
ment to which we are about to commit our happi¬ 
ness and safety, to look to its capacity and its dispo¬ 
sition to encourage the growth of population, the 
acquisition of the means of sustenance and comfort 
by the great mass of the people, the improvement of 
all classes of society by education, and the general 
prevalence of an enlightened and pure morality. Add 
to this the protection of person and property from 
the wrongs of individuals, or the public, security 
7 


66 


from the oppression of public officers, or the bur¬ 
dens of unnecessary exactions, and freedom of ac¬ 
tion in all things in which the exigencies of society 
do not call for restraint, and we shall have little rea¬ 
son to complain of the wisdom of our choice, if we 
shall have embarked our happiness and liberties, in 
a government which is capable of securing so large 
a portion of good, in a state of being to which un- 
mingled happiness and prosperity is denied. 

I shall conclude my remarks upon these topics by 
observing that in selecting the form of our institu¬ 
tions, we should look not to the securing of a par¬ 
ticular object, or remedying a particular evil only, 
but to the combining the principles of the several 
forms of government in such degrees, as to secure 
to society the greatest practicable good upon the 
whole , though we must of necessity fall short of that 
perfection, which is confessedly unattainable in hu¬ 
man concerns. Moreover by parity of reason, when 
we have once settled down upon our system, we 
should not too hastily change what may occasion - 
ally disappoint our expectations; nor should we 
indulge that fretful impatience which would over¬ 
throw what has once been established, because we 
occasionally meet with unpleasant ingredients in our 
cup. We must learn to be contented though not 
supine; and though it is our duty to correct the 
evils of a system which oppresses us, we should al¬ 
ways bear in mind, that change is not of necessity 
for the better ; and that perpetual change is among 
the most fearful evils in the affairs of a people. 

The author already so frequently quoted, although 
he very vehemently controverts the notion of a so¬ 
cial compact, admits nevertheless the existence of 
the right of resistance and change, on the part of 
the people, whenever the interests of society require 
it, and the grievances of the people are greater than 
the probable mischiefs of revolution. As there is 
much good sense in many of his remarks, I beg 


67 


leave to present them to you here, (though in doing 
so, I am deviating from the particular matter in dis¬ 
cussion.) I give them in his own plain yet clear 
and forcible language. He has been speaking of 
the right of resistance and proceeds : 

“ This principle being admitted, the justice of 
every particular case of resistance, is reduced to a 
computation of the quantity of the danger and 
grievance on the one side, and of the probability and 
expense of redressing it on the other. 

“ But who shall judge of this ? We answer, 
“ Every man for himself.” In contentions between 
the sovereign and the subject, the parties acknow¬ 
ledge no common arbitrator ; and it would be ab¬ 
surd to refer the decision to those whose conduct 
has provoked the question, and whose own interest, 
authority, and fate, are immediately concerned in it. 
The danger of error and abuse, is no objection to 
the rule of expediency, because every other rule is 
liable to the same or greater ; and every rule that 
can be propounded upon the subject (like all rules 
which appeal to, or binds the conscience) must in 
the application depend upon private judgment. It 
may be observed, however, that it ought equally to 
be accounted the exercise of a man’s private judg¬ 
ment, whether he be determined by reasonings and 
conclusions of his own, or submit to be directed by 
the advice of others, provided if he be free to choose 
his guide.” 

On the subject of public expediency it may be ob¬ 
served that, “ I. It may be as much a duty, at one 
time, to resist government, as it is at another, to 
obey it—to wit, whenever more advantage will, in 
our opinion, accrue to the community from resistance, 
than mischief.” This must, however, be glaringly 
obvious. 

“ II. The lawfulness of resistance, or the lawful¬ 
ness of a revolt, does not depend alone upon the 
grievance which is sustained or feared, but also up- 


63 


on the probable expense and event of the contest. 
They, who concerted the revolution in England were 
justifiable in their counsels, because from the appa¬ 
rent disposition of the nation, and the strength and 
character of the parties engaged, the measure was 
likely to be brought about with little mischief or 
bloodshed whereas, it might have been a question 
with many friends of their country, whether the in¬ 
juries then endured and threatened, would have au¬ 
thorized the renewal of a doubtful civil war. 

“ IV. Not every invasion of the subject’s rights, 
or liberty, or of the constitution ; not every breach 
of promise, or of oath ; not every stretch of preroga¬ 
tive, abuse of power, or neglect of duty by the chief 
magistrate, or by the whole or any branch of the le¬ 
gislative body, justifies resistance, unless these crimes 
draw after them public consequences of sufficient 
magnitude to outweigh the evils of civil disturbance. 
Nevertheless, every violation of the constitution 
ought to be watched with jealousy, and resented as 
such, beyond what the quantity of estimable damage 
would require or warrant ; because a known and 
settled usage of governing affords the only security 
against the enormities of uncontrolled dominion, and 
because this security is weakened by every encroach¬ 
ment which is made without opposition, or opposed 
without effect. 

V. No usage, law, or authority whatever, is so 
binding that it need or ought to be continued, when 
it may be changed with advantage to the communi¬ 
ty. The family of the prince, the order of succes¬ 
sion, the prerogative of the crown, the form and 
parts of the legislature, together with the respective 
powers, office, duration, and mutual dependency of 
the several parts, are all only so many laws, mutable 
like other laws, whenever expediency requires, either 
by the ordinary act of the legislature, or, if the oc¬ 
casion deserve it, by the interposition of the people „ 


* So of our own revolution. 




69 


These points are wont to be approached with a kind 
of awe; they are represented to the mind as prin¬ 
ciples of the constitution settled by our ancestors, 
and, being settled, to be no more committed to in¬ 
novation or debate; as foundations never to be 
stirred ; as the terms and conditions of the social 
compact, to which every citizen of the state has en¬ 
gaged his fidelity, by virtue of a promise, which he 
cannot now recall. Such reasons have no place in 
our system; to us, if there be any good reason for 
treating these with more deference and respect than 
other laws, it is, either the advantage of the present 
constitution of government (which reason must be 
of different force in different countries,) or because 
in all countries, it is of importance, that the form 
and usage of governing be acknowledged and under¬ 
stood, as well by the governors as the governed, and 
because the seldomer it is changed, the more per¬ 
fectly it will be known by both sides.” 


LECTURE V. 


ON GOVERNMENT. 

Political writers seem generally to have agreed, 
that the several simple forms of government may be 
reduced to three; viz: monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy. The monarchical, is that in which the 
administration of affairs is vested in a single person ; 
the aristocratical, where the public authority is in 
the hands of a distinct class of citizens, arrogating 
to themselves peculiar privileges ; and the democra- 
tical, where all power is exercised by the people,, 
7 * 




70 


These three may be variously combined and then they 
are called mixed governments. In all, however, 
whether simple or mixed, the same powers are 
vested, in some form or other, since they all exer¬ 
cise the powers of sovereignty, and those powers 
must in every state be the same. It may be well 
therefore, to analyze, in the first place, the charac¬ 
ter of the sovereignty, before we enter upon the 
consideration of the distribution of its authority. 

I have remarked heretofore, that the very exis¬ 
tence and organization of society, implies the esta¬ 
blishment of rules for its government; of regula¬ 
tions for the ascertainment and protection of the 
rights of all, and the enaction of penalties against 
the violators of persons or of property. These rules 
and regulations are laws, and the power that makes 
them, exercises de facto the supreme power, and 
constitutes the legislature. But when laws have 
been made there must be somewhere vested the 
power of carrying them into execution. This pow¬ 
er is clearly distinct from the legislative, and is call¬ 
ed the executive. It consists in nothing more than 
in giving effect to what a superior power has com¬ 
manded. As, if the law denounces death against the 
murderer, the duty of enforcing that law by the con¬ 
dign punishment of the offender, devolves upon the 
executive, or on some of those numerous officers 
who together constitute that branch of political pow¬ 
er. But though the punishment of the guilty de¬ 
volves upon the executive, the ascertainment of his 
euilt, belongs to an entirely different branch of the 
sovereign authority, and this branch is the judiciary. 
For the power of judging, constitutes no part either of 
legislative or executive authority. It is a separate 
and distinct attribute, and in wise governments en¬ 
trusted to different hands. Thus the legislature 
makes the law, the executive institutes its prosecu¬ 
tions against the infractors, the judiciary decides on 
their guilt, and pronounces judgment, and the execu- 


71 


tive then again steps in, and carries that judgment 
into execution. 

Such is a true and simple analysis of the powers 
of government, and one would at first suppose, that 
there was little difficulty in constructing a machine, 
which would be perfectly adequate to effect its plain 
and obvious purposes. Unhappily for mankind, how¬ 
ever, in all time, the science of government has pro¬ 
ved to be the most complicated and difficult; and 
the ambitious and designing have too generally suc¬ 
ceeded in perverting, to the oppression and wretch¬ 
edness of the people, what was in its very origin de¬ 
signed for their happiness and comfort. These mis¬ 
chievous effects, have sometimes resulted from force, 
and sometimes from the arts of aspiring men, bat by 
whatever means they have been brought about, they 
have generally been attended either by the improper 
union, of all or most of the powers of government in 
the same hands ; or by vesting thegreat and important 
law making power, in a single individual, or a privi¬ 
leged class. The mischiefs of this latter arrange¬ 
ment will be the subject of remark hereafter. At 
present it is proper to point to some of the evils, 
which always flow from blending the various powers 
of the government in the same hands. 

It is sufficiently obvious, that where all the three 
powers of government, are united in one man, as in 
Turkey, the most ruthless tyranny must be the con¬ 
sequence. If the monarch first makes the law, then 
judges of the infraction and concludes by inflicting 
the bowstring or the knout, no man can be safe from 
his oppression, or find security but in his clemency. 
He may enjoy immunity indeed under a Titus, but 
what may be his destiny under his immediate suc¬ 
cessor, Domitian ? A tyrant invested with all pow¬ 
er would enact tyrannical laws, and of course would 
execute them in a tyrannical manner. And as he 
would possess the power of judging also, life and 
liberty would be altogether exposed to his arbitrary 


72 


control. There is an end of all security, if the 
same man, or even the same body of men , whether 
princes, nobles, or people, exercise all these powers; 
—that of enacting the laws—of judging of their in¬ 
fraction, and of executing their own judgments. 

It has been said “ that most kingdoms of Europe 
enjoy some moderation in their government, because 
the prince, though he is invested with the power of 
making and executing the law, leaves the power of 
judging to his subjects. But in Turkey where the 
three powers are united in the Sultan’s person, the 
subject groans under the weight of a most frightful 
oppression. So in the miscalled republics of Italy, 
these three powers are united* and there is less lib¬ 
erty than in the monarchies themselves. Witness 
the state inquisitors in the palmiest days of Venice, 
and the lion’s mouth into which the basest inform¬ 
ers, with vengeful spirit, secretly threw their written 
accusations. When the same body of magistrates 
are possessed, as judges and executors of the laws, of 
the whole power they have given themselves in quality 
of legislators, tyranny and misrule closely follow. I 
Adams, 154. They may plunder the state by legisla¬ 
ting away its possessions to themselves; they may 
plunder individuals by partial and oppressive legisla- 
tion in their own favor; and then as judges they may 
declare their legislation valid, and ruin the citizen by 
their corrupt decrees. The current of power, thus 
concentrated, sweeps all before it, and public and 
private rights find one common ruin, in the gulf of 
despotic rule. How wretched the subject in such a 
state! How different, where the legislative hand is 
restrained by the consciousness, that the law which 
it creates, is to be enforced by another, and may 
fall, if oppressive, with fatal effect upon the guilty 
heads of those who made it. 

In relation to the separation of the judiciary from 
the other t\Vo branches of government, Mr. Paley 
remarks with his usual force : “ Let us suppose that 


73 


the courts made their own laws, or that the king and 
parliament tried and decided causes instead of the 
courts; it is evident, in the first place, that the de¬ 
cisions of such a judicature would be so many laws ; 
and, in the second place, that, when the parties and 
the interests to be affected by the law were known, 
the inclinations of the law-makers would inevitably 
attach on one side or the other; and that, where 
there was neither any fixed rules to regulate their 
determinations, nor any superior power to control 
theur proceedings, these inclinations would interfere 
with the integrity of public justice. The conse¬ 
quence of which must be, that the subjects of such 
a constitution would live either without any constant 
laws, that is, without any known pre-established 
rules of adjudication whatever ; or, under laws made 
for particular cases and particular persons, and par¬ 
taking of the contradictions and iniquity of the mo¬ 
tives, to which they owed their origin. 

“ Which dangers, by the division of the legislative 
and judicial functions, are in this country effectually 
provided against. Parliament knows not the indi¬ 
viduals upon whom its acts will operate; it has no 
cases or parties before it; no private designs to serve ; 
consequently, its resolutions will be suggested by the 
consideration of universal effects and tendencies, 
which always produces impartial, and commonly ad¬ 
vantageous regulations. When laws are made, 
courts of justice, whatever be the disposition of the 
judges, must abide by them ; for the legislative be¬ 
ing necessarily the supreme power of the state, the 
judicial and every other power is accountable to 
that; and it cannot be doubted, but that the persons, 
who possess the sovereign authority of government, 
will be tenacious of the laws which they themselves 
prescribe, and sufficiently jealous of the assump¬ 
tion of dispensing and legislative powers by any 
others. 

“ This fundamental rule of civil jurisprudence is 


74 


violated in the case of acts of attainder or confisca¬ 
tion, in bills of pains and penalties, and in all ex 
post facto laws whatever, in which parliament ex¬ 
ercises the double office of legislator and judge. 
And whoever either understands the value of the 
rule itself, or collects the history of those instances 
in which it has been invaded, will be induced, I be¬ 
lieve, to acknowledge, that it had been wiser and 
safer never to have departed from it. He will con¬ 
fess at least, that nothing but the most manifest and 
immediate peril of the commonwealth will justify a 
repetition of these dangerous examples. If the 
laws in being do not punish an offender, let him go 
unpunished ; let the legislature, admonished of the 
defect of the laws, provide against the commission 
of future crimes of the same sort. The escape of 
one delinquent can never produce so much harm to 
the community, as may arise from the infraction of a 
rule, upon which the purity of public justice, and 
the existence of civil liberty essentially depend.” 
See also Jefferson’s Notes, the Letters of the Fede¬ 
ralist, and Tucker’s Blackstone, on this interesting 
topic. 

Nor does the separation of the judiciary from the 
other two branches of the government do much more 
to afford security to personal liberty and to pro¬ 
perty , where the legislative and executive are uni¬ 
ted in the same hands. What security can there be 
against the encroachment and the tyranny of an ex¬ 
ecutive, which is its own lawgiver ? What hope of 
limits upon its power to be imposed by itself? What 
prospect of relief from the tyranny of the throne, 
when the throne itself is the legislative body, from 
which we ask a redress of our grievances ? The no¬ 
tion is fallacious ! In such a government the only 
reliance is on the sense of justice, and the clemency 
of»the monarch. If he is a brute, there is nothing 
left but resistance or despair. 

Nor is it in monarchies or aristocracies alone, that 


75 


this meretricious union of the powers of government 
is fruitful of mischief. Whatever the form of go¬ 
vernment, the union brings forth evil. If the legis¬ 
lative power is vested in the executive magistrate, 
the case is presented which we have just been con¬ 
sidering. If on the other hand the executive power 
is intrusted to the legislature , in whole or in part, 
the mischief is corresponding. The execution of 
the laws being too much dependent upon the will of 
a many headed body, all the evils of vacillating coun¬ 
cils, of tardiness, indecision, and inefficiency, will be 
felt, while occasionally, the legislative body will be 
tempted into extravagance, which may ultimately 
lead to usurpation on the one hand, or render, on 
the other, revolution a virtue. 

“ If the executive pow r er,” says Mr. Adams, (pre¬ 
face, page 13) “ or any considerable part of it, is 
left in the hands of an aristocratical or democratical 
assembly, it will corrupt the legislature as naturally, 
as rust corrupts iron, or as arsenic poisons the hu¬ 
man body ; and when the legislature is corrupted, 
the people are undone.” See also 3 Adams, 417 
to 425. 

“ Whenever,” says Mr. Blackstone, “the right of 
making and enforcing the laws are united together, 
there can be no public liberty ;” “ but where the le¬ 
gislative and executive authority are in distinct 
hands, the former will take care not to entrust the 
latter with so large a power, as may tend to the sub¬ 
version of its own independence and therewith of 
the liberty of the subject.” There is some security 
for good laws, when they may be brought to bear 
upon those who made them. But if those who make 
them, have the power to execute them, they will be 
too soon tempted to execute them upon others only, 
and not upon themselves. There may be some hope 
of resistance to executive oppression, when the law¬ 
making power and the executive are distinct. The 
formar will be the champion of the people, against 


16 


a tyranny which, if not arrested, may reach them* 
selves. But if the legislature, are executive also, 
all hope of relief from them is vain. A parliament 
may readily refuse a standing army to a king, from 
jealousy of his power. What parliament would be 
restrained from raising an army from jealousy of 
their own ? A parliament may insist, against the 
crown, on frequent elections. How long before they 
would be tempted to extend the tenure of their office, 
instead of curtailing it, if they had themselves 
alone to fear ? Where the powers are distinct, the 
legislative may not only be a check to the execu¬ 
tive, but the latter also may be an efficient check 
to the usurpations of the former. The execu¬ 
tive may veto an oppressive law of parliament, 
but who will look to parliament to veto its own law ? 
The executive may give the alarm of legislative usur¬ 
pation, but when would the legislature raise the cry 
against themselves ? 

There can be little doubt that these and suchlike 
weighty considerations together with the opinions of 
the most distinguished authors have given rise to the 
provision which is to be found in the constitution of 
the state of Virginia. It has in that instrument been 
well and distinctly declared, “ that the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary departments, shall be kept 
separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the 
powers belonging to the other.” Well it would have 
been, if in practice the framers of our state consti¬ 
tution, had but adhered to the great principle which 
they so strongly maintained in theory. But in the 
survey we propose of that instrument, we shall too 
often have occasion to observe, how large a portion of 
the powers of the government are swallowed up in 
the legislative vortex. 

Having thus established, I trust, the importance 
of keeping separate the three great powers of go¬ 
vernment, we proceed next to consider in whom it 
would be most expedient that they should respective- 


11 


ly be vested. Let us begin with the legislature or law¬ 
making power, both because it is supreme de facto. 
as long as it continues to exercise its functions, and 
because its proper adjustment, very materially and 
indeed decidedly, influences the general character of 
the institutions of a state. 

Now, as every workman who is called upon to de¬ 
vise the plan of his machine for accomplishing a par¬ 
ticular object, first sets himself to deliberate upon its 
purpose, so let us, in considering the best construc¬ 
tion of a legislative body, keep steadfastly in view 
the great object of promoting the security of the 
state, and the happiness and welfare of the people. 
And here it is obvious that two things are essential, 
good intentions and adequate ability. For all the 
ability in the world will be of less importance, than 
that the rulers be inspired by a love of country which 
will prompt to zeal for the public good ;—a purity 
and disinterestedness, which is ready to sacrifice itself 
for the state, and a stern integrity which is above 
temptation, and sets at defiance the lures of ambi¬ 
tion, the seductions of wealth, the follies of titles, 
and the splendors of a court. On the other hand, 
these elevated virtues will not avail to secure the 
happiness and prosperity of the state, without wis¬ 
dom in council and sagacity in the conduct of af¬ 
fairs. Intelligence and 'public virtue are therefore 
the two great objects of attainment in the construc¬ 
tion of this branch of a government , and the grand 
desideratum is to discover, by what system they 
are most likely to be secured. Moreover, as wdth 
good intentions, the mass of mankind may often 
succeed in the attainment of praiseworthy ends, and 
as with bad intentions, wisdom and sagacity will but 
make matters worse, it would seem to follow', that 
our first object should be the infusion, into the body 
that exercises the supreme power, of the greatest 
attainable degree of public spirit or public virtue. 
Cf this be so, it is not difficult to shew, that in every 
8 


78 


government there should be a large infusion of the 
democratic principle. For nothing is more clear 
than that the great body of the people, taken en 
masse , can have no other object than the prosperity 
and happiness of their common country. They may 
err as to the means of attaining it. but they can 
have no other wish but for its well-doing. Its pros¬ 
perity is their prosperity ; its happiness their hap¬ 
piness ; its subjugation and its misery emphatically 
also theirs . Individuals in office, indeed, and indi¬ 
viduals seeking office, popular generals and popular 
orators, flatterers and sycophants, the courters of 
popularity, and political partizans, all h&xe their pri¬ 
vate and selfish views. Their own elevation, their 
own wealth, their own aggrandizement, are the base 
motives which actuate them. But, for one of these 1 
there are hundreds of the honest yeomanry of the 
country, whose thoughts are never raised to office or 
to power; whose fields and whose firesides are the 
theatre of their action; who have nothing to ask 
and nothing to hope at the hand of the public but 
wholesome laws, protection and security;—freedom 
from public burdens ; the blessings of peace, and 
exemption from the ills of war and devastation, the 
accursed fruits of mad ambition. These have but 
one sentiment in relation to their country, a sincere 
desire for its prosperity and happiness. They may 
be, and often are indeed, misled by demagogues, 
who breathe the pestilential breath of party into 
their honest bosoms, and pervert their virtuous feel¬ 
ings from their proper aim. Yet still that aim is 
good. Even Mr. Blackstone, (1 vol. 49) with all 
his predilections for monarchical institutions, pays a 
just tribute to the good intentions of the people, 
and estimates, as of no little value, the democratical 
ingredients in the British constitution. “ In a de¬ 
mocracy,” says he, “ where the right of making laws 
resides in the people at large, public virtue or good¬ 
ness of intentions is more likely to be found than 


79 


either of the other qualities of government. Popu* 
lar assemblies are frequently foolish in their contri¬ 
vance, and weak in their execution ; but generally, 
mean to do the thing that is right and just, and 
have always a degree of patriotism or public spi¬ 
rit.” “ Democracies,” he adds, “ are therefore best 
calculated to direct the end of the laws and he 
afterwards, in speaking of the happy structure of 
the British government, takes occasion to remark 
upon “ the House of Commons, as freely chosen by 
the people from among themselves, and as making 
that branch of the legislature a kind of democra¬ 
cy.” p. 50. 

Archdeacon Paley, too, in commenting on the 
comparative advantages of the different forms of 
government, has the candor to acknowledge, “ that 
those of a republic are liberty, or exemption from 
needless restrictions ; equal laws ; regulations adapt¬ 
ed to the wants and circumstances of the people; 
public spirit; frugality; averseness to war; the op¬ 
portunities which democratic assemblies afford to men 
of every description of producing their abilities and 
counsels to public observation, and the exciting 
thereby and calling forth to the service of the com¬ 
monwealth the faculties of its best citizens.” 

To these unbiassed testimonials, of two of the 
most zealous and distinguished admirers of monar 
chical government, let me refer the student to the 
just reflections of the distinguished Frenchman so 
often quoted. See De Tocqueville, 218 to 222. 
In concluding his very striking remarks, he observes : 

“ In the United States, where the public officers 
have no interests to promote connected with their 
caste, the general and constant influence of the go¬ 
vernment is beneficial, although the individuals who 
conduct it are frequently unskilful and sometimes 
contemptible. There is indeed a secret tendency in 
democratic institutions to render the exertions of the 
citizens subservient to the prosperity of the commu- 


80 


nity, notwithstanding their private vices and mis¬ 
takes ; whilst in aristocratic institutions there is a 
secret propensity, which, notwithstanding the talents 
and the virtue of those who conduct the government, 
leads them to contribute to the evils which oppress 
their fellow-creatures. In aristocratic governments 
public men may frequently do injuries which they 
do not intend ; and in democratic states they pro¬ 
duce advantages which they never thought of.” 

It would be fortunate for mankind, if these great 
advantages were not in a great degree counterba¬ 
lanced by correspondent defects. These will be 
fairly presented, when we come to consider, more 
distinctly, the several forms of government, with 
their comparative merits. It is only necessary here 
to remark, that having found in the government of 
the people the principle of public virtue, we are next 
to see, by what means that intelligence, deliberation 
and wisdom in the councils of the nation are to be 
secured, without which the great ends of social in¬ 
stitutions can never be effectually attained. It is 
lamentably true, that these are too often wanting in 
governments of the people. In pure democracies, 
where the assembled nation meet together to delibe¬ 
rate on public affairs, (as was the case in Athens,) 
the very character of the assembly excludes every 
idea of calm and deliberate reflection. The dissen- 
tions, the tumults, and the disorder which prevail in 
large asse mblies, are familiar to all ; the factions 
which agitate and control them arising from the at¬ 
tempts of the leading citizens to possess themselves 
of power is attested by every page in the his¬ 
tory of the Grecian republics; the clamor and con¬ 
fusion of deciding questions by the vote of a multi¬ 
tude, and the angry passions which lead to blood¬ 
shed and broil, as the ultimate result of the public 
councils, all sufficiently evince, how totally inade¬ 
quate a pure democracy is to produce that wisdom 
and intelligence in the management of affairs, which 


81 


is essential to a nation’s liberty, prosperity, and hap¬ 
piness. 

On the other hand, what has been already 
said abundantly shews the danger of vesting the 
law-making power in the hands of the prince ; for 
the execution of the laws being intrusted to him, it 
is obvious that there can be no safety for the people, 
when the power shall devolve upon a tyrant. The 
best security which man can have against oppressive 
laws, is their bearing upon the lawgiver as well as 
upon the people. But if the prince has the power 
to make law, he will take care to exempt himself 
from those which are onerous and oppressive; and 
the history of the world, and the character of the 
human heart both conspire to shew, that when this 
is the case, the only barrier against oppression is ta¬ 
ken away. The subject will be ground into dust, 
when the master does not share in his sufferings. 

Absolute monarchy then, is utterly destitute of 
the first great requisite in social institutions. The 
monarch has no common feeling or common interest 
with his slaves. He legislates for his own security 
and power, and not for their happiness. Wrapped 
up in self, corrupted by luxury, enervated by volup¬ 
tuousness, and spoiled by power, he is blind and 
deaf to human calamity. 

He sits aloft amid the herd 

Of mute barbarians bending to his nod, 

And says within himself, I am a king ! 

And wherefore should the clamorous voice of woe 
Intrude upon my ear!— Akenside. 

Nor is the absolute monarch presented in these 
dark colors by the poet only. Take but the sketch 
which holy writ has given of his iron rule, and my 
feeble language will not be needed, to stamp upon „ 
your hearts an enduring impression of the horrors of 
a heartless tyranny. It is to be found in that inte¬ 
resting passage, in which it is recited that the way¬ 
ward children of Israel had demanded of Samuel, 
8 * 


82 


their prophet, a king to reign over them. And 
Samuel prayed unto the Lord ! and the Lord in his 
anger commanded him to yield unto the people’s 
wishes, “ and to shew them the manner of the king 
that should reign over them.” 

“ And Samuel told all the words of the Lord unto 
the people that asked of him a king. And he said,, 
this will be the manner of the king that shall reign 
over you : He will take your sons and appoint them 
for himself, and for his chariots and for his horse¬ 
men, and some shall run before his chariots. 

“ And he will appoint him captains over thou¬ 
sands, and captains over fifties, and will set them to 
ear his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make 
his instruments of war and instruments of his cha¬ 
riots. 

“ And he will take your daughters to be confection¬ 
aries and to be cooks and to be bakers; 

“And he will take your fields and your vineyards, 
and your olive yards, even the best of them and give 
them to his servants. 

“ And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of 
your vineyards, and give to his officers and to his 
servants. 

“And he will take your men servants, and your 
maid servants, and your goodly young men, and your 
asses and put them to his work. 

“ He will take the tenth of your sheep and your 
cattle, and ye shall be his servants. 

“ And ye shall cry out in that day because of 
your king which you shall have chosen you; and 
the Lord will not hear you in that day !” 

What a portrait! Yet how many dark lines are 
wanting to complete the formidable resemblance. 
The bowstring and the knout, the sword and the 
scaffold, the inquisition and the bastile,the burnings 
at Smithfield, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, 
furnish yet harsher traits in the revolting picture! 

Nor is it alone in the want of public virtue and an 


83 


honest zeal for the interest of the community, 
that an absolute monarchy may be regarded as defi¬ 
cient. It is defective also, for the most part, in in¬ 
telligence. It may sometimes chance, indeed, that 
he who has seized upon the throne may be a man of 
an enlarged and capacious mind ; sagacious to per¬ 
ceive the importance of gathering around him all 
the ability of his empire, and availing himself of 
their wisdom in the direction of his affairs. But this 
must rarely be the case, and when the sceptre de¬ 
scends upon a fool, the affair is hopeless. It has in¬ 
deed been well observed to be a silly fashion to admit 
(as writers often do) that if you could be always sure 
of a wise, active, and virtuous prince, monarchy 
would be the best of governments. But this is so 
far from being admissible, that it will forever remain 
true that a government, though only partially imbued 
with the principles of freedom, has unspeakable 
advantages over a simple monarchy. The best and wi¬ 
sest prince, by means of the freer communication with 
his people, and the greater opportunities to collect 
the best advice through the great councils of the na¬ 
tion which a parliament would give him, would have 
an immense advantage over a simple monarchy. 
“An assembly, composed of representatives chosen 
by the people in all parts of the dominion, gives the 
whole nation free access to the monarch, and com¬ 
municates all the wants, the knowledge, the pro¬ 
jects, and the wishes of the nation to the head of 
the government; it excites an emulation among all 
classes of the people ; it removes complaints, re¬ 
dresses grievances, affords opportunities of exertion 
to genius though in obscurity, and gives full scope to 
all the faculties of man ; finally, it opens every ave¬ 
nue to improvement to the legislature, to the admin¬ 
istration, and to the public, and gives an universal 
energy to the human character, in every part of the 
state, which never can be obtained under the blight¬ 
ing influences of a [simple] monarchy.” See Adams' 
Defence, Pref. 9-10. 


81 


It may, indeed, well be questioned, whether the 
reign of a great, a clement and beneficent prince 
is not in its effects more fatal to the liberties of man¬ 
kind, than the misrule of an idiot or the cruelties of 
a tyrant. It reconciles man to despotism! It stills 
all opposition to the sovereign will. It induces such 
an habitual reverence for, and acquiescence in the 
measures of the prince, who has won the public 
confidence, that self-reliance is destroyed! Man 
forgets to think for himself, in the consciousness, 
that there is another to think for him. It levels 
whatever barriers may have existed against power, 
and relaxes every bond by which it was once re¬ 
strained. It converts a senate or a parliament into 
a mere registrar of imperial edicts, and though the 
forms of a constitution may be preserved, the go¬ 
vernment becomes a despotism, under the false guise 
of a commonwealth. Such was the case under the 
dominion of Augustus, who affected to govern 
through the power of the senate, while in effect he 
annihilated its authority, and left it a supple tool in 
the hands of the gloomy and cruel Tiberius. Such 
too was the case in the halcyon days of Trajan and 
the Antonines, who for more than three quarters of 
a century, conducted the affairs of Rome with con¬ 
summate wisdom and paternal care, but only con¬ 
tributed thereby to “ the waveless calm” of arbitrary 
power, and to surrender the mistress of the world, 
impotent and nerveless, into the hands of a beard¬ 
less boy—the tiger Commodus. 

Come down to modern history, and to that par¬ 
ticularly of the race from which we spring, and be¬ 
hold how many privileges have been wrung from 
wicked monarchs. The charters of Henry III. and 
John, which contain the most salutary safeguards 
for person and for property, the habeas corpus in the 
reign of the second Charles and his provision for 
triennial parliaments ; the revolutions of 1648 and 
1688, all prove the struggle for liberty and the pri- 


85 


vileges of the people, to be but the consequences of 
power abused, and tyranny no longer to be endured. 
In every shape, therefore, monarchy is of fearful cha¬ 
racter. In the hands of a tyrant, it is ruthless, sa¬ 
vage and unrelenting ; in the hands of a gentle and 
an able prince, it acquires new strength and vigor. 
It grows and increases unperceived, until it becomes 
gigantic, and falls into the hands of the unworthy 
successor, invested with terrific energy and irresisti¬ 
ble power. 

OF ARISTOCRACY. 

If the ingredient of public virtue, or zeal for the 
general welfare of the whole people, is wanting in a 
simple or absolute monarchy, it is not more to be 
found in aristocratical governments. These being 
founded on a distinction of ranks, and a difference 
of privileges, the two classes are of necessity al¬ 
ways in antagonizing positions. And though the 
lower class may be kept quiet and submissive by the 
power and ability of the nobles, yet it is obvious that 
their rights are outraged, and that the great purpo¬ 
ses of society are but imperfectly accomplished, in 
regard to them,. The nobles, (from the natural in¬ 
stincts of the human heart,) being in possession of 
wealth and power, are ever tenacious of their enjoy¬ 
ment, and greedy for more. The people, already in 
subjection, are incapable of resistance, and their 
numerous masters lord it over them with unsparing 
rigor. Of all species of domination, that is cer¬ 
tainly the most odious, where the nobles not only 
have, as a body, the powers of government in their 
hands, but possess, as individuals, personal privileges 
and immunities over portions of their vassals. Such 
was the feudal system with the king at its head ; (for 
he was only the chief baron, until his powers were 
increased by the body of the people, in their own 
defence, as a counterpoise to the tyranny of the 
lords.) Cast back your recollections to the frightful 


86 


accounts of feudalism, which you have recently pe¬ 
rused, and recall the fealty and the degrading ho¬ 
mage, and the knight-service, and the wardships, 
and the reliefs, and the aids and the primer seizins, 
with all the other burdens which ground the vassal 
into dust, and nothing more can be necessary to con¬ 
vey to you an adequate idea, of the tyranny and 
selfishness of a privileged aristocracy. Invested 
with the power of making laws, and the interests of 
their whole body concurring to oppress the great 
body of their tenants by new exactions operating for 
their own benefit, they have every temptation to in¬ 
justice. Nay, more, each having his own vassals 
immediately under his eye, the wretched people find 
themselves even more oppressed, than under the do¬ 
minion of a monarch, from whose injustice and from 
whose observation, the greater part might be removed 
by their distance, or concealed by their obscurity. 
Aggrieved by the exactions or provoked by the enor¬ 
mities of their immediate superiors, the commons 
have in many countries of Europe sought refuge in 
the monarchy, and received protection from the 
reigning prince, against the oppressions of the aris¬ 
tocracy. The depression of the barons in England, 
under the house of Tudor, was beheld with satisfac¬ 
tion by the people, although they saw the crown was 
thereby acquiring a power, which no limitations, at 
that time provided, were ever likely to confine. For 
grievous as is the despotism of a single man, it is 
scarcely so vexatious as the tyranny of a body of 
nobles ; since he can never exercise oppression in so 
many places at the same time, as a numerous nobility 
over their respective vassals and dependents. The 
freedom and the satisfaction of private life, have ever 
been found to be more constrained and harrassed by 
the latter, than by the most vexatious laws or even 
by the lawless will of an arbitrary monarch. 

“ The English aristocracy is perhaps the most 
liberal that ever has existed. But it cannot escape 



87 


observation that in the legislation of England, the 
good of the poor has been sacrificed to the advantage 
of the rich, and the rights of the majority to the pri¬ 
vileges of the few. The consequence is that she 
combines the extremes of fortune in the bosom of 
her society, and her perils and calamities are almost 
equal to her power and her renown.” De Tocque- 
ville, p. 221. 

In vain then, it would seem, can man look to either 
of the unmixed forms of government for happiness 
and protection. In one only does he find that pub¬ 
lic virtue or great zeal for the good of the great 
body of the people, which is the only legitimate ob¬ 
ject of all social institutions, and peculiarly essen¬ 
tial in the law-making power ; and in that one there 
are probably defects which require the infusion of 
some other principles for their correction. For ad¬ 
mitting that a pure democracy is animated by the pu¬ 
rest intentions, yet it is sufficiently apparent, from 
what has been adverted to, that it is not fitted for 
deliberation, nor are its measures likely to be gene¬ 
rally the result of wise and judicious councils. 
Moreover, as it is very obvious, that it is ill adapted 
to fulfil the executive and judicial functions, which 
it would be dangerous to intrust to the hands of the 
law-making power, we are driven of necessity to the 
formation of a mixed government for the attainment 
of our ends. And in order the better to be enabled 
to determine what is best, it behoves us to be¬ 
come somewhat more intimately acquainted with 
the principal advantages and disadvantages, and 
also with the spirit and tendencies of the three sim¬ 
ple forms of government. 


88 


LECTURE VI. 


07 THE THREE SIMPLE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, 

We have already had occasion to remark that the 
several simple forms of government have been gene¬ 
rally reduced by political writers to three, viz : mo¬ 
narchy, aristocracy, and democracy. 

But though these may be regarded as the three 
simple principles into whichgovernments may be re¬ 
solved, yet it is probable that all actual governments 
are composed of some combination and intermixture 
of one or more of the several forms ; and are not 
anywhere to be found existing in a pure and elemen¬ 
tary state. And accordingly as one of these several 
principles predominates over the rest, it gives its 
name and communicates its general character to the 
government. Thus, Athens was called a democracy, 
even with its Archons. Rome was at one time an 
aristocracy, in spite of the consuls and comitia cen- 
turiata on the one hand, and the tribunes and com- 
mitia tribunitia on the other. England is called a 
monarchy, notwithstanding its nobility and the infu¬ 
sion of the principles of democracy to be found in 
its institutions. Perhaps it is more truly an aristo¬ 
cracy of birth and wealth combined, balanced and 
checked by a large infusion of monarchical princi¬ 
ples on one hand, and some important democratical 
forms on the other. 

But notwithstanding the intermixture, the princi¬ 
ples of the several infused ingredients are felt and 
preserved in all the operations of the system ; that 
which is predominant, however, giving very much of 



89 


its peculiar character to the whole. Hence it is that 
we should make ourselves familiar with the peculiar 
characteristics of each. Let us take them in their 
order. 

The advantages which have been attributed to 
monarchy by its admirers might perhaps be summon¬ 
ed up in its strength. In detail they are said to 
be “ unity of council, activity, decision, secrecy, 
dispatch ; the military strength and energy which 
result from these qualities of government; the ex¬ 
clusion of popular and aristocratical contentions; 
the preventing by a known rule of succession of all 
competition for the supreme power, and thereby re¬ 
pressing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambi¬ 
tion of aspiring citizens.”—Paley. These are quali¬ 
ties largely infused into the British constitution. 
Without, by any means, admitting the entire cor¬ 
rectness of this view of the matter, it may safely be 
conceded that the principle of monarchy is strength 
and vigor; and that, if ably and faithfully adminis¬ 
tered, it has capacities for effecting great ends by vi¬ 
gorous and efficient means, springing from its unity 
of purpose, its activity, its decision, and its uncon¬ 
trolled and untrammelled action. These are indeed 
valuable objects in government, and in so far as they 
can be secured, without incurring th$ mischiefs by 
which they are sometimes attended, it is certainly 
desirable that they should be infused into every sys¬ 
tem, which is intended to promote the prosperity 
and power of the nation. But unfortunately, the 
mischiefs and dangers of monarchy are of an appall¬ 
ing character where it is not adequately restrained. 
It is conceded by its admirers that “ its dangers are 
tyranny, expense, exaction, military domination ; un¬ 
necessary wars waged to gratify the passions of an 
individual, and the risk of the character of the reign¬ 
ing prince—Paley,—since the successor of an able, 
wise, politic and patriotic monarch, maybe a tyrant, 
a madman or a fool; in whose hands those fearful 
9 


90 


powers, wielded by his predecessor for the benefit of 
the people, may be perverted to their oppression or 
injudiciously employed to their ruin and destruc¬ 
tion. 

Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi! 

Nor is this all! The possession of power gene¬ 
rates the love of it, and the march of power is ever 
onward. In the hands of a good king, accumula¬ 
tion of privileges and authority in the crown is con¬ 
ceded on the part of the people to his virtues; and 
are exercised, because the beneficent monarch is 
conscious of his own good intentions. They pass 
to a tyrannical successor who holds fast what he 
gets, and gets more by the operation of that power¬ 
ful machinery which is committed to his hands. Add 
to these considerations the corruptions employed to 
secure retainers, the patronage sought and acquired 
to strengthen power, the tendency to luxury and re¬ 
gal splendor, and we may well hesitate to concur in 
the blind admiration mankind has ever paid to mo¬ 
narchy. But when we further call to mind, that the 
operation of the system is always to aggrandize the 
few at the expense of the many, and to create a 
community of wealthy retainers at court, and de¬ 
spised and suffering paupers throughout the land, 
we can have ]itfle doubt that a preponderance of the 
monarchical principle, is less calculated to effect its 
boasted ends on the one hand, than to prove fatal to 
the nation’s happiness on the other. 

The advantages attributed to aristocracy consist 
in the wisdom which may be expected from experi¬ 
ence and education : a permanent counsel naturally 
possesses experience, and the members who succeed 
to their places in it by inheritance, will probably be 
trained and educated with a view to the stations 
which they are destined by their birth to occupy. 
Paley. Its mischiefs are, dissentions in the ruling 
orders of the state, (which from the want of a com¬ 
mon superior are liable to proceed, in their contests 


91 


for power, to the most desperate extremities ;) and 
oppression of the lower classes by the privileged or 
higher orders, and by laws and institutions partial to 
the separate interests of the law makers.—Paley. 

In these remarks of Mr. Paley there is too much, 
I apprehend, attributed to the supposed wisdom of 
the aristocracy. Experience has demonstrated that 
in wisdom and capacity for public affairs, a nobility 
does not always surpass the representatives of the 
Commons. The history of England might be confi¬ 
dently appealed to for the proof. The house of 
Lords can boast of no superiority of talent or ac¬ 
quirement, over the members of the lower house, 
and particularly if we take from them those, who 
hold their seats among the peers, by a patent of no¬ 
bility conferred upon themselves, for their distin¬ 
guished career in the other house of parliament. 
Perhaps, indeed, it might not be too hazardous to 
affirm, that for centuries past the Commons have ex¬ 
hibited a decided superiority over the Lords ; the 
consequence of which has been, that the high offices 
of the government are almost always found in the 
hands of a commoner. The Walpoles and St. Johns, 
the Pitts and the Foxes, the Castlereaghs and the 
Peels, the Cannings and the Broughams, may chal¬ 
lenge competition with the noblest members of the 
British peerage. Yet all of them were commoners 
themselves. Who among the degenerate descend¬ 
ants of the Lancasters, the Yorks, the Richmonds 
or the Warwicks can now boast of being “ lords of 
the ascendant ?” Their suns have set, and their 
great and shining lights have dwindled to twinkling 
stars, that scarce are seen amid the blaze of rising 
constellations. Those who hold their patent of no¬ 
bility by inheritance, have been beautifully compared 
to stars, which are reflected from the calm and still 
surface of the ocean. They would not appear there 
but for their bright originals in heaven. If the 
house of Lords has been too contemptuously called 


92 


the mausoleum of genius, yet it must be conceded 
to be absolutely necessary to renovate its strength, 
by frequent infusions of the wholesome vigor of the 
Commons. Enervated by luxury, and deprived by 
the possession of boundless wealth and convention¬ 
al dignity, of the strongest stimulants to intellectual 
effort, they would degenerate into a hospital of im¬ 
beciles, but for the healthy influence of new-made- 
peers. We cannot then, I think, concede to aristo¬ 
cracy the title it arrogates to permanent wisdom and 
ability, while on the other hand it has been attend¬ 
ed, wherever it has wielded the powers of sovereign¬ 
ty, by the most grinding oppression of the great bo¬ 
dy of the people, and by the other mischiefs to which 
we already have adverted. 

“ The advantages of a republic,” says a devoted 
admirer of the British monarchy, (Mr. Paley. See 
also the Federalist, No. 71,) “ are liberty or exemp¬ 
tion from needless restrictions ; equal laws; regula¬ 
tions adapted to the wants and circumstances of the 
people ; public spirit, frugality, averseness to war; 
the opportunities which democratic assemblies af¬ 
ford to men of every description, of bringing for¬ 
ward their abilities and counsels to public observa¬ 
tion, and the exciting thereby and calling forth to 
the service of the commonwealth the faculties of it* 
best citizens.” 

On the other hand the evils of a republic are by 
the same writer said to be “ dissensions, tumults, 
factions; the attempts of powerful citizens to pos¬ 
sess themselves of the empire ; the confusion, rage, 
and clamor which are the inevitable consequences of 
assembling multitudes, and of propounding ques¬ 
tions of state to the discussion of the people; the 
delay and disclosure of public counsels and designs; 
and the imbecility of measures retarded by the ne¬ 
cessity of obtaining the consent of numbers ; lastly, 
the oppression of the provinces which are not ad - 
mited to a participation in the legislative power'* 


93 


In these animadversions, if our devotion to the 
republican character of our own institutions forbids 
us altogether to concur, yet we must in all fairness 
admit that there is too much truth in the picture in 
respect to a wild and uncontrolled democracy, such 
as existed at one time in the Athenian common¬ 
wealth. Happily, however, mankind are not driven 
to the dangerous resort of a pure democracy, in fly¬ 
ing from the horrors of a gloomy despotism, or the 
not less terrible oppressions of a heartless aristocra 
cy. We seek for refuge in mixed governments, and 
our business is so to mingle the ingredients in our 
power as to produce the most wholesome and salu¬ 
tary results. 

We shall, therefore, now proceed to examine the 
structure and organization of mixed governments 
and to enquire into their probable operation and ef¬ 
fect in promoting the only legitimate objects of so¬ 
cial institutions, the happiness of the people, and 
their security from foreign danger and domestic 
violence. 


LECTURE Vli. 


OF MIXED GOVERNMENTS. 

u A mixed government,” says Mr. Paley, “ is com¬ 
posed of two or more of the simple forms of go¬ 
vernment above described—and, in whatever pro¬ 
portion each form enters into the constitution of a 
government, in the same proportion may both the 
advantages and evils, which we have attributed to 
that form, be expected ; that is, those are the uses 
9* 




94 


to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the 
constitution, and these are the dangers to be provi¬ 
ded against in each. Thus, if secrecy and dispatch 
be truly enumerated amongst the separate excellen¬ 
cies of regal government; then a mixed government, 
which retains monarchy in one part of its constitu¬ 
tion, should be careful that the other estates of the 
empire do not, by an officious and inquisitive inter¬ 
ference with the executive functions, which are, or 
ought to be, reserved to the administration of the 
prince, interpose delays, or divulge what it is expedi¬ 
ent to conceal. On the other hand, if profusion, 
exaction, military domination and needless wars, be 
justly accounted natural properties of monarchy, in 
its simple unqualified form ; then are these the ob¬ 
jects to which, in a mixed government, the aristo¬ 
cratic and popular parts of the constitution ought to 
direct their vigilance; the dangers against which 
they should raise and fortify their barriers ; these 
are departments of sovereignty, over which a power 
of inspection and control ought to be deposited with 
the people. 

“ The same observation may be repeated of all 
the other advantages and inconveniences which 
have been ascribed to the several simple forms of 
government; and affords a rule whereby to direct 
the construction, improvement, and administration 
qf mixed governments, subjected however to this 
remark, that a quality sometimes results from the 
Conjunction of two simple forms of government, 
which belongs not to the separate existence of ei¬ 
ther : thus corruption, which has no place in an ab¬ 
solute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is sure 
to gain admission into a constitution, which divides 
the supreme power between an executive magistrate 
and a popular council.”—Paley. 

Without cavilling at any part of these remarks of 
the very sensible and intelligent author, I shall only 
here premise, that it may not perhaps be easy to re- 


95 


duce our own institutions, whose character we are 
most interested in observing, to the class of mixed 
or unmixed governments, as defined by the writers 
upon political topics. Its infusion of the monar¬ 
chical principle on the one hand is so minute, and 
that of the democratical so pervading, that it can 
with little propriety be classed with those mixed go¬ 
vernments, in which the king is hereditary, and in¬ 
vested with the largest and most formidable powers. 
Yet as there are points of resemblance in some of 
their imporant features, between the British institu¬ 
tions and our own, it may not be amiss to present to 
the student a view of the former, as it is very cer¬ 
tainly the best specimen of a mixed monarchy which 
is afforded by the nations of Europe, whose systems 
alone are worthy of our observation. In doing this 
I cannot do better than to refer the class, in addition 
to what they will find in Mr. Blackstone, to Mr. Pa- 
ley’s defence of the British constitution ; as being 
one of the most candid, if not the most successful, 
while it has at the same time the merit of succinct¬ 
ness, so important to us from the narrow limits allot¬ 
ted for these disquisitions. The works of Delolme 
and of Miller merit all the encomiums which have 
been lavished on them, and are well worthy of dili¬ 
gent perusal. But they are too voluminous for our 
use here. The same consideration will induce me 
to read for the instruction of the student, Mr. Pa- 
ley’s defence. Book 6, ch. 7. 

“ By the constitution of a country, is meant, so 
much of its laws as relates to the designation and 
form of the legislature ; the rights and functions of 
the several parts of the legislative body ; the con¬ 
struction, office, and jurisdiction of the courts of 
justice. The constitution is one principal division, 
section, or title of the code of public laws; distin¬ 
guished from the rest only by the superior impor¬ 
tance of the subject of which it treats. 

“ The constitution of England, like that of most 


96 


other countries in Europe, hath grown out of occa¬ 
sion and emergency ; from the fluctuating policy of 
different ages ; from the contentions, successes, in¬ 
terests, and opportunities of different orders and 
parties of men in the community. It resembles one 
of those old mansions, which, instead of being built 
all at once, after a regular plan, and according to 
the rules of architecture at present established, has 
been reared in different ages of the art, has been al¬ 
tered from time to time, and has been continually 
receiving additions and repairs suited to the taste, 
fortune, or conveniency of its successive proprietors. 
In such a building, we look in vain for the elegance 
and proportion, for the just order and correspon¬ 
dence of parts, which we expect in a modern edi¬ 
fice ; and which external symmetry, after all, con¬ 
tributes much more perhaps to the amusement of 
the beholder, than the accommodation of the inha¬ 
bitant. 

u In the British, and possibly in all other constitu¬ 
tions, there exists a wide difference between the ac¬ 
tual state of the government and the theory. The one 
results from the other; but still they are different. 
When we contemplate the theory of the British con¬ 
stitution, we see the king invested with the most ab¬ 
solute personal impunity ; with a power of rejecting 
laws, which have been resolved upon by both houses 
of parliament; of conferring by his incorporation, 
upon any set or succession of men he pleases, the 
privilege of sending representatives into one house 
of parliament, as by his immediate appointment he 
can place whom he will in the other. What is this, 
a foreigner might ask, but a more circuitous despo¬ 
tism? Yet, when we turn our attention from the 
legal extent to the actual exercise of royal authority 
in England, we see these formidable prerogatives,, 
dwindled into mere ceremonies ; and in their stead, 
a sure and commanding influence, of which the 
constitution, it seems, is totally ignorant, growing 


97 


out of that enormous patronage, which the in¬ 
creased territory and opulence of the empire ha* 
placed in the disposal of the executive magistrate. 

“ Upon questions of reform, the habit of reflec¬ 
tion to be encouraged, is a sober comparison of the 
constitution under which we live, not with models 
of speculative perfection, but with the actual chance 
of obtaining better. This turn of thought will ge¬ 
nerate a political disposition, equally removed from 
that puerile admiration of present establishments 
which sees no fault, and can endure no change, and 
that distempered sensibility, which is alive only to 
perceptions of inconveniency, and is too impatient 
to be delivered from the uneasiness which it feels, to 
compute either the peril, or expense of the remedy. 
Political innovations commonly produce many effects 
besides those that are intended. The direct conse¬ 
quence is often the least important. Incidental, re¬ 
mote, and unthought of evils or advantages fre¬ 
quently exceed the good that is designed, or the 
mischief that is foreseen. It is from the silent and 
unobserved operation ; from the obscure progress of 
causes, set at work for different purposes, that the 
greatest revolutions take their rise. When Eliza¬ 
beth, and her immediate successor, applied them¬ 
selves to the encouragement and regulation of trade, 
by many wise laws, they knew not, that, together 
with wealth and industry, they were diffusing a con¬ 
sciousness of strength and independency, which 
would not long endure, under the forms of a mixed 
government, the dominion of arbitrary princes. 
When it was debated whether the mutiny act, the 
law by which the army is governed and maintained, 
should be temporary or perpetual, little else, proba¬ 
bly, occurred to the advocates of an annual bill, 
than the expediency of retaining a control over the 
most dangerous prerogative of the crown—the di¬ 
rection and command of a standing army : whereas, 
in its effect, this single reservation has altered the 


98 


whole frame and quality of the British constitution. 
For since, in consequence of the military system, 
which prevails in neighboring and rival nations, as 
well as on account of the internal exigencies of go¬ 
vernment, a standing army has become essential to 
the safety and administration of the empire ; it ena¬ 
bles parliament, by discontinuing this necessary pro¬ 
vision, so to enforce its resolutions upon any other 
subject, as to render the king’s dissent to a law, 
which has received the approbation of both houses, 
too dangerous an experiment any longer to be ad¬ 
vised. A contest between the king and parliament, 
cannot now be persevered in, without a dissolution 
of the government. Lastly, when the constitution 
conferred upon the crown the nomination to all em¬ 
ployments in the public service, the authors of this 
arrangement were led to it, by the obvious propriety, 
of leaving to a master the choice of his servants ; 
and by the manifest inconveniency of engaging the 
national council, upon every vacancy, in those per¬ 
sonal contests which attend elections to places of 
honor and emolument. Our ancestors did not ob¬ 
serve that this disposition added an influence to the 
regal office, which as the number and value of pub¬ 
lic employments increased, would supersede in a 
great measure the forms, and change the character 
of the ancient constitution. They knew not, what 
the experience and reflection of modern ages has 
discovered, that patronage universally is power; 
that he who possesses in a sufficient degree the 
means of gratifying the desires of mankind after 
wealth and distinction, by whatever checks and 
forms his authority may be limited or disguised, will 
direct the management of public affairs. Whatever 
be the mechanism of the political engine, he will 
guide the motion. These instances are adduced to 
illustrate the propositions we laid down, that, in po-< 
litics, the most important and permanent effects have, 
for the most part, been incidental and unforseen ; 


99 


and this proposition we inculcate, for the sake of 
the caution which it teaches, that changes ought not 
to be adventured upon without a comprehensive 
discernment of the consequences,—without a know¬ 
ledge, as well of the remote tendency, as of the im¬ 
mediate design. The courage of a statesman should 
resemble that of a commander, who, however re¬ 
gardless of personal danger, never forgets, that with 
his own he commits the lives and fortunes of a mul¬ 
titude; and who does not consider it as any proof 
of zeal or valor, to stake the safety of other men 
upon the success of a perilous or desperate enter- 
prize. 

“ The government of England , which has been 
sometimes called a mixed government, sometimes a 
limited monarchy, is formed by a combination of 
the three regular species of government; the mo¬ 
narchy, residing in the king ; the aristocracy, in the 
house of Lords ; and the republic being represent¬ 
ed by the house of Commons. The perfection in¬ 
tended by such a scheme of government is, to unite 
the advantages of the several simple forms, and to 
exclude the inconveniences. To what degree this 
purpose is attained or attainable in the British con¬ 
stitution ; wherein it is lost sight of or neglected; 
and by what means it may in any part be promoted 
with better success, the reader will be enabled to 
judge, by a separate recollection of these advanta¬ 
ges and inconveniences, as enumerated in the prece¬ 
ding chapter, and a distinct application of each to 
the political condition of this country. We will 
present our remarks upon the subject in a brief ac¬ 
count of the expedients by which the British consti¬ 
tution provides, 

“ 1st, For the interest of its subjects. 

“2dly, For its own preservation. 

“ The contrivances for the first of these purposes 
are the following: 

“In order to promote the establishment of salu* 


100 


tary and public laws, every citizen of the state ia 
capable of becoming a member of the senate; and 
every senator possesses ihe right of propounding to 
the deliberation of the legislature whatever law he 
pleases. 

“Every district of the empire enjoys the privilege 
of choosing representatives, informed of the inte¬ 
rests, and circumstances and desires of their consti¬ 
tuents, and entitled by their situation to communi¬ 
cate that information to the national council. The 
meanest subject has some one whom he can call up¬ 
on to bring forward his complaints and requests to 
public attention. 

“ By annexing the right of voting for members of 
the house of Commons to different qualifications in 
different places, each order ,and profession of men 
in the community become virtually represented; 
that is, men of all order and professions, statesmen, 
courtiers, country ntljmen, lawyers, merchants, 
manufacturers, soldiers, sailors, interested in the pros¬ 
perity, and experienced in the occupation of their 
respective professions, obtain seats in parliament. 

“ The elections at the same time, are so connect¬ 
ed with the influence of landed property, as to af¬ 
ford a certainty that a considerable number of men 
of great estates will be returned to parliament; and 
are also so modified, that men the most eminent and 
successful in their respective professions, are the 
most likely, by their riches, or the weight of their 
stations, to prevail in these competitions. 

“ The number, fortune, and quality of the mem¬ 
bers ; the variety of interests and characters amongst 
them ; above all, the temporary duration of their 
power, and the change of men which every new 
election produces, are so many securities to the pub¬ 
lic, as well against the subjection of their judgments 
to any external dictation, as against the formation 
of a junto in their own body, sufficiently powerful 
to govern their decisions. 


101 


“The representatives are so intermixed with the 
constituents, and the constituents with the rest of 
the people, that they cannot, without a partiality too 
flagrant to be endured, impose any burden upon 
the subject, in which they do not share themselves ; 
nor scarcely can they adopt any advantageous regu¬ 
lation in which their own interests will not partici¬ 
pate of the advantage. 

“ The proceedings and debates of parliament, and 
the parliamentary conduct of each representative, 
are known by the people at large. 

“ The representative is so far dependent upon the 
constituent, and political importance upon public fa¬ 
vor, that a member of parliament cannot more effec¬ 
tually recommend himself to eminence and advance¬ 
ment in the state, than by contriving and patroni¬ 
zing laws of public utility. 

“ When intelligence of the\ mdition, wants, and 
occasions of the people, is thus collected from every 
quarter, when such a variety of invention, and so 
many understandings are set at work upon the sub¬ 
ject, it may be presumed, that the most eligible ex¬ 
pedient, remedy or improvement, will occur to some 
one or other; and when a wise counsel, or benefi¬ 
cial regulation is once suggested, it may be expect¬ 
ed, from the disposition of an assembly so consti¬ 
tuted as the British house of commons is, that it 
cannot fail of receiving the approbation of a ma¬ 
jority. 

“ In the defence of the empire; in the mainte¬ 
nance of its power, dignity, and privileges, with fo¬ 
reign nations ; in the advancement of its trade by 
treaties and conventions; and in the providing for 
the general administration of municipal justice, by a 
proper choice and appointment of magistrates, the 
inclination of the king and of the people usually 
coincide ; in this part, therefore, of the regal office, 
the constitution entrusts the prerogative with ample 
powers. 

10 


102 


“ The dangers principally to be apprehended froftj 
fegal government, relate to the two articles, of 
taxation and punishment. In every form of go¬ 
vernment, from which the people are excluded, it is 
the interest of the governors to get as much, and of 
the governed to give as little as they can : the pow¬ 
er also of punishment, in the hands of an arbitrary 
prince, oftentimes becomes an engine of extortion, 
jealousy, and revenge. Wisely, therefore, hath 
the British constitution guarded the safety of the 
people, in these two points, by the most studious 
precautions. 

“Upon that of taxation; every law, which, by 
the remotest construction, may be deemed to levy 
money upon the property of the subject, must ori¬ 
ginate, that is, must first be proposed and assented 
to, in the house of commons: by which regulation, 
accompanying the weight which that assembly pos¬ 
sesses in all its functions, the levying of taxes is al¬ 
most exclusively reserved to the popular part of the 
constitution, who it is presumed, will not tax them¬ 
selves, nor their fellow subjects, without being first 
convinced of the necessity of the aids which they 
grant. 

e ' e The application also of the public supplies, is 
watched with the same circumspection, as the as¬ 
sessment. Many taxes are annual; the produce of 
others is mortgaged, or appropriated to specific ser¬ 
vices; the expenditure of all of them, is accounted 
for in the house of commons ; as computations of 
the charge of the purpose, for which they are want¬ 
ed, are previously submitted to the same tribunal. 

“ In the infliction o i punishment, the power of the 
crown, and of the magistrate appointed by the 
crown, is confined by the most precise limitations: 
the guilt of the offender must be pronounced by 
twelve men of his own order, indifferently chosen 
out of the county where the offence was committed 
the punishment, or the limits to which the punish- 


i03 


ment may be extended, are ascertained and affixed 
Jo the crime, by laws which knew not the person of 
the criminal. 

“ We proceed, in the second place, to enquire in 
what manner the constitution has provided for its own 
preservation; that is, in what manner each part of 
the legislature is secured in the exercise of the pow¬ 
ers assigned to it, from the encroachment of the 
other parts. This security is sometimes called the 
balance of the constitution’, and the political equi 
librium, which this phrase denotes, consists in two 
contrivances—a balance of power, and a balance oi 
interest. By a balance of power is meant, that there 
is no power possessed by one part of the legislature, 
the abuse, or excess of which is not checked by 
some antagonist power, residing in another part.— 
I B. C. 153. Thus the power of the two houses 
of parliament to frame laws is checked by the king’s 
negative; that if laws subversive of regal govern¬ 
ment should obtain the consent of parliament, the 
reigning prince, by interposing his prerogative, may 
save the necessary rights and authority of his sta¬ 
tion. On the other hand, the arbitrary application 
of this negative is checked by the privilege which 
parliament possesses, of refusing supplies of money 
to the exigencies of the king’s administration. The 
constitutional maxim, “ that the king can do no 
wrong,” is balanced by another maxim, not less con¬ 
stitutional, “ that the illegal commands of the king 
do not justify those who assist, or concur, in carry¬ 
ing them into execution and by a second rule, sub¬ 
sidiary to this, “ that the acts of the crown acquire 
not any legal force, until authenticated by the sub¬ 
scription of some of its great officers.” The wis¬ 
dom of this contrivance is worthy of observation. 
As the king could not be punished, without a civil 
war, the constitution exempts his person from trial 
or account; but lest this impunity should encourage 
n licentious exercise of dominion, various obstacles 


104 


are opposed to the private will of the sovereign, when 
directed to illegal objects. The pleasure of the 
crown must be announced with certain solemnities, 
and attested by certain officers of state. In some 
cases, the royal order must be signified by a secreta¬ 
ry of state ; in others it must pass under the privy 
seal, and in many, under the great seal. And when 
the king’s command is regularly published, no mis¬ 
chief can be achieved by it, without the ministry 
and compliance of those to whom it is directed. 
Now, all who either concur in an illegal order, by 
authenticating its publication with their seal or sub¬ 
scription, or who in any manner assist in carrying it 
into execution, subject themselves to prosecution 
and punishment, for the part they have taken ; and 
are not permitted to plead or produce the command 
of the king, in justification of their obedience.* 
But farther; the power of the crown to direct the 
military force of the kingdom, is balanced by the an¬ 
nual necessity of resorting to parliament for the 
maintenance and government of that force. The 
power of the king to declare war, is checked by the 
privilege of the house of commons, to grant or 
withhold the supplies by which the war must be car¬ 
ried on. The king’s choice of his ministers is con¬ 
trolled by the obligation he is under of appointing 
those men to offices in the state, who are found ca¬ 
pable of managing the affairs of his government 

*Amongst the checks, which parliament holds over the ad¬ 
ministration of public affairs, I forbear to mention the practice 
of addressing the king, to know by whose advice he resolved 
upan a particular measure, and of punishing the authors of 
that advice, for the counsel they had given. Not because I 
think this method either unconstitutional or improper, but for 
this reason, that it does not so much subject the king to the 
control of parliament, as it supposes him to be already in 
subjection. For if the king were so far out of the reach of 
the resentment of the house of commons, as to be able, with 
safety, to refuse the information requested, or to take upon 
himself the responsibility inquired after, there must be an 
end of all proceedings founded in this mode of application. 



105 


with the two houses of parliament. Which conside¬ 
ration imposes such a necessity upon the crown, as 
hath in a great measure subdued the influence of fa¬ 
voritism ; insomuch, that it is become no uncommon 
spectacle in this country, to see men promoted by 
the king to the highest offices, and richest prefer¬ 
ments, which he has in power to bestow, who have 
been distinguished by their opposition to his person¬ 
al inclinations. 

“ By the balance of interest , which accompanies 
and gives efficacy to the balance of power, is meant 
this, that the respective interests of the three estates 
of the empire are so disposed and adjusted, that 
which ever of the three shall attempt any encroach¬ 
ment, the other two will unite in resisting it. If the 
king should endeavor to extend his authority, by 
contracting the power and privileges of the com¬ 
mons, the house of lords would see their own digni¬ 
ty endangered by every advance which the crown 
made to independency upon the resolutions of par¬ 
liament. The admission of arbitrary power is no 
less formidable to the grandeur of the aristocracy, 
than it is fatal to the liberty of the republic; that is, 
it would reduce the nobility from the hereditary 
share they possess, in the national councils, in which 
their real greatness consists, to the being made a 
part of the empty pageantry of a despotic court. 
On the other hand, if the house of commons should 
encroach upon the distinct province, or usurp the 
established prerogative of the crown, the house of 
lords would receive an instant alarm from every new 
stretch of popular power. In every contest in which 
the king may be engaged with the representative 
body, in defence of his established share of authori¬ 
ty, he will find a sure ally in the collective power of 
the nobility. An attachment to the monarchy, from 
which they derive their own distinction ; the allure¬ 
ments of a court, in the habits and with the senti¬ 
ments of which they have been brought up ; their 
10 * 


106 


hatred of equality, and of all leveling pretensions, 
which may ultimately affect the privileges, or even 
the existence of their order; in short, every princi¬ 
ple and every prejudice which are wont to actuate 
human conduct, will determine their choice, to the 
side and support of the crown. Lastly, if the no¬ 
bles themselves should attempt to revive the superi¬ 
orities, which their ancestors exercised under the 
feudal constitution, the king and the people would 
alike remember, how the one had been insulted, and 
the other enslaved, by that barbarous tyranny. They 
would forget the natural opposition of their views 
and inclinations, when they saw themselves threat¬ 
ened with the return of a domination, which was odi¬ 
ous and intolerable to both. 

“ The reader will have observed, that in describ¬ 
ing the British constitution, little notice has been 
taken of the house of lords. The proper use and 
design of this part of the constitution, are the fol¬ 
lowing : First, to enable the king, by his right of 
bestowing the peerage, to reward the servants of the 
public, in a manner most grateful to them, and at a 
small expense to the nation ; secondly, to fortify the 
power and to secure the stability of regal govern¬ 
ment, by an order of men naturally allied to its in¬ 
terests ; and, thirdly, to answer a purpose, which, 
though of superior importance to the other two, does 
not occur so readily to our observation ; namely, to 
stem the progress of popular fury. Large bodies of 
men are subject to sudden phrenzies. Opinions are 
sometimes circulated amongst a multitude without 
proof or examination, acquiring confidence and re¬ 
putation merely by being repeated from one to ano¬ 
ther ; and passions founded upon these opinions, 
diifusing themselves with a rapidity which can nei¬ 
ther be accounted for nor resisted, may agitate a 
country with the most violent commotions. Now 
the only way to stop the fermentation, is to di¬ 
vide the mass ; that is, to erect different orders 


107 


in the community, with separate prejudices and in¬ 
terests. And this may occasionally become the 
use of an hereditary nobility, invested with a 
share of the legislation. Averse to those prejudices 
which actuate the minds of the vulgar; accus¬ 
tomed to condemn the clamor of the populace ; dis¬ 
daining to receive laws and opinions from their infe¬ 
riors in rank, they will oppose resolutions, which are 
founded in the folly and violence of the lower part 
of the community. Was the voice of the people 
always dictated by reflection ; did every man, or even 
one man in a hundred think for himself, or actually 
consider the measure he was about to approve or 
censure; or even were the common people tolera¬ 
bly steadfast in the judgment which they formed, I 
should hold the interference of a superior order, not 
only superfluous, but wrong: for, when every thing 
is allowed to difference of rank and education, which 
the actual state of these advantages deserves, that, 
after all, is most likely to be right and expedient, 
which appears to be so to the separate judgment 
and decision of a great majority of the nation ; at 
least, that, in general, is right for them , which is 
agreeable to their fixed opinions and desires. But 
when we observe* what is urged as the public opin¬ 
ion, to be, in truth, the opinion only or perhaps the 
feigned professions of a few crafty leaders ; that the 
numbers who join in the cry, serve only to swell and 
multiply the sound, without any accession of judg¬ 
ment, or exercise of understanding; and that often¬ 
times the wisest counsels have been thus overborne 
by tumult and uproar,—we may conceive occasions 
to arise, in which the commonwealth may be saved 
by the reluctance of the nobility to adopt the caprices, 
or to yield to the vehemence of the common people. 
In expecting this advantage from an order of nobles, 
we do not suppose the nobility to be more unpreju¬ 
diced than others; we only suppose that their pre¬ 
judices will be different from, and may occasionally 
counteract those of others. 


108 


4 ‘ If the personal privileges of the peerage, which 
are usually so many injuries to the rest of the com¬ 
munity, be restrained, I see little inconveniencv in 
the increase of its number ; for it is only dividing 
the same quantity of power amongst more hands, 
which is rather favorable to public freedom, than 
otherwise. 

“ There is nothing, in the British constitution, so 
remarkable, as the irregularity of the popular repre¬ 
sentation. The house of commons consists of five 
hundred and forty-eight members, of whom, two 
hundred are elected by seven thousand constituents : 
so that a majority of these seven thousand, without 
any reasonable title to superior weight or influence in 
the state, may, under certain circumstances, decide 
a question against the opinion of as many millions. 
Or, to place the same object in another point of 
view; if my estate be situated in one county of the 
kingdom, I possess the ten thousandth part of a sin¬ 
gle representative ; if in another, the thousandth 
if in a particular district, I may be one in twenty 
who choose two representatives ; if in a still more 
favored spot, I may enjoy the right of appointing 
two myself. If I have been born, or dwell, or have 
served an apprenticeship in one town, I am repre¬ 
sented in the national assembly by two deputies, in 
the choice of whom, I exercise an actual and sensi¬ 
ble share of power ; if accident has thrown my birth, 
or habitation, or service into another town, I have 
no representative at all, nor more power or concern 
in the election of those who make the laws, bv which 
I am governed, than if I was a subject of the grand 
seignior—and this partiality subsists without any pre¬ 
tence whatever of merit or propriety, to justify the 
preference of one place to another. Or, thirdly, to 
describe the state of national representation as it ex¬ 
ists in reality, it may be affirmed, I believe, with 
truth, that about one half of the house of commons 
obtain their seats in that assembly by the election of 


109 


the people, the other half by purchase, or by the 
nomination of single proprietors of great estates.” 
Great changes and improvements have been made 
in these respects during the late reigns. 

“ This is a flagrant incongruity in the constitution ; 
but it is one of those objections which strike most 
forcibly at first sight. The effect of all reasoning 
upon the subject is to diminish the first impression : 
on which account it deserves the more attentive ex¬ 
amination, that we may be assured, before we ad¬ 
venture upon a reformation, that the magnitude of 
the evil justifies the danger of the experiment. 

“ In the several plans which have been suggested, 
of an equal or reformed representation, it will be 
difficult to discover any proposal that has a tenden¬ 
cy to throw more of the business of the nation into 
the house of commons, or to collect a set of men 
more fit to transact that business, or in general more 
interested in the national happiness and prosperity. 
One consequence, however, may be expected from 
these projects, namely, “less flexibility to the influ¬ 
ence of the crown.” And since the diminution of 
this influence, is the declared, and perhaps the whole 
design of the various schemes that have been pro¬ 
duced, whether for regulating the elections, contract¬ 
ing the duration, or for purifying the constitution of 
parliament by the exclusion of placemen and pen¬ 
sioners ; it is obvious to remark, that the more apt 
and natural, as well as the more safe and quiet way 
of attaining the same end, would be, by a direct re¬ 
duction of the patronage of the crown, which might 
be effected to a certain extent without hazarding 
farther consequences. Superfluous and exorbitant 
emoluments of office may not only be suppressed 
for the present; but provisions of law be devised, 
which should for the future restrain within certain 
limits, the number and value of the offices in the do* 
nation of the king.” 


110 


LECTURE VIII. 


It is not my purpose to enter upon a labored reply 
of my own, to the very strong and forcible defence 
of the British constitution, from the pen of a writer, 
who usually manifests as much sound and practical 
sense as any other of his contemporaries. I shall con¬ 
tent myself in the main, with offering some of the 
views of others, who question the pre-eminence of 
the government of Great Britain, as “ the most stu¬ 
pendous monument of human invention and have 
assailed its various departments with the powers of 
argument, the weapons of sarcasm, and the splen¬ 
dor of declamation. I shall then beg leave to sub¬ 
join some general speculations of my own. 

To begin, however, let me first introduce a pas¬ 
sage from Mr. Paley himself, in which he gives a 
decided preference to an hereditary over an elective 
monarchy. 

“ An hereditary monarchy,” says he, “ is uni¬ 
versally to be preferred to an elective monarchy. 
The confession of every writer upon the subject of 
civil government, the experience of ages, the exam¬ 
ple of Poland, and of the papal dominions, seem to, 
place this amongst the few indubitable maxims 
which the science of politics admits of. A crown 
is too splendid a price to be conferred, upon merit. 
The passions or interests of the electors exclude all 
consideration of the qualities of the competitors. 
The same observation holds concerning the appoint¬ 
ment to any office which is attended with a great 
share of power or emolument. Nothing is gained 



lli 


by a popular choice worth the dissentions, tumults* 
and interruption of regular industry with which it 
is inseparably attended. Add to this, that a king, 
who owes his elevation to the event of a contest, or 
to any other cause than a fixed rule of succession, 
will be apt to regard one part of his subjects as the 
associates of his fortune, and the other as conquer¬ 
ed foes. Nor should it be forgotten, amongst the 
advantages of an hereditary monarchy, that as plans 
of national improvement and reform are seldom 
brought to maturity by the exertions of a single 
reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree of happi¬ 
ness and prosperity to which it is capable of being 
carried, unless an uniformity of counsels, a consis¬ 
tency of public measures and designs be continued 
a succession of ages.” 

Mr. Blackstone too, as you may recollect, deli¬ 
vers his sentiments as might naturally have been ex¬ 
pected very decidedly in favor of hereditary over 
elective monarchy. “ It must be owned,” says he, 
(vol. 1, page 192) an elective monarchy seems 
to be the most obvious, and best suited of any 
to the rational principles of government , and the free¬ 
dom of human nature: and accordingly we find 
from history that, in the infancy and first rudiments 
of almost every state, the leader, chief magistrate, 
or prince, hath usually been elective. And, if the 
individuals who compose that state could always 
continue true to first principles, uninfluenced by 
passion or prejudice, unassailed by corruption, and 
unawed by violence, elective succession were as 
much to be desired in a kingdom, as in other inferior 
communities. The best, the wisest, and the bravest 
man, would then be sure of receiving that crown, 
which his endowments have merited : and the sense 
of an unbiassed majority would be dutifully acqui¬ 
esced in by the few who were of different opinions. 
But history and observation will inform us, that elec¬ 
tions of every kind (in the present state of human 


119 


nature) are too frequently brought about by influ¬ 
ence, partiality, and artifice: and, even where the 
case is otherwise, these practices will be often sus¬ 
pected, and as constantly charged upon the suc¬ 
cessful, by a splenetic disappointed minority. This 
is an evil to which all societies are liable; as well 
those of a private and domestic kind, as the great 
community of the public, which regulates and in¬ 
cludes the rest. But in the former there is this ad¬ 
vantage ; that such suspicions, if false, proceed no 
farther than jealousies and murmurs, which time 
will effectually suppress; and, if true, the injustice 
may be remedied by legal means, by an appeal to 
the tribunals to which every member of society has 
(by becoming such) virtually engaged to submit. 
Whereas in the great and independent society, which 
every nation composes, there is no superior to re¬ 
sort to but the law of nature : no method to redress 
the infringements of that law, but the actual exer¬ 
tion of private force. As therefore between two na¬ 
tions, complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel 
can only be decided by the law of arms ; so in one 
and the same nation, when the fundamental princi¬ 
ples of their common union are supposed to be in¬ 
vaded, and more especially when the appointment 
of their chief magistrate is alleged to be unduly 
made, the only tribunal to which the complainants 
can appeal is that of the God of battles, the only 
process by which the appeal can be carried on 
is that of a civil and intestine war. An heredi¬ 
tary succession to the crown is therefore now esta¬ 
blished, in this and most other countries, in order to 
prevent that periodical bloodshed and misery, which 
the history of ancient imperial Rome, and the more 
modern experience of Poland and Germany, may 
shew us are the consequences of elective king¬ 
doms.” 

After these quotations I must content myself with 
re erring you to the opinions of Chancellor Kent on 


113 


our side of the water which are far less sanguine, 
I think, in favor of an elective executive than might 
have been expected from an American jurist. 1 
Kent’s Com. 273. 

It is not necessary, I conceive that we should de¬ 
cide between the evils of these two forms of monar¬ 
chy. But admitting what I am by no means dis¬ 
posed to deny, the peculiar mischiefs of ele'cTive 
monarchy where the election is for life , and taking 
it for granted that hereditary succession is to be pre¬ 
ferred to that, let us see whether there is any just 
ground, for exempting it from the imputation of the 
very evil which it proposes to avoid. That evil is 
the danger of civil war, and bloodshed, consequent 
upon the contention for a nation’s crown, which it 
is admitted have desolated the earth, wherever such 
governments have existed. But the history of eve¬ 
ry monarchy of the world, though protected by the 
fancied security of hereditary succession, is preg¬ 
nant with evidence that it affords no such boasted 
advantages. The prize is too great, to permit the 
ambitious long to remain in peace. Secure as the 
monarch may fancy himself, his throne may be sha¬ 
ken by some towering spirit in spite of his heredi¬ 
tary claims. The kingdoms of France and of Eng¬ 
land have, since their foundation, seen a succession 
of houses, who rested their titles to the throne, not 
upon the right of inheritance, but upon the sword. 
The sceptre passed into the hands of William the 
Conqueror from those of Harold the Dauntless, who 
was himself an usurper on the death of the Confes¬ 
sor. The Confessor, too, intruded on his nephew’s 
throne, who had been driven into foreign lands by 
the conquering arms of Canute the Great. Heredi¬ 
tary succession, to the contrary notwithstanding 
then, the crown of England was usurped in early 
days by various races ; while in France, the Moro- 
vingian, Carlovingian and Capetian lines, in turn, be¬ 
ll 


114 


came predominant. But what is yet more striking, 
the pages of history are stained throughout with 
blood profusely spilled by competitors for the crown, 
in the same family or house. The Conqueror was 
confessedly an usurper; Rufus and Henry I. suc¬ 
cessively seized upon their brother’s throne. Ste¬ 
phen did the like, first with his elder brother and 
afterwards with his cousin Matilda, who boldly as¬ 
serted her right by the sword. John next usurped 
young Arthur’s rights, and sought to secure his totter¬ 
ing throne by foul, unnatural murder. His crime has 
been eternized by Shakespeare’s never-dying verse. 
Six short reigns followed, when the second Richard 
was deposed, and Henry of Lancaster seized upon the 
throne: and then began the famous struggle of the 
white and red roses, in which the nation was enga¬ 
ged, for nearly an hundred years. Then came the 
tyrannies of the two Henrys VII. and VIII., and of 
Mary and Elizabeth, and James and Charles, until 
the nation, tired of misrule, threw off the yoke, and 
Cromwell next was tyrant! Charles II. was then 
restored, but his brother James was soon dethroned. 
The crown was then settled upon William and Mary, 
and the heirs of the Princess Sophia; not however 
without war and devastation, in 1715 and 1745, on 
account of the pretender’s claims. “ Thirty kings 
and two minors have reigned in the distracted 
kingdom since the conquest, in which time, there 
have been eight civil wars (including the revolution) 
and nineteen rebellions.”—Payne. What in all 
these contests has been the loss of human life, I 
know not. In the wars of the houses of York and 
Lancaster alone, they are computed at 91,000. The 
wretchedness which attended them, “ who knows 
save heaven.” But so it is, that with these awful 
blots upon the history of hereditary succession, it 
seems to me that nothing but the most deep and 
rooted prejudice can see in it a security and defence, 
against the acknowledged mischiefs of civil discord. 


115 


Taking the history of England as our warning, we 
should look upon hereditary monarchy as the direst 
curse; and should be ready in relation to such a 
halcyon state as it can boast of, to exclaim with the 
martyred Sydney, 

Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitiura ! 

In our estimates indeed upon this subject, we 
ought not to exclude from consideration, the insur¬ 
rections, and rebellions, the throes and the revolu¬ 
tions, to which the growing tyranny of centuries 
must inevitably give rise. There is a point of suf¬ 
fering and oppression, beyond which human endu¬ 
rance cannot go; and the struggle for freedom, 
against the well-trained myrmidons of a tyrant ends 
sooner or later in the overthrow of the despot or in 
the immolation of his victims. The field, or the 
scaffold, flow plenteously with blood, whichever 
proves victorious. Fatal consequence of hereditary 
rule!! not chargeable upon oppressed and suffer¬ 
ing man for seeking to throw oft' the yoke, but 
chargeable on his oppressors; for we have the 
authority even of a monarchist for saying, that man 
is justified in rebellion, when he is trampled on and 
oppressed. “ It may be as much a duty at one time 
to resist a government as it is at another, to obey it,” 
says Mr. Paley; “to wit, whenever less mischief 
than advantage will accrue to the community from 
such resistance.” “ They, who concerted the revolu¬ 
tion in England, were justifiable in their counsels, 
because from the apparent disposition of the nation, 
and the strength and character of the parties, the 
measure was likely to be brought about with little 
mischief or bloodshed.” And if this be so, it would 
seem perfectly obvious that wherever resistance and 
civil war are occasioned by gross misrule, the con¬ 
sequences are to be charged to the evil ruler, rather 
than to the suffering people. Upon these princi¬ 
ples, the dungeons of the bastile and the lettres de 
cachtt, of despotic power, offer no small apology for 


116 


the French revolution, though they cannot justify its 
horrible excesses; and a moralist might, perhaps, be 
perplexed by the speculation, “ whether the horrors 
of the wars which have succeeded, and desolated 
Europe, may not, without injustice, be set down, 
to the accumulated tyrannies of an hereditary des¬ 
potism.” 

To what I have said, it may be at least amusing 
to add a few paragraphs from a once very popular 
author on the absurdity and mischiefs of hereditary 
succession. 

“We have heard,” says our author, “ the Rights of 
Man called a levelling system ; but the only system to 
which the word levelling is truly applicable, is the he¬ 
reditary monarchical system. It is a system of mental 
levelling. It indiscriminately admits every species of 
character to the same authority. Vice and virtue, 
ignorance and wisdom, in short, every quality, good 
or bad, is put on the same level, kings succeed each 
other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies 
not what their mental or moral characters are. Can 
we then be surprised at the abject state of the hu¬ 
man mind in monarchical countries, when the go¬ 
vernment itself is formed on such an abject level¬ 
ling system ?■—it has no fixed character. To-day it 
is one thing ; to-morrow it is something else. It 
changes with the temper of every succeeding indi¬ 
vidual, and is subject to all the varieties of each. It 
is government through the medium of passions and 
accidents. It appears under all the various charac¬ 
ters of childhood, decrepitude, dotage, a thing at 
nurse, in leading strings, or in crutches. It reverses 
the wholesome order of nature. It occasionally 
puts children over men, and the conceits of nonage 
over wisdom and experience. In short, we cannot 
conceive a more ridiculous figure of government, 
than hereditary succession, in all its cases, pre¬ 
sents.” 

“ Passing over, for the present, all the evils and 


mischiefs which monarchy has occasioned in the 
world, nothing can more effectually prove its use¬ 
lessness in a state of civil government, than making 
it hereditary. Would we make any office heredita¬ 
ry that required wisdom and abilities to fill it? and 
where wisdom and abilities are not necessary, such 
an office, whatever it may be, is superfluous or in¬ 
significant. 

“Hereditary succession, is a burlesque upon mo¬ 
narchy. It puts it in the most ridiculous light, bv 
presenting it as an office which any child or idiot 
may fill. It requires some talents to be a common 
mechanic ; but, to be a king, requires only the ani¬ 
mal figure of a man—a sort of breathing automa¬ 
ton. This sort of superstition may last a few years 
more, but it cannot long resist the awakened reason 
and interest of man. 

“ Experience, in all ages, and in all countries, has 
demonstrated, that it is impossible to control nature 
in her distribution of mental powers, She gives 
them as she pleases. Whatever is the rule by 
which she, apparently to us, scatters them among 
mankind, that rule remains a secret to man. It 
would be as ridiculous to attempt to fix the heredi- 
taryship of human beauty, as of wisdom. What¬ 
ever wisdom constituency is, it is like a seedless 
plant: it may be reared when it appears, but it can¬ 
not be voluntarily produced. There is always a suf¬ 
ficiency somewhere in the general mass of society 
for all purposes; but with respect to the parts of 
society, it is continually changing its place. It rises 
in one to-day, in another to-morrow, and has most 
probably visited in rotation every family of the earth, 
and again withdrawn. 

“ I smile to myself when I contemplate the ridicu¬ 
lous insignificance into, which literature and all the 
sciences would sink, were they made hereditary; 
and I carry the same idea into governments. An 
hereditary governor is as inconsistent as an heredU 
II* 


118 


tary author. I know not whether Homer or Euclid 
had sons ; but I will venture an opinion, that if they 
had, and had left their works unfinished, those sons 
could not have completed them. 

“ How irrational then is the hereditary system 
which establishes channels of power, in company 
with which wisdom refuses to flow ! By continuing 
this absurdity, man is perpetually in contradiction 
with himself; he accepts, for a king, or a chief ma¬ 
gistrate, or a legislator, a person whom he would 
not elect for a constable. 

“ But what is this thing which Mr. Burke calls 
monarchy? Will he explain it? All men can un¬ 
derstand what representation is; and that it must 
necessarily include a variety of knowledge and ta¬ 
lents. But what security is there for the same qua¬ 
lities on the part of monarchy ? or when this mon¬ 
arch is a child, where then is the wisdom ? What 
does it know about government? Who then is the 
monarch, or where is the monarchy ? If it is to be 
performed by regency, it proves to be a farce. A 
regency is a mock species of a republic, and the 
whole of monarchy deserves no better description. 
It is a thing as various as imagination can paint. It 
has none of the stable character that government 
ought to possess. Every succession is a revolution, 
and every regency a counter-revolution. The whole 
of it is a scene of perpetual court cabal and intrigue, 
of which Mr. Burke is himself an instance. To ren¬ 
der monarchy consistent with government, the next 
in succession should not be born a child, but a man 
at once, and that man a Solomon. 

“ It is ridiculous that nations are to wait, and 
government be interrupted, till boys grow to be 
men.” 

From these remarks on the objectionable features 
of the monarchical system, we might now proceed to 
show, from the practical operation of the British 
constitution, though aided, as it undoubtedly is, by 


119 


the democratical infusion of the house of commons,, 
how far short it falls of providing for the general 
happiness and liberty, of the great body of the peo¬ 
ple. The nobility and the gentry, the wealthy mer¬ 
chant and the thriving farmer, are, it may be conce¬ 
ded, protected in the enjoyment of their rights and 
liberties, by the provisions of magna charta and the 
wise and salutary system of British jurisprudence. 
But what shall we say of the mass, who compose 
the laboring class ; what of the paupers who swarm 
throughout the land in inconceivable distress, while 
pampered luxury and bloated wealth are revelling in, 
every human enjoyment ? What shall we say of the 
corn laws and the poor laws, and the law of settle¬ 
ments, which forbid the laboring man, whom the 
overseers pronounce likely to become chargeable to 
the parish, to move to any other parish than that to 
which in parochial language he belonged! What 
shall we say of parish charges of “ so much paid for 
men and boys" standing in the pound,”* where they 
had been enclosed, under statutory regulation, like 
the beasts of the field distrained for rent ? What of 
the universal wretchedness pervading the lower class¬ 
es, and what of the ruinous wars which have crushed 
the nation with their monumental debt?” But hear 
one of their most elbquent and able writers, (Sir James 
McIntosh, Defence, 337.) We are boldly challenged, 
says he, to produce our proofs ; our complaints are as¬ 
serted to be chimerical, and the excellence of our go¬ 
vernment is inferred from its beneficial effects. Most 
unfortunately for us, most unfortunately for our coun¬ 
try these proofs are too ready, and too numerous. We 
find them in that monumental debt, the bequest of 
wasteful and profligate wars, which wrings from the 
peasant something of his hard earned pittance ; to 
which the madness of political quixotism adds a mil¬ 
lion for everyfarthing that ministerial empiricism pays, 


* This fact is taken from a late Review. 




120 


and which menaces our children, with .convulsions 
and calamities, of which no age has seen the parallel. 
We find them in the bloody roll of persecuting sta¬ 
tutes, that are still suffered to stain our code. # •* 

We find them in the ignominious exclusion of great 
bodies of our fellow citizens, from public trusts, by 
tests which reward falsehood and punish probity ; 
which profane the rites of the religion which they 
pretend to guard, and usurp the dominion of the God 
they profess to revere ! We find them in the growing 
corruptions of those who administer the government; 
in the venality of a house of commons, which has be¬ 
come only a cumbrous and expensive chamber for 
registering ministerial edicts ; in the increase of a 
nobility, arrived to a degradation by the profusion 
and prostitution of honors, which the most zealous 
partizans of democracy would have spared them. 
We find them above all, in the rapid progress which 
has been made to silence the great organ of public 
opinion, the press, which is the true control on min¬ 
isters and parliaments, who might else, with impuni¬ 
ty, trample on the impotent formalities, that form the 
pretended bulwark of our freedom. The mutual 
control, the well-poised balance, of the several mem¬ 
bers of our legislature are the visions of theoretical 
or the pretexts of practical politicians. It is a gov¬ 
ernment not of check but of conspiracy , a conspir¬ 
acy which can only be repressed by the energy of 
popular opinion.” 

Admitting the high wrought character of the fore¬ 
going picture, whose dark coloring received no 
doubt much of its gloom from the bitterness of poli¬ 
tical feeling during the throes of the French revolu¬ 
tion, we may surely be excused if we hazard the as¬ 
sertion that the British government cannot be the 
impartial guardian and protector of the rights, and 
liberties, and happiness of the great body of the peo¬ 
ple. It cannot be denied that there must be some¬ 
thing vicious or something rotten,—something posU 


121 


lively mischievous, or something deplorably wanting, 
in a system where wealth and misery, grandeur and 
squalid poverty, haughtiness and servility, are to be 
found perpetually in revolting contrast. Yet let us 
not condemn without distinction. Let us not un¬ 
justly deny to merit, merit’s due. In this, as in every 
good and evil beneath the sun, there are obvious 
gradations. No just and accurate'observer, for in¬ 
stance, can place the political and civil liberty of a 
Russian or a Turk, upon the same level with that of 
the people of Great Britain. However strong, and 
indeed however natural may be our impressions and 
our prejudices against the structure of that govern¬ 
ment ; however justly we may condemn their sub¬ 
jection to a monarch of inordinate powers, and the 
subordination of the mass of society to a proud aris¬ 
tocracy, we cannot without injustice deny, that there 
are many excellent features in their institutions, and 
many efficient barriers against the oppressions of the 
government. Even the infusion of democracy, (see 
1 B. C. 50, 51, 158.) in their legislative body fur¬ 
nishes no inconsiderable check to the power both of 
crown and noble, and gives to public opinion, and 
to the voice of a portion of the commonalty, a pre¬ 
vailing influence in the councils of the nation. 
While therefore the British constitution, confessedly 
falls very far short of the liberal principles which we 
have introduced, (and as we all think so successfully) 
we should not be blind to those excellencies, which 
have served as the model of some of the most valu¬ 
able features of our own institutions. The admirable 
securities which have been introduced for the pro¬ 
tection of life, of personal liberty, and property; the 
trial by jury, the habeas corpus , and an independent 
judiciary; the existence of annual parliaments; of 
a co-ordinate and co-equal branch of the legislature 
taken from the body of the people, responsible to 
them, and having with them common interests and 
common feelings ; the dependence of the crown on 


122 


the popular branch for supplies, and the changes of 
ministry which take place at its bidding, all give to 
the government of Great Britain an impress of free¬ 
dom, which is no where else to be found upon earth, 
except on our own shores. These valuable safeguards 
of the subject too, it must be recollected, have been 
wrung from the monarchy in the struggles of six hun¬ 
dred years, by a people, who by foreign conquest and 
by feudal constitutions, had been reduced to the most 
degraded subjection : and if they have heretofore 
been unable by their efforts to elevate themselves to 
their proper grade on the one hand, and to bring 
down the powers of the crown and reduce the in¬ 
fluence of the nobles on the other, it has more 
than probably arisen from the conscious enjoyment 
of a large portion of happiness and liberty, and 
from a natural and not ill-grounded dread of innova¬ 
tion, which leads them to bear the ills they have, ra¬ 
ther than hazard those they know not of. That dread 
may have taught them, (in the language of our 
declaration of Independence) the solemn truth, that 
u prudence dictates, that governments long estab¬ 
lished should not be changed for light and tran¬ 
sient causes and they may accordingly, (as all 
mankind are prone to do) prefer “ to suffer while 
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abo¬ 
lishing the forms to which they have been accustom¬ 
ed.” So long as the mass of the people acquiesce 
in the existing state of things from these considera¬ 
tions, that acquiescence is to some extent at least, 
inconsistent with the notion that the government is 
despotic. It can only safely be affirmed that its op¬ 
erations are oppressive on the lower classes, and that 
the happiness of the body of the community would 
probably be promoted, by introducing into their con¬ 
stitution more liberal principles, and breaking down 
the unjust distinctions which prevails between the 
different ranks of society in that great and powerful 
kingdom. The restlessness of large portions of the 


123 


people, and the loud and well founded complaints of 
the great body of the laboring classes and the suf- 
ering poor, seem to justify the belief, that without 
some radical remedies of the existing evils by wise 
and judicious legislation, force—the ultima ratio of 
people as well as of kings—will be resorted to by 
the oppressed; and a remedy will be sought for in 
the fearful panacea of revolution. The events of 
the last five years, have tended not only to confirm 
the truth of the idea, that there is a strong demo- 
cratical infusion in the British constitution, but to 
add very materially to that infusion by the extinc¬ 
tion of the rotten boroughs and the exclusion of 
nearly sixty members of the house of commons who 
formerly represented these ideal cities. If this has 
been effected before the crown and the nobles were 
shorn of their locks, what may not now be expected 
when the rotten borough system, the Sampson of the 
aristocracy, has been put down and the right of suf¬ 
frage has been extended to a large portion of the 
kingdom. The next blow is the ballot—a blow that 
must be struck at the undue influence of the nobles, 
the gentry, the capitalist and the crown on the inde¬ 
pendence of elections ; and that will be followed, at 
no distant day, by “ purifying the constitution of 
parliament,” as Mr. Paley remarks, “ by the exclu¬ 
sion of placemen and pensioners.” These are in¬ 
deed consummations devoutly to be wished and most 
confidently to be expected ; for depend upon it, the 
remark which has been applied to aristocracy, will, 
in the present state of the world, prove eminently 
true of the democratic spirit : 

Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo, 

Parva metu primo, mox sese atlollit in auras 
Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubil a condit. 

Permit me to offer a translation in my own doggrel. 
Still as it moves, with innate power it grows, 

And gathers vigor as it onward goes. 

At first a pigmy, soon with giant size 
It lifts its head in triumph to the skies. 


124 


LECTURE IX. 


OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. 

I have remarked that the constitution of Great 
Britain was in some degree tempered by the infu¬ 
sion of democratical principles through the house 
of commons. We shall see by and bye, how im¬ 
perfect the infusion is, but it behooves us first to 
turn our eyes upon the house of lords, the supposed 
repository of the dignity, as it certainly is, of a large 
portion of the wealth and the power of the nation. 

The predominance of the king in England over 
the aristocracy except as lord paramount under the 
feudal system, is not coeval with the form of govern¬ 
ment. Miller’s View, 11, in note. William the 
Norman could neither make laws or impose taxes in 
his dutchy without the consent of his barons or princi¬ 
pal landholders ; and when those powerful chief¬ 
tains obtained large possessions in England and be¬ 
came grandees of the kingdom, they doubtless as¬ 
serted the same independence and the same privile¬ 
ges which they had enjoyed in their own country. 
Yet, it is evident, that William and his successors 
were not content with this state of things, and that 
they were continually striving, by masterly strokes 
of policy and the exercise of their power and influ¬ 
ence, to extend their authority and to invest them¬ 
selves with all the prerogatives of a great king, in¬ 
stead of resting contented with the more limited 
privileges of a lord paramount. 

The struggles between the crown and the feudal 



125 


barons was carried on for centuries with various suc¬ 
cess. Though the barons were the oppressors of 
their vassals, they resisted the encroachments of 
power and availed themselves of the imbecility of the 
more feeble princes to wring from them their rights 
and privileges. Such was the case of magna charta. 
But from the reign of Henry VII. the union of the 
crown and the commons by degrees depressed the for¬ 
mer exorbitant power of the nobility, and elevated 
that of the kingly office. So that in modern times, 
though the lords have formed indeed a third estate, 
yet their power would be but little felt but for their 
intimate connexion with the crown and the aristocra¬ 
cy of wealth in the house of commons. Their in¬ 
fluence is, indeed, to be seen in the subserviency of 
the lower classes to the upper. Intelligent observers 
remark, that while between themselves the manners 
of the nobility are bland and unassuming as be¬ 
comes well-bred gentlemen, yet towards their inferi¬ 
ors, they are haughty and overbearing. And on the 
other hand, though in the remaining classes of so¬ 
ciety, the higher ranks are domineering and inso¬ 
lent towards those beneath them, yet they are them¬ 
selves condescending and deferential to the members 
of the aristocracy and pay the most condescending 
homage to all who bear a title. 

There are, indeed, very marked differences be¬ 
tween the various aristocracies which have existed in 
the world. In some, the whole power of the state 
is absolutely vested in an assembly of a particular 
class or order, “ the members of which, neverthe¬ 
less, separately and individually possess no authori¬ 
ty or privilege beyond the rest of the community. 
Such was the constitution of Venice. In others, 
the nobles may in their several and individual capa¬ 
cities be invested with great personal authority and 
immunities such as were exercised in the feudal 
times by lords over their vassals. Where this is the 
case, and where at the same time the powers of 
12 


126 


sovereignty are wielded by the aggregated authority 
of this privileged nobility, (as at one time was in effect 
the case with the government of Poland,) the worst 
and most oppressive of all governments is created. For 
this is a domination in which tyranny is exercised 
not only in the conduct of public affairs by an as¬ 
sembled senate, but it is brought home to the fireside 
of every individual through his immediate lord and 
master. Like the plagues of Egypt, the mischief 
intrudes itself into our bedchambers and our knead¬ 
ing troughs. The first species of aristocracy is 
therefore more tolerable than the last: for although 
many of those who compose it might be profligate 
enough to abuse the authority of their stations in 
the prosecution of private designs ; yet all not being 
tempted to the same injustice, nor having the same 
union of design, or the same end to attain, it would 
be difficult to obtain the consent of a majority either 
to specific acts of oppression, or to oppressive laws 
upon the mass of the commonalty. But where the 
body is composed of members having vassals under 
their power, and all united by a common interest to 
maintain and to exercise their individual authority 
and exactions by augmenting the general power of 
the class, there will be no limit to human suffering 
but the capacity of human endurance. Moreover, 
a government like this is a many-headed monster;— 
not a government of thirty tyrants only, but of hun¬ 
dreds. One tyrant is bad enough, whether the ty¬ 
ranny reside in a single person or a senate, acting 
only as an unit; but the single tyrant or such a se¬ 
nate cannot exercise oppression in such infinite de¬ 
tail, as a numerous nobility over their respective vas¬ 
sals and dependents. Of all species of domination 
therefore, this is the most odious. The freedom, 
and comfort and satisfaction of private life are more 
constrained and harrassed by it than by the most op¬ 
pressive laws; its domiciliary visits and its endless 
exactions are more vexatious than the lawless will of 


127 


the most arbitrary monarch. From his observation 
and his injustice, the wretched subject may fly. He 
may shrink into obscurity, and be removed by dis¬ 
tance from his grasp or protected by insignificance 
from his notice. His omnipotence is limited at least 
by want of omnipresence. But from an aristocracy 
of privileged nobility like the feudal lords there is 
no escape. The tyranny is as omnipresent as it is 
omnipotent. Like the polypus, it insinuates its at¬ 
tenuated fibres through all the interstices of society, 
and with its cancerous ramifications reaches every 
portion of the body politic. 

A third species of aristocracy, like that of Great 
Britain, is more harmless than either of the former. 
Though invested with a share of legislative power, 
it cannot boast of absolute dominion, and is there¬ 
fore incapable of exercising the tyranny of a Vene¬ 
tian senate or a Polish diet. In short, it constitutes 
no government of itself, being checked and con¬ 
trolled by crown and people. And though it springs 
from the stern and iron-handed tyranny of the feudal 
system, yet has it been so deprived ol all its harsher 
features, as to present but little to complain of in 
our day in the power of individuals- over their infe¬ 
riors. The partial legislation arising from their com¬ 
bination with the aristocracy of wealth among the 
commons constitutes the real grievance of which 
the people have reason to complain. We have al¬ 
ready seen the advantages attributed by Mr. Paley 
to this branch of the British government. Permit 
me to add an extract from our favorite commentator 
upon the same subject, whose calm and sober views 
are better suited to our purpose than the splendid 
declamation and highly wrought encomiums of Mr. 
Burke. 

“ The distinction of rank and honors is necessary 
in every well-governed state, in order to reward 
such as are eminent for their services to the pub¬ 
lic, in a manner k the most desirable to individuals, 


128 


and yet without burden to the community ; exciting 
thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardor, and gene¬ 
rous emulation, In others: and emulation, or virtu¬ 
ous ambition is a spring of action, which, however 
dangerous or invidious in a mere republic, or under 
a despotic sway, will certainly be attended with good 
effects under a free monarchy, where, without de¬ 
stroying its existence, its excesses may be continual¬ 
ly restrained by that superior power, from which all 
honor is derived. Such a spirit, when nationally 
diffused, gives life and vigor to the community; it 
sets all the wheels of government in motion, which, 
under a wise regulator, may be directed to any bene¬ 
ficial purpose ; and thereby every individual may be 
made subservient to the public good, while he prin¬ 
cipally means to promote his own particular views. 
A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary 
in our mixed and compounded constitution, in order 
to support the rights of both the crown and the peo¬ 
ple, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroach¬ 
ments of both. It creates and preserves that gra¬ 
dual scale of dignity, which proceeds from the pea¬ 
sant to the prince ; rising like a pyramid from a 
broad foundation, and diminishing to a point as it 
rises. It is this ascending and contracting propor¬ 
tion that adds stability to any government; for when 
the departure is sudden from one extreme to ano¬ 
ther, we may pronounce that state to be precarious. 
The nobility, therefore, are the pillars which are 
reared from among the people more immediately to 
support the throne; and, if that falls, they must al¬ 
so be buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in 
the last century the commons had determined to ex¬ 
tirpate monarchy, they also voted the house of lords 
to be useless and dangerous. And since titles of 
nobility are thus expedient in the state, it is also ex¬ 
pedient that their owners should form an indepen¬ 
dent and separate branch of the legislature. If they 
were confounded with the mass of the people, and 


129 


1 ike them had only a vote in electing representatives, 
their privileges would soon be borne down and over¬ 
whelmed by the popular torrent, which would effec¬ 
tually level all distinctions. It is therefore highly 
necessary that the body of nobles should have a dis¬ 
tinct assembly, distinct deliberations, and distinct 
powers from the commons.” 

After this fair and candid quotation of the opin¬ 
ions of the most distinguished admirers of the house 
of lords as a constituent part of the government of 
Great Britain, I hope I shall be excused for offering 
the views of others (Tuck. Appendix, 39, 40, 222, 
223, 224,) who vehemently denounce it. 

“ In aristocracies where the whole power is lodged 
in a senate, or council of men of eminent stations 
or fortunes, one may sometimes expect sufficient wis¬ 
dom and political abilities to discern and accomplish 
whatever the interest of the state may require. But 
there is no security against factions, seditions, and 
civil wars; much less can this form secure fidelity to 
the public interest. The views of a corrupt senate 
will be the aggrandizing of themselves, their fami¬ 
lies, and their posterity, by all oppressions of the 
people. In hereditary senates these evils are cer¬ 
tain ; and the majority of such bodies may even 
want a competent share of talents to discharge the 
duties of their stations. Among men born in high 
stations of wealth and power, ambition, vanity, in¬ 
solence, and an unsociable contempt of the lower 
orders, as if they were not of the same species, or 
were not fellow-citizens with them, too frequently 
prevail. And these high stations afford many occa¬ 
sions of corruption, by sloth, luxury, and debauchery, 
the general forerunners and attendants of the basest 
venality. An unmixed hereditary aristocracy, if not 
the worst, must be among the very worst forms of 
government, since it engenders every species of evil 
in a government, without producing any counter¬ 
vailing benefit, or advantage. 

12 * 


130 


“In a council of senators elected for life, by the 
people, or by any popular interest, there is more rea¬ 
son to expect both wisdom and fidelity, than in the 
case of an hereditary aristocracy: but here the co¬ 
gent tie of responsibility is wanting; and without 
that, the ambitious views of enlarging their powers, 
and their wealth, will supercede all ideas of gratitude, 
or fidelity to those to whom they owe their elevation. 

“ When new members are admitted into the sena¬ 
torial order by an election, in which the right of suf¬ 
frage is confined to such as have already obtained an 
admission into that order; or where the right of ad¬ 
mission into the senate itself is vested in that body ; 
the senate will infallibly become a dangerous cabal, 
(without any of the advantages desirable in civil 
polity,) and attempt to make their office hereditary. 
When senators are entitled to the privileges of that 
station in consequence of possessing a certain de¬ 
gree of wealth, the burthens of the state will, with¬ 
out exception, be thrown upon the poorer classes of 
the people. Thus aristocracy, whatever founda¬ 
tion it may be raised upon, will always prove a most 
iniquitous and oppressive form of government. 5 ’ 

“ The house of lords is composed either of new 
made peers, or of such to whom that honor has been 
transmitted by hereditary right; we may admit, 
though the fact will hardly justify it, that the new 
made peers have a chance of being selected for 
their superior wisdom; nay, that is universally the 
case; the portion of wisdom thus acquired, even in 
the creative reign of George the third, could never 
be sufficient to countetbalance the large majority of 
hereditary peers, who affect to hold in great contempt 
the talents and learning of their new created breth¬ 
ren. The wisdom of this body rests then upon the 
chance of natural talents, with the advantages of 
education to improve and mature them. As to the 
latter, should we admit that a child, who, from the 
moment he is capable of making any observation, 


131 


sees himself treated as a superior being, would have 
the same stimulus to improve, as one who is taught 
to consider the road to science as the only one which 
leads to distinction, no advantage could be claimed 
in favor of the hereditary legislator, unless it should 
be proved that the benefits of education are neces¬ 
sarily confined to that class of men.—The question 
rests then solely upon the mode by which the nobili¬ 
ty become legislators, and here every argument 
against the transmission of talents and virtue in he¬ 
reditary succession, recurs with accumulated force, 
the chance of this inheritance being confined by the 
laws to the eldest son.”* 

“The senate of the United States, as we have 
seen, is composed of individuals selected for their 
probity, attachment to their country, and talents, by 
the legislatures of the respective states. They must 
be citizens of the states for which they are chosen— 
their merits must be known, must have been distin¬ 
guished, and respected. Age must have matured 
the talents, and confirmed the virtues which dawned 
with childhood^ or shine forth with youth. Princi¬ 
ples must have been manifested, and conduct have 
evinced their rectitude, energy, and stability—Equi¬ 
vocation of character can scarcely obtain admittance 

“ * The right of primogeniture to the inheritance of virtue 
and talents, has always appeared to be questionable, if we 
may draw our conclusion from the authority of the sacred 
scriptures. The first born son of the first man, was a mur¬ 
derer. The firstborn sdn of Abraham, (by a concubine it 
must be confessed,) was an outcast from society ; his hand 
was against every man, and every man’s hand against him. 
The first born son of Isaac was, by the dispensations of the 
divine providence, postponed to his younger brother: the 
first born of Jacob went up unto his father’s bed, and defiled 
it: and the sceptre was transmitted to the race of Judah : 
the first born of Jesse, appeared worthy in the sight of the 
prophet, but he, with six of his brethren, was rejected in fa¬ 
vor of David the youngest : and the first born of that same 
David, was by the same providence set aside in favor ot 
Solomon his youngest son.” 




132 


where the trust is important, elections rare, and lim¬ 
ited to an individual, or, at most, to two. Thewhole 
number of senators are at present limited to thirty- 
two—it is not probable that they will ever exceed 
fifty.—A late writer* has observed, that an assembly 
of Newtons, if they exceeded a hundred, would be 
a mob. The British house of peers consists of 
twice that number at the least, and may be increased, 
at the will of the prince, to any number, j* The sena¬ 
tors of America have the interest of a state to pro¬ 
mote, or to defend. A British house of peers has 
the privileges of the order, the interests of the cor¬ 
poration of aristocracy, to advance. Their wisdom, 
their exertions, are directed to their own personal 
aggrandizement.—Those of an American senator 
can scarcely find an object, except the good of the 
nation, or of the individual state which he represents. 
A peer holds himself responsible to no one for his 
conduct; a senator is responsible to his constituents, 
and if he abuses their confidence, will be sure to be 
displaced, whilst the former hugs himself in the se¬ 
curity and stability of his station. I say nothing of 
the bench of bishops. The independence of that 
body has been too frequently questioned to render 
them respectable, even in the eyes of their own na¬ 
tion, as a part of the legislature. 

“ A member of the house of lords, may make 
another lord his proxy,$ to vote for him in his ab¬ 
sence ; a privilege which he is supposed to derive 
from sitting there in his own right; and not as one of 
the representatives of the nation. He may likewise, 
by leave of parliament enter his protest against any 
measure, analogous to which we have seen that the 
yeas and nays of either house of congress shall be 
called, if one fifth part of the members present con¬ 
cur therein.”<§> 

* Mackintosh. 

t The temporal peers of Great Britain are said to amount 
to two hundred and twenty at this time. 

x 1 Black. Com. p. 168. § C, U. S. Art. 1 . s. 5. 




133 


Next let me present you with the racy remarks of 
a very popular writer already cited, to whose pen our 
revolutionary ancestors were not a little indebted in 
the great struggle for our liberties. 

“ That, then, which is called aristocracy in some 
countries, and nobility in others, arose out of the 
governments founded upon conquest. It was ori¬ 
ginally a military order for the purpose of support¬ 
ing military government (for such were all govern¬ 
ments founded in conquest;) and to keep up a suc¬ 
cession of this order for the purpose for which it was 
established, all the younger branches of those fami¬ 
lies were disinherited, and the law of primogeniture- 
ship set up. 

“ The nature and character of aristocracy shews 
itself to us in this law. It is a law against every law 
of nature, and nature herself calls for its destruc¬ 
tion. Establish family justice and aristocracy falls. 
By the aristocratical law of primogenitureship, in a 
family of six children, five are exposed.—Aristocra¬ 
cy has never but one child. The rest are begotten 
to be devoured. They are thrown to the cannibal 
for prey, and the natural parent prepares the unna¬ 
tural repast. 

“ As every thing which is out of nature in man, 
affects, more or less, the interest of society, so does 
this. All the children which the aristocracy dis¬ 
owns (which are all, except the eldest) are, in gene¬ 
ral, cast like orphans on a parish, to be provided for 
by the public, but at a greater charge. Unnecessa¬ 
ry offices and places in governments and courts 
are created at the expense of the public, to main^ 
tain them. 

“ With what kind of parental reflections can the 
father or mother contemplate their younger off¬ 
spring. By nature they are children, and by mar¬ 
riage they are heirs ; but by aristocracy they are 
bastards anti orphans. They are the flesh and blood 
of their parents in one lipe, and nothing akin to 
them in tiie other. 


134 


Let us examine the grounds on which the French 
constitution resolved against having a house ol peers 
in France. 

“ Because, in the first place, as is already mentioned, 
aristocracy is kept up by family, tyranny and injustice. 

“ Secondly, because there is an unnatural unfit-, 
ness in an aristocracy to be legislators for a nation. 
Their ideas of distributive justice are corrupted at 
the very source. They begin life by trampling on 
all their younger brothers and sisters, and relations 
of every kind, and are taught and educated so to 
do. With what ideas of justice or honor can that 
man enter an house of legislation, who absorbs in 
his own person the inheritance of a whole family of 
children, or doles out to them some pitiful portion 
with the insolence of a gift? 

“ Thirdly, because the idea of hereditary legisla¬ 
tors is as inconsistent as that of hereditary judges, or 
hereditary juries; and as absurd as an hereditary 
mathematician, or an hereditary wise man ; and as 
ridiculous as an hereditary poet-laureat. 

“ Fourthly, because a body of men holding them¬ 
selves accountable to nobody, ought not to be trust¬ 
ed by any body. 

“ Fifthly, because it is continuing the uncivilized 
principle of governments founded in conquest, and 
the base idea of man having property in man, and 
governing him by personal right. 

“Sixthly, because aristocracy has a tendency to 
degenerate the human species. By the universal 
economy of nature it is known, and by the instance 
of the Jews it is proved, that the human species has 
a tendency to degenerate, in any small number of 
persons, when separated from the general stock of 
society, and intermarrying constantly with each 
other. It defeats even its pretended end, and be¬ 
comes in time the opposite of what is noble in man. 
Mr. Burke talks of nobility; let him shew what it is. 
The greatest characters the world have known, have 


135 


rose on the democratic floor. Aristocracy has not 
been able to keep a proportionate pace with demo¬ 
cracy. The artificial noble shrinks into a dwarf be¬ 
fore the noble of nature; and in the few instances 
(for there are some in all countries) in whom na¬ 
ture, as by a miracle, has survived in aristocracy, 
those men despise it. But it is time to proceed to a 
new subject.’ 5 


LECTURE X. 


OF THE DEMOCRATICAL PART OF THE BRITISH 
CONSTITUTION. 

I have already called the attention of the student 
to that passage of the Commentaries in which Mr, 
Blackstone claims for the British constitution an in 
fusion of democracy. The house of commons,’* 
says he, “ freely chosen by the people from among 
themselves makes the government a kind of demo¬ 
cracy.”—Vol. 1, p. 51. And again: “ The com¬ 
mons consist of all such men of property in the 
kingdom as have not seats in the house of lords ; 
every one of which has a voice in parliament, either 
personally, or by his representatives. In a free state 
every man, who is supposed a free agent, ought to 
be in some measure his own governor; and there¬ 
fore a branch at least of the legislative power should 
reside in the whole body of the people. And this 
power, when the territories of the state are small 
and its citizens easily known, should be exercised 
by the people in their aggregate or collective capaci¬ 
ty, as was wisely ordained in the petty republics of 
Greece, and the first rudiments of the Roman state. 




136 


Bat this will be highly inconvenient, when the pub¬ 
lic territory is extended to any considerable degree, 
and the number of citizens is increased. Thus when, 
after the social war, all the burghers of Italy were 
admitted free citizens of Rome, and each had a vote 
in the public assemblies, it became impossible to dis¬ 
tinguish the spurious from the real voter, and from 
that time all elections and popular deliberations grew 
tumultuous and disorderly; which paved the way 
for Marius and Sylla, Pompey and Caesar, to tram¬ 
ple on the liberties of their country, and at last to 
dissolve the commonwealth. In so large a state as 
ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that 
the people should do that by their representatives, 
which it is impracticable to perform in person ; re¬ 
presentatives, chosen by a number of minute and 
separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easi¬ 
ly may be, distinguished. The counties are there¬ 
fore represented by knights, elected by the proprie¬ 
tors of lands; the citizens and boroughs are repre¬ 
sented by citizens and burgesses, chosen by the 
mercantile part, or supposed trading interest of the 
nation ; much in the same manner as the burghers 
in the diet of Sweden are chosen by the corporate 
towns, Stockholm sending four, as London does 
with us, other cities two, and some only one. The 
number of English representatives is 513, and of 
Scots 45 ; in all 558. And every member, though 
chosen by one particular district, when elected 
and returned, serves for the whole realm ; for 
the end of his coming thither is not particular, but 
general; not barely to advantage his constituents, 
but the common wealth; to advise his majesty (as 
appears from the writ of summons) “ de communi 
consilio super negotiis quibusdam arduis et urgen- 
tibus y regem, stalum, defensionem regni Anglia 
et ecclesice Anglicana concernentibus And there¬ 
fore he is not bound, like a deputy in the united 
provinces, to consult with, or take the advice of, his 


137 


constituents upon any particular point, unless he 
himself thinks it proper or prudent so to do. 

“ These are the constituent parts of a parliament; 
the king, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the 
commons. Parts, of which each is so necessary, 
that the consent of all three is required to make any 
new law that shall bind the subject. Whatever is 
enacted for law by one, or by two only, of the three, 
is no statute; and to it no regard is due, unless in 
matters relating to their own privileges.” 

It cannot fail to be highly gratifying to every friend 
of our free institutions, resting as they do, upon the 
basis of democratical principles to hear these candid 
eulogiums, from the pen of a monarchist, upon their 
spirit and influence in securing the real happiness of 
the people. Well indeed are they deserved from 
every liberal minded Englishman. Imperfect as the 
infusion of democracy is in the British constitution 
it would not be difficult to trace to it all those noble 
principles of freedom which are the boast of English¬ 
men and which distinguish their institutions from 
the gloomy absolutism of the continent. In making 
this declaration, I am well aware of all that has been 
forcibly advanced against the state of representation 
in the house of commons, against the system of rot¬ 
ten boroughs, which prevailed before the late re¬ 
form, against the venality and corruption of the body 
and the hosts of placemen and pensioners that crowd 
its hall and too pliantly obey the lead of a trium¬ 
phant ministry. I am well aware that one of the 
most eloquent of British statesmen has declared that 
the appellation of the term popular representation 
to the house of commons is the “ most insolent and 
preposterous abuse of language in the vocabulary of 
tyrants.” An abuse of language it is indeed to call 
it a fair representation even now, but it does not 
follow because it is unequal that it does not in any 
degree represent, the interests, the opinions, and 
even the wishes of the nation. It does not follow, 
13 


138 


because the ministerial influence too readily com¬ 
mands the complying support of obsequious parti- 
zans to the ordinary measures of their administra¬ 
tion, that they would find even in them , the supple 
tools who would sustain an attempt to extinguish 
the rays of liberty which still shine out in the British 
constitution amid surrounding gloom. What min¬ 
istry, with all their influence, could repeal the habeas 
corpus or abolish the trial by jury ? What ministry 
could muster retainers enough to dispense with an¬ 
nual parliaments, or to tear from the commons' 
house the purse strings of the nation ? None—none 
whatever 1 Venal as they may be, they would with 
indignation hurl from the seat of power, any minis¬ 
try who should venture to assault these important 
fortresses of their liberty. Venal as they may be, 
they cannot set at defiance the angry denuncia¬ 
tions of a betrayed and indignant nation. Imper¬ 
fect as the representation is, the people are felt in 
the deliberations of the commons; and however or¬ 
ganized, that government in which the people are 
felt, is in precisely the same degree under the sana¬ 
tive influence of the principles of democracy. I 
will not say indeed that it matters not in what man¬ 
ner this influence is produced, but I will say that 
wherever it does exist, it is wholesome and benign, 
and, however minute, it is essentially the democra¬ 
tic in principle. It is an important point gained 
that the law-making power is in the hands of those 
who have a common interest and a common feeling 
with the great body of the people. Few men will 
be disposed to enact laws which are to operate to 
their own oppression. Few will oppress themselves 
from a desire to oppress others. Few who will not 
resist oppression by which others may suffer, when 
they suffer by it themselves. Una salus commune 
periclum is the strong chain which binds together 
the commoner and the people. Where it is destroy¬ 
ed, it is not broken by force but dissolved by cor- 


139 


ffuption. The commoner will battle for himself, his 
posterity and his fellows, unless, like Judas, he has 
sold himself for gold ; and fortunately in all time there 
have been found among the members of the house 
of commons not a few upright patriots whom the 
thirty pieces could not buy. These form a phalanx 
which breasts the ministerial attack—sounds the toc¬ 
sin to the people—casts dismay among the ranks of 
power, and threatens with overthrow and defeat the 
reckless and unscrupulous minister who would dare 
to aim a blow at the vitals of their constitution. 

I cannot therefore doubt that though in the ordi¬ 
nary concerns ot administration the undue influence 
of the crown paralyzes the popular principle of the 
government, and though very undue weight is con¬ 
ferred on rank and wealth in the house of commons 
itself, so as to give a preponderating influence to the 
higher classes even in that body, yet there is upon 
the whole much justice in the opinion of Mr. Black- 
stone, that the house of commons does give a demo¬ 
cratic character to the British constitution.* I have 
said that it may be attributed every valuable princi¬ 
ple which has been engrafted into their laws in sup¬ 
port of the liberties of the people. To what other 
source can we trace them ? To the crown ? When 
did arbitrary power voluntarily lay down the scep¬ 
tre or magnanimously tie up its own hands ? Can 
we trace it to the barons ? When did that iron- 
fisted order ever join for the emancipation of their 
vassals? Never but when their object was to pull 
flown the powers of the crown by the assistance of 
the people. The crown and the nobles in their 
ceaseless hostilities for centuries, have alternately 
purchased the confederacy of the commons, by the 
mitigation of their oppressions and the extension of 
their privileges and their rights. Such, from the 
pages of history, appears to have been the case 

* Mr. Hume seems to have had the same idea of the house 
of commons.—Vol. 1, 432. 



140 


even with magna charta which was extorted at the 
point of the sword from the weakest and the basest 
of English monarchs. There was then no house of 
commons indeed and the great charter was obtained 
from the crown, in semblance at least by the barons 
alone. Two things, however, must be observed. 
Two thousand knights , with all the retainers of the 
feudal lords, and with inferior persons without num¬ 
ber, “assembled together in arms and advanced to 
Oxford against the king.” Now the knights them¬ 
selves in such a number were, in this contest with 
the crown , of the people’s party, and must have had 
a common feeling and a common concern with the 
great body of the commonalty, whose interests there¬ 
fore they represented at Runnemeade. But this 
was not all. They were followed to the field by 
countless numbers of inferior people. These were 
“ the thews and sinews” of the barons’ power. Ac¬ 
cordingly, as Mr. Hume has well observed, the ba¬ 
rons who alone had enforced “ on the prince this 
memorable charter were under the necessity of in¬ 
serting in it clauses of a more extensive and more 
beneficent nature than those which respected them¬ 
selves alone. They could not expect the concur¬ 
rence of the people, without comprehending toge¬ 
ther with their own, the interests of inferior ranks of 
men; and all provisions which the barons for their 
own sake were obliged to make in order to ensure 
the fair and equitable administration of justice, tend¬ 
ed directly to the benefit of the whole community .” 
Thus we see clearly that the rights of the great 
body of the community was an object of the char¬ 
ter, and that the weight of the people was distinct¬ 
ly felt in its acquisition. 

In another struggle with a succeeding monarch, 
Henry III., the earl of Leicester, a bold, a popular 
and rebellious noble, with a view to “ increase and 
turn to advantage his popularity, summoned a new 
parliament and fixed that assembly on a more demo- 


141 


cratical basis than any which had ever been as¬ 
sembled since the foundations of the monarchy. 
He ordered returns to be made of two knights 
from each shire, and, what is more remarkable, 
of deputies from the boroughs ; an order of men, 
which in former ages, had always been regarded as 
too mean to enjoy a place in the national councils. 
This period is commonly esteemed the epoch of the 
house of commons in England. But though it de-r 
rived its existence from so precarious, and even from 
so invidious an origin as Leicester’s usurpation, it 
soon proved, when summoned by the legal princes, 
one of the most useful, and in process of time, one 
of the most powerful members of the national con¬ 
stitution ; and gradually rescued the kingdom from 
aristocratical as well as from regal tyranny. The 
feudal system with which the liberty, and much more, 
the power of the commons was totally incompatible, 
began gradually to decline, and both the king and the 
commonalty, who felt its inconveniences, contributed 
favor this to new power, which was more submissive 
than the barons to the regular authority of the crown, 
and at the same time afforded protection to the in¬ 
ferior orders of the state.”—Hume’s Hist. Henry III. 

Such was the origin and such the uses of the 
house of commons, in the hands of kings and no¬ 
bles, at its first institution. In the following reign 
of Edward it began to assume a more distinct and 
important character, and to grow in influence and 
weight. It continued for many succeeding reigns in 
favor with the crown as a check upon the power of 
the nobles. Indeed, as, even in those early days, no 
subsidies nor levies could be laid upon the nation 
without the ;assent of parliament, and as the com¬ 
mons alone could impose a burden on their consti¬ 
tuency, the monarch was compelled at every meet¬ 
ing of the body to ask a vote of funds to meet Iris 
urgent necessities. In return for these, it soon be¬ 
came customary to prefer petitions for redress of 
13 * 


142 


grievances. These causes contributed not a little 
to increase the weight and importance of the com¬ 
mons, and finally to give them that strength and in¬ 
fluence which they now possess in the British con¬ 
stitution. That they are a fair, full and equal repre¬ 
sentation of the commonalty cannot be affirmed : 
that the influence of the crown on the floor of the 
house of commons, through placemen and pension¬ 
ers, and in various other modes, is most extensive* 
and mischievous cannot be denied ; and that through 
this undue influence and that of the aristocracy of 
rank and wealth the representative body too rarely 
reflects the interests, the wishes and the feelings of 
the great body of the nation must in all fairness be 
admitted. On the other hand, if we discard the pre¬ 
judices to which early education has given rise ; if 
we look upon the operations of the government with 
a philosophic eye, we shall be compelled to ac-. 
knowledge, that with all its defects the house of 
commons is an all-important safeguard of the rights, 
and liberties of a British subject. If those who 
ought to have the privilege of voting are not all ad¬ 
mitted to the polls, if the representation be still un¬ 
duly apportioned between the different parts of the 
kingdom, if the lords and the great landholders pos-> 
sess the inordinate influence over their tenantry 
which enables them in a great degree to influence 
elections, still there is one security left. The law ma¬ 
king power, so far as the commons are concerned, is 
m the hands of those who are in fact a part of the 
people—are equally bound by the laws, and have a 
common interest and a common feeling with them. 
They have a common interest and a common feel¬ 
ing (if they be independent) even with those who. 
are improperly denied their right of being repre¬ 
sented. They carry therefore into the body of the 
house of commons much of the popular feeling 
and of popular opinion ; and the laws which they 
enact and the measures which they pursue are 


143 


in a good degree the dictates of the popular sen-* 
timent. Unfortunately, indeed, this is not always 
the case, as is distinctly manifested by the corn laws 
which the powerful influence of the great landed 
proprietors has still retained, to the great oppression 
of the laboring classes. But this results from the 
yet imperfect organization of the system, which is 
therefore still imperfect in its salutary operations and 
effects. The beneficent action of the late reform is 
neutralized in part, by the undue influence of the 
crown but still more by that of the wealthy and the 
noble over their dependants and their tenants. The 
consequence is, that notwithstanding the extinction 
of the power exerted, through the rotten boroughs, 
and the very great extension of the right of suffrage 
which has recently been effected, the power of the 
aristocracy is still predominant through their influ¬ 
ence over elections. If this could be effectually 
prevented by the introduction of the ballot, if place¬ 
men and pensioners were excluded from the hall, if 
the ministers of the crown were denied a seat with¬ 
in its walls, we should probably find the house of 
commons in its effects as well as in its form entitled 
to be ranked in the class of representative democra¬ 
cy and always ready to maintain and to extend, the 
free principles of the government. 

I have been educated from my childhood in the 
strongest prejudices against Great Britain and her 
institutions. This was the natural consequence 
of the revolution (during the troubles of which I 
was born) and of the strong contrast existing in ma¬ 
ny respects between our constitutions and hers. But 
when I look back through the vista of ages, upon 
what has been, and what now is, when I trace her 
progress and witness the important though gradual, 
conquest by the nation from the crown, of the most 
efficient fortresses against arbitrary power, I cannot 1 
withhold the justice which is their due for all which 
they have gained. Take even the apparently fruit- 


144 


less revolution, which after bringing Charles the 
First to the block, and declaring both the peers and 
crown to be useless and oppressive, ended at last 
in the despotism of Cromwell. I have seen that key 
which the national assembly of France presented as 
a fit offering to the foremost man of all this world, 
the immortal champion of American liberty. But 
where are the keys of Newgate and of the once aw¬ 
ful tower of London ? You will find them in the 
statute book ! in that memorable statute which gave 
the habeas corpus to the nation !—in that writ which, 
with talismanic power unbolts the massive lock and 
throws open to the captive every prison-door in the 
kingdom ! 

If any other evidence were wanting of the influ¬ 
ence of the nation upon the conduct of affairs in 
the British government, it is abundantly furnished 
by the power which parliament possesses and exer¬ 
cises of changing the ministry at pleasure. Pos¬ 
sessed of the power of refusing supplies, and of par¬ 
alyzing the military power of the crown, they have 
an efficient control over the executive branch of the 
government. No ministry can carry on the go¬ 
vernment without a majority in the house of com¬ 
mons, and those who cannot command that majori¬ 
ty are of necessity obliged to surrender their places 
to others. A new course of measures is thus, inin- 
vitum, forced upon the crown, however averse it 
may really be to the change demanded by the na¬ 
tion. Thus in 1783, the favorites of George III. 
were forced to resign their power by a vote of a ma¬ 
jority of the commons alone, though the lords were 
of their party; and the coalition of North and Fox 
was forced upon the crown, to the great annoyance 
of king and nobles. And though within a^ year 
these ministers were dismissed and Mr. Pitt was re¬ 
appointed, yet an appeal was found necessary to the 
nation through the election of a new parliament, in 
which the new minister was successful on account 


145 


of the odium which the India bill had excited 
through the nation against his predecessor. The 
commons, therefore, must be admitted to have a 
large control over the measures of the government. 
The power of proposing taxes and laws are exer¬ 
cised by them, the former exclusively and the latter 
in conjunction with the house of lords. If therefore 
the house were elected by the unbiassed vote of the 
electors, the government would in that regard have 
a most important feature of representative democra¬ 
cy. It might indeed be itself checked by heredita¬ 
ry peers and an hereditary monarch, but still the 
influence of the nation would be felt, and its great 
concerns would be mainly directed by its will. In 
the struggles for power too, between the contend¬ 
ing branches of the government, it would be more 
likely to gain than to lose, unless its privileges were 
extinguished by violence and usurpation or its purity 
destroyed by venality and corruption. Of this indeed 
the late reform bill furnishes a memorable instance. 
The old house of commons with all its placemen and 
pensioners, with all the influence of rotten boroughs, 
and with all the inequality of representation, effect¬ 
ed in the year 1832 a most vital reform. Fifty-six 
rotten boroughs were deprived of their members and 
a number of other insignificant boroughs were re¬ 
duced to a single member. Besides these salutary 
measures, the right of suffrage was extended to all 
occupiers of houses of the value of £10 per an¬ 
num who should be rated or assessed upon the poor 
rates; an extension which must embrace a very 
large portion of the constituency of the kingdom, 
and render the commons more than ever democratic, 
if the exercise of the electoral privilege could be 
preserved in its purity. 

Unfortunately, however, the house of commons 
can never be said to be a fair representation of the 
nation’s will, until its elections can be rendered un¬ 
biassed and independent. So great is the influence 


146 


of the crown, of the nobles, of the great landed pro¬ 
prietors, of the great capitalists, of the holders of the 
public debt, and in short, of the combined numbers 
of rank and wealth, reinforced by hosts of pension¬ 
ers and placemen, that it may well be doubted whether 
the house of commons itself, however democratical 
in form, has not even yet more of aristocratical lea¬ 
ven than of popular influence in its composition. It 
will not fall in with the plan of these lectures to go 
into an examination of that matter ; but I beg leave 
to refer in conclusion of these remarks on the Bri¬ 
tish constitution, to a few of the judicious specula¬ 
tions of a distinguished writer on the increased and 
increasing influence of the crown.—See Miller’s 
View, chap. 2, vol. 4. pp. 94 to 99. 


LECTURE XI. 


OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND OUR FEDE¬ 
RATIVE SYSTEM. 

The glaring defects of a pure democracy, the 
vacillating councils which distinguish it, the dissen- 
tions, tumults and factions which incessantly disturb 
its tranquillity, the confusion, uproar and commo¬ 
tions attending its deliberations, and the impossibili¬ 
ty of adapting it to a community sufficiently exten¬ 
sive for self-protection, have deservedly brought it 
into disrepute with all writers upon the science of 
government. Unfortunately too., I fear, its undeni¬ 
able mischiefs have had no little tendency to impair 
the confidence of many of our own fellow-citizens 
in its great and leading principle—the government 
of the people. The very word ‘‘democracy” sounds 




147 


harshly in the ears of many, and the will of the peo¬ 
ple is the never-ceasing subject of their sneers and 
their derision. Not that they do not love their coun¬ 
try and its institutions, thoroughly imbued as they 
are with democratical principles, but that they love 
to call them by another name. “ Republican go¬ 
vernment”—“ representative government” they can 
tolerate, but call it a democracy, and it “ stinks in 
their nostrils,” though its principles are essentially 
democratic. I am no great stickler for names on 
the one hand, and certainly no admirer of pure de¬ 
mocracy on the other. Yet in presenting you my 
views of a mixed government, which is calculated 
to sustain and to secure the liberties and the happi¬ 
ness of our people, I must beg leave, lor the sake 
of making myself clearly understood, to use the 
terms “ representative democracy” as distinguishing 
that species of institution, which I deem best 
adapted to those valuable objects. The term repub¬ 
lic is too generic for our purposes. Athens was a 
republic, and, at the same time, a wild democracy. 
Rome was a republic, and yet a haughty aristocra¬ 
cy. Venice was called a republic with its domineer¬ 
ing senate. Poland was styled a republic with a 
monarch at its head ! It has been truly said, “ that 
* f the name republic is given to things in their na- 
“ ture as different and contradictory as light and 
“ darkness, truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, hap- 
“ piness and misery. There are free republics and 
“ republics as tyrannical as an oriental despotism. 
“ A free republic is the best of governments and 
the greatest blessing which mortals can aspire to : 
“ but there have been oligarchies called republics, 
“ carried to such extremes of tyranny, that the des- 
“ potism of Turkey as far as the happiness of the 
“ nation is concerned, would perhaps be preferable.” 
The word republic then means any thing, or nothing, 
and is therefore ill-adapted for use in these discus¬ 
sions. 


148 


On the other hand, the appellation “ representa¬ 
tive democracy” seems to be perfectly distinct and 
definite. The government which it designates is one 
in which the nation’s will prevails, and in so far it is 
a democracy,—a government of the people ; but the 
power not being exercised by the people in person but 
by their agents as representatives, it is with the most 
perfect propriety distinguished by the name of u repre¬ 
sentative democracy.” Tn this sense I shall use the 
term in these lectures, and in this sense I trust it 
will not be unacceptable to any portion of my 
hearers. 

In some of my preceding lectures it has been my 
purpose to shew, not only that a government of the 
people, (by which I mean that form in which the 
will of the nation prevails) is alone reconcileable to 
natural right, but that it is more apt to be under the 
influence of public virtue or goodness of intentions 
than any other form of government whatsoever. 
Even in the governments of the people in their pri¬ 
mary assemblies, it is candidly admitted by the ad¬ 
vocates of monarchy “ that they generally mean to 
do the thing that is right and just, and have always 
a degree of patriotism or public spirit.” And if this 
be true in those small communities which alone can 
constitute a pure democracy, how much more true 
must it be in the wide spread regions of a represen¬ 
tative democracy like ours, covering the half of a 
continent, and peopled by millions of unassuming 
citizens. In the small state where every man forms 
a part of the assembly of the people, every man 
may be lured from the path of true patriotism by 
the hope of promotion and power. The emolu¬ 
ments of office and the reins of power are within 
the grasp of all. But what is there, in the chances 
of promotion of millions of our people, to corrupt 
their good faith and honest intentions for the good 
of their country. What temptations have they to 
multiply offices, and to magnify powers, and to la- 


149 


vish the resources of the nation upon their own re¬ 
presentatives and ministers, when of those who can 
look forward to political stations there is not one 
for thousands of those who are destined to obscuri¬ 
ty? This indeed is one of the great securities in a 
government like ours, as I shall by and bye, have 
occasion to shew more at large ; and although from 
the natural imperfection which is stamped upon eve¬ 
ry thing human, the machine does not always in its 
operation , work out the theoretical principles upon 
which it is constructed, yet there has been nothing 
in our history which justifies our calling in question 
the general fact admitted even by Mr. Blackstone and 
Mr. Paley, that the body of the people generally 
mean to do the thing that is right and just, and have 
always a degree of patriotism and public spirit. 

If then it be true that the intentions of the peo¬ 
ple are honest and patriotic, and if it be true that 
in no other form of government can we expect to 
find so sincere a devotion to the general good, it 
would seem to follow that the organization of the 
state should be imbued with as large a portion of 
the democratical spirit as is practicable without ren¬ 
dering it at the same time liable to the alarming 
mischiefs which so many see in the unbridled license 
of a government of the people. And, moreover, 
the more the operation of a mixed government is to 
restrain the outbreakings of the democratical spirit, 
the more liberally may the exertion of its virtuous 
and beneficent tendencies be indulged. I flatter myself 
that in the sequel we shall discover that we are so 
fenced and protected by our situations, our circum¬ 
stances, and the peculiar character of our institutions, 
that the fear of the ordinary evils of democracy will, 
appear like a sick man’s dream. At the same time, 
I am not insensible to the fact that the democratic 
principle is so prevailing in our government, and its 
natural tendencies so strong, to an increase of power, 
that I am not less sensible of the necessity of keep- 
14 


ing a watchful eye upon it than upon the other 
branches of the government. Our system is indeed 
in strict truth a democracy, but we hope and believe 
it to be a restricted democracy ;—restricted not only 
by the representative principle, but by various causes 
having their foundation, not in the form of the go¬ 
vernment, but in matters extrinsic of its organiza¬ 
tion. 

In considering our institutions as democratic, I 
am distinctly sustained by the most profound politi¬ 
cal thinker of the present day. “ In America,” says 
De Tocqueville, p. 153, “the people appoints the 
legislative and the executive power, and furnishes 
the jurors who punish all offences against the 
laws. The American institutions are democra¬ 
tic, not only in their principle but in all their 
consequences; and the people elects its repre¬ 
sentatives directly , and for the most part annually , 
in order to insure their dependence. The people is 
therefore the real directing power ; and although 
the form of government is representative, it is evi¬ 
dent that the opinions, the prejudices, the interests, 
and even the passions of the community are hinder¬ 
ed by no durable obstacles from exercising a per¬ 
petual influence on society. In the United States 
the majority governs in the name of the people, as 
is the case in all the countries in which the people 
is supreme. This majority is principally composed 
of peaceable citizens, who, either by inclination or 
by interest, are sincerely desirous of the welfare of 
their country. But they are surrounded by the in¬ 
cessant agitation of parties, which attempt to gain 
their co-operation and to avail themselves of their 
support.” 

If our government then be essentially a democra¬ 
cy, it is peculiarly our business to guard against the 
defects and mischiefs incident to that form of go¬ 
vernment. Of aristocracy, I am persuaded we can 
never be in danger, (De Tocqueville, p. 400,) and 


151 


the character of our institutions affords us, I think, 
every reasonable security against the establishment 
of a monarchical government either upon the basis 
of our present constitution or through the instru¬ 
mentality of revolution.—See Fed. No. 28, as to 
the obstacles to usurpation offered by the extent of 
our country and the division into states. But the 
democratical spirit may grow even under the exist¬ 
ing frame of government to a pernicious height, and 
it demands therefore the watchful vigilance of every 
wise patriot to keep it within its proper bounds ; for 

“ Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.” 

Let us proceed, however, to the consideration of 
those regards in which a democracy is defective and 
endeavor to discover how far its deficiences are coun¬ 
teracted by the existing state of things in the United 
States of America. 

The first defect of a democracy is its want of that 
strength and vigor which a monarchy has been sup¬ 
posed to possess for the protection of the state 
against foreign aggression.—De Tocqueville, pp. 142 
208. The unity or centralization of power is un 
questionably of infinite importance in the conduct of 
military affairs, and in carrying on wars whether of 
aggression or of defence. This unity of power, this 
vigor and promptness of decision and of action, this 
capacity of seizing at will upon the resources of the 
nation and of pressing, without objection, the citi¬ 
zen into the service, which the exigencies of warfare 
may occasion, it is obvious is incompatible with the 
very nature of the action of a pure democracy. 
There, every measure must be discussed, every sup¬ 
ply must be voted, every soldier or seaman must be 
raised by the suffrages of the people. There, the 
plan of a campaign must undergo scrutiny, and the 
commanders of the armies must receive authority 
from the mass. But these evils are in a great de¬ 
gree parried by the character of our representative 


152 


democracy. The representative body is not too 
large very promptly to dispose of all questions of 
supplies whether of money or men, and the con¬ 
duct of military operations is in the hands of the 
executive and of officers appointed and removed by 
it. It is true that experience has proved even a go¬ 
vernment like ours, far less efficient in war than an 
absolute monarchy, wielded by the hand of a Na¬ 
poleon ; and it may, perhaps, very truly be confess¬ 
ed, that without a sacrifice of freedom, the tremen¬ 
dous energy of absolutism can never be attained. 
Yet we are not without consolation vvhen we look 
back upon the wars of the revolution and of 1812, 
both of which were waged with much success 
against a powerful foe; and we have, moreover, 
many other important and cheering considerations in 
relation to our capacity to maintain our indepen¬ 
dence among the nations of the earth. 

In the first place let it be observed, that we are 
separated from all the powerful nations of the world 
by an ocean of three thousand miles. The nations 
of Europe can never be formidable to the American 
confederacy in continental wars.—See Fed. No. 8. 
It would be very difficult for any European nation to 
transport and maintain in America more than 25,000 
soldiers: an army which may be considered to re¬ 
present a nation of 2,000,000 of men. The most 
populous people of the eastern continent contend¬ 
ing in this way against the union is in the position 
then of a nation of 2,000,000 of inhabitants at war 
with one of 15,000,000. Add to this that America 
has all its resources within its reach, whilst the Eu¬ 
ropean would be at three thousand miles distant 
from his ; and that the immensity of the American 
continent would of itself present not only an insur¬ 
mountable obstacle to its conquest,” but the most 
serious difficulties in every military operation. The 
largest armies could never make progress over a 
continent stretching from New Orleans to Passa- 


maquoddy, and from the atlantic to the rocky moun¬ 
tains. They might be conquered even by retreat¬ 
ing. The Fabian tactics would overthrow them, and 
the attempt to hold what they got would subdivide 
and annihilate them. Their march would be like 
the passage of a fish through the sea or a bird through 
the air. The elements would close up around them. 
There is no centralization here, the subduing of 
which, would result in the subjugation of the na¬ 
tion. Had Napoleon made himself master of Lon¬ 
don, the seat of the British government, he might 
have shaken the British power in its centre, but the 
possession by an enemy of New York or New Or¬ 
leans, of Boston or Philadelphia, could have no ef¬ 
fect upon Baltimore or Richmond, on Cincinnati or 
St. Louis. The foe must conquer all and garrison 
as he goes, and thus divided, must dwindle into in¬ 
significance. The nations of Europe have sagacity 
enough to see this, and we may therefore dismiss 
the fear of continental wars, except possibly on the 
flanks of the union with the British in Canada, or at 
some future day with Mexico and her provinces. To 
a maritime war, it is true, occasion may give rise. 
But there is always “ greater facility and less dan¬ 
ger in supporting a maritime than a continental war. 
Maritime warfare is not only not dangerous to the 
liberties of the nation, but it has the advantage of 
requiring only one species of effort. A commercial 
people which will furnish the funds, may always have 
a marine and a fleet. And it has been said, “ to be 
far easier to induce a nation to part with its money 
almost unconsciously, than to reconcile it to sacra- 
ficing of men and to personal efforts. Moreover, 
defeat by sea rarely compromises the existence or 
independence of a people.” 

But if it were even probable that military strength 
would with us be needed for continental wars, our 
extensive and fertile country, and its population 
growing with a rapidity unparalleled in the historv 

14 * 


154 


of the world, would leave no fears of a deficiency of 
men or money for carrying them on ; so that I think 
we may console ourselves with the assurance that 
we are not amenable to the charge which may so 
justly be brought against a petty democracy, of ina¬ 
bility to sustain itself against the inroads and the 
domination of a foreign power. 

But though it is easy to remove the objections to 
our representative government in relation to its fo¬ 
reign intercourse, we shall perhaps find more diffi¬ 
culty when we come to consider the operation of the 
democratic principle on our interna} concerns. The 
most vital objection to democracy is its tendency to 
faction, to tumult, to political change, and to fall at 
last into the hands of some ambitious usurper. 
These are indeed very serious effects, and are too 
firmly supported as to pure democracies by the pages 
of history to admit of a denial. But there is still 
much reason to hope, that there are various causes 
arising out of the circumstances in which we are 
placed, not less than out of the character of our re¬ 
presentative and federative systems, which will con¬ 
tribute to protect us in a great degree from these 
alarming mischiefs. 

It is not to be denied, that though the forms of a 
pure democracy do not exist among us, though the 
people do not assemble plenis comitiis, and consult 
upon public affairs, though the government is ad¬ 
ministered through all its departments by means of 
representation, yet the American institutions are 
deeply imbued with the spirit of democracy, and the 
American counsels are ever inspired by the popular 
sentiment in the conduct of affairs. “ Though the 
form of government is representative,” says the sa¬ 
gacious De Tocqueville, “ it is evident that the opin¬ 
ions, the prejudices , the interests , and even the 
passions of the community are hindered by no du¬ 
rable obstacles from exercising a perpetual influence 
on society.” How then are the effects of the infu- 


155 


sion of these prejudices and passions into the coun¬ 
cils of the nation, to be neutralized and rendered 
harmless ? 

In the first place, I think we may fairly assume 
that there is less danger of their prevailing to a dan¬ 
gerous excess in a legislative body composed of not 
more than 200 members than in a tumultuary assem¬ 
blage of thousands of the people. However ani¬ 
mated by the sentiments, the prejudices and the pas¬ 
sions of their constituents, the representatives are 
not likely, in so small a body, to have their passions 
as far excited as those of the people would be in 
their primary assemblies. Moreover, the forms of 
parliamentary proceeding, the protracted discus¬ 
sions, the decision, first in committee of the whole 
and afterwards in the house, the necessity of the 
concurrence of the two houses, and of the subse¬ 
quent acquiescence of the executive, are alt calcula¬ 
ted to check the predominance of sudden passion 
or reckless and headstrong self-will in the adoption 
of measures. 

It is indeed with the deepest regret that I feel in 
candor bound to acknowledge that practical results 
have not always corresponded with these theoretical 
speculations. The intemperance, the disorder, the 
violent passions, the rude and offensive conduct of 
members upon the floor of the house of representa¬ 
tives, are all calculated to awaken the most alarming 
fears for the success of our institutions. But they 
make it the more necessary to impress upon you— 
the future legislators of the land—the solemn duty 
of maintaining the calm dignity and the respectful 
decorum which ought ever to prevail in the great de¬ 
liberative assembly of the nation. When Brennus 
the Gaul, with his conquering legions, entered the 
senate house of Rome, the elevation and dignity of 
the senators, even in that fearful moment, impressed 
the awe-struck barbarian with a belief that it was 
an assembly of the gods ! I very much fear that 


156 


the late disgraceful scenes—enacted in the presence, 
it is said, of a late member of the British parliament 
—have left an impression upon his mind of a cha¬ 
racter altogether opposite. Let us not despair how¬ 
ever. These evils have a tendency to cure them* 
selves ; and moreover the general disgust which 
they have inspired, consoles us with the assurance 
that the great body of the nation is uncontaminated 
by the censurable deportment of a portion of its 
representatives, and is justly resentful at the tame 
and passive acquiescence of the rest. 

But notwithstanding these disgraceful scenes which 
too often degrade the hall of representatives, the 
calm and attentive observer must perceive that 
they have very little reaction upon the body of 
the people. They can produce no serious con¬ 
flict or collision among the constituency, because 
they are scattered over so wide a continent that there 
are often no touching points between them, by rea¬ 
son of their remoteness from each other. Suppose 
the matter in discussion sectional;—abolition for inn 
stance. If ten thousand abolitionists and ten thou¬ 
sand slaveholders were to meet upon a plain to dis¬ 
cuss their points of difference, they would not part 
most probably without a tumult. Bloodshed and 
civil commotion would be the probable consequence. 
But happily for us, all the abolitionists are in the 
north and the slaveholders in the south, and they 
never can come together. Their representatives in¬ 
deed may squabble, but a war of words on the floor 
of congress is a far less evil than a war upon the 
plain of “ man and steel, the soldier and the sword.” 
Suppose, however, the topics of interest are not 
sectional: suppose they divide every city, every vil¬ 
lage, every hamlet, every county. Even then, our 
wide-spread territory is our salvation. As a victory 
gained by a party in one quarter is not decisive of 
the contest, there are no incitements to that violence 
which so naturally prevails iq democratic assemblies, 


157 


If the people of New Orleans could govern the 
union by their votes, there might be a motive for ob¬ 
taining per fas et nefas, by fraud or violence, a 
victory at an election. But in every distinct dis¬ 
trict or section of the union, it is well understood 
that nothing will be gained by a tumultuary course 
there, and though occasionally such scenes are 
enacted, they have no effect upon the public mind, 
except to give rise to sentiments of disapprobation 
and disgust. I am therefore persuaded that we 
have less danger in the United States of civil com¬ 
motion than exists in any other part of the world. 
To this opinion I am the more decidedly inclined 
from various other considerations to which I cannot 
more than briefly allude. Our security from these 
disturbances which occasionally agitate all other 
communities except those exhibiting under oriental 
despotism “ the waveless calm the slumber of the 
the dead,” is essentially promoted not only by the 
extent of our territory, but by the thinness of our 
population. Where the population is sparse, there 
is little opportunity for the collection of masses or 
the creation of excitement. Where the grains of 
powder are not in contact there is never danger of 
explosion. There is moreover little temptation to 
violence, which, however it may effect a particular as¬ 
sembly, can have little influence on distant portions 
of the community; and lastly, little mischief can 
arise from these partial disturbances, which are only 
felt in that remote corner of the nation where they 
happen to occur. It is of vast importance too, that 
from the immense and fertile territories which open 
to our people in the west, there can never be, for 
centuries, that real suffering for want of the means 
of subsistence, which is the great exciting cause of 
many of the riots and excesses which prevail in some 
of the finest countries of Europe. England and 
Ireland are in a state of insurrection and rebellion 
whenever the crops are cut short by unfavorable 


158 


seasons, and the revolution of France, which well 
nigh upturned all the governments around it, as well 
as its own, received its first most fatal impulses from 
a starving population. The train was indeed laid 
by other causes ; the explosive materials had been 
collected in abundance, tyranny may have created 
the combustibles,but famine applied the match. No 
such state of things can exist with us. The means 
of obtaining sustenance and even comfort is so much 
within every man’s power, the facility of migration 
to our back countries, where land, and meat and 
bread, and fuel are in profuse abyndance, is so great, 
that there is little danger that we or our children or 
our children’s children even to the third and fourth 
generation shall ever be the unhappy witnesses of 
riots or revolutions occasioned by a desperate and 
starving population. Moreover, the like causes will 
most probably contribute successfully to prevent the 
dissemination of those agrarian principles, which 
tramples on the rights of property under the false 
pretence of promoting the liberty and equality of 
the people. The beautiful and fertile plains which 
lie beyond our mountains, are open to every adven¬ 
turer, and offer him a home and an asylum without 
resorting to legalized robbery and pillage. Such is 
every system of agrarianism. They violate that 
principle of equality which they profess to revere, 
when they take from me the fair accumulation of the 
earnings of my talents, my care and my industry and 
bestow them upon the indolent, the reckless and the 
dissolute. Resist, I pray you, through life, by rea¬ 
son, by argument, by the influence and authority 
you may acquire on the great theatre of action, every 
effort for the introduction of a principle as deadly in 
its effects upon the prosperity and happiness of so¬ 
ciety, as the aspick’s poison to the life of man. 

Intimately connected with this subject, is the pro¬ 
tection and security of the rights of persons and of 
property. It has been one of the reproaches of pure 


159 


democracy, that these are too little respected in as¬ 
semblies of the people; but with us, there is reason 
to hope that the deviations from the rule of right in 
this regard, will be few and far between. The fa¬ 
cility of accumulation, and the very large propor¬ 
tion of our society who are in the enjoyment of a 
competence, has the necessary effect of inducing a 
general respect for the right of property, and the 
steadfast purpose of defending it. De Tocqueville 
has somewhere remarked upon the general predomi¬ 
nance in the United States of the desire of accu¬ 
mulation ; and as nothing herein is more necessary 
to success than the security of acquisition, so no¬ 
thing is more general among us than respect for the 
rights of property. Occasional and partial excesses 
have occurred indeed, in populous places, very much 
to the disgrace of those concerned, and to the deep 
regret of every sensible and reflecting man. The 
destruction of private property and the violation of 
the person by mobs, sometimes even under the im¬ 
pulse of strong indignatijon against vice, deserve and 
meet with the execration of every virtuous person 
and every sincere lover of free government; since 
this contempt of public authority, this taking of the 
law into their own hands, this sacrifice of life and 
property without judge or jury, is very naturally a 
subject of reproach and makes us a bye-word with 
other nations of the earth. Let me again impress 
upon you, my young friends, the solemn duty 
which rests on you to hold up all such violence as 
calculated to overthrow, by bringing into disrepute, 
our free institutions. Obsta principiis. Oppose 
the very beginnings of these fatal mischiefs. Let 
not the guilt of the victims of popular fury be ever 
pleaded as its justification. Let not acquittals by 
the false leniency of juries, or the strained techni¬ 
calities of the bar or the bench, be an excuse for an 
outrage upon the fundamental principles of all go¬ 
vernment. Better that a thousand acquitted felons 


160 


and desperadoes should be turned loose upon socie¬ 
ty, than that the fatal precedent should be admitted 
of a mob sitting in judgment upon the citizen, and 
dealing death and devastation according to their wild 
and unregulated discretion. That fatal precedent if 
it be not checked, will, sooner or later, prove an in¬ 
strument of destruction in the hands of an infuri¬ 
ate populace for an obnoxious patriotism and un¬ 
compromising virtue. 

One of the most fruitful sources of disorder in 
governments of the people must always be the ac¬ 
cumulation of colossal fortunes in the hands of an 
extensive class, and the existence of squalid poverty 
among the great bulk of the community. Out of 
this gross inequality, arises those heart burnings and 
jealousies which give rise to oppressive laws, if the 
power is in the hands of the wealthy, and to unjust 
ones, if it be in the hands of the poor. Classes 
marked out and thus distinguished, are antagonizing 
to each other, and their acts are correspondent. 
Thus in England, where the noble, and the land¬ 
holder, and the capitalist hold, in reality, the reins 
of the government, the poorer classes are oppressed 
by corn laws and innumerable vexatious regula¬ 
tions ; while in the ancient democracies on the other 
hand, agrarian and sumptuary laws were enacted to 
the prejudice of the rich. Thus, “ when the rich 
alone govern, the interest of the poor is always en¬ 
dangered ; and when the poor make the laws, that 
of the rich incurs very serious risks.” Hence, the 
real friend of his country may well unite in the 
prayer of Agur, “Lord, give us neither poverty nor 
riches,” for the happy mean in this as in all things 
else, is best for man. Colossal fortunes disarm even 
democracy itself of all its power; and the democra- 
tical principles of the British constitution though in 
outward shew so much increased, are paralyzed and 
nerveless through the influence of the noble, the 
landholder, and the capitalist—by corruption at the 


161 


polls. The ballot is now beginning to be looked to, 
as the only successful method of counteraction. 

Happily for us, this state of things can never take 
place here. The foundations of the English aristo¬ 
cracy and of the vast distinctions between the diffe¬ 
rent classes of society was laid in feudal times, when 
the Norman barons were invested with immense 
possessions by their lord the king. These have been 
kept up among other things, by the law of primo¬ 
geniture and the intermarriage of the branches of 
wealthy families with each other. But with us there 
is a comparative equality of condition ; and even 
the few large estates, which are from time to time ac¬ 
cumulated among us, are broken up and subdivided 
in one or two generations by the equal division of 
property among the children of the proprietor and 
his children’s children. Hence, the present self- 
eomplacent holder of a principality may through 
the vista of the future, see his descendant at the 
plough or seated in the workshop, making a coat for 
the grandson of his tailor. So true is this with us, 
that the American sage, whose knowledge of hu¬ 
man life and whose native sagacity entitles him to 
rank with the sages of antiquity, has reduced it to a 
proverb. “ He who begins,” says Dr. Franklin, 
“ where his father ends, generally ends where his fa¬ 
ther began.” The child of wealth dies in a jail, the 
child of poverty expires in the bed of luxury. The 
consequence is, first, that all of us in making laws 
to operate on posterity, are governed by the most 
perfect bona fides in legislating for the general good ; 
since he who would countenance oppression in our 
legislation, can never be assured that his own seed 
will escape the ills that he is preparing for others. 
Secondly : There are few so rich as to be able to 
corrupt the electoral vote, and few so poor as to be 
corrupted. The instances of both are too rare to per¬ 
mit a fear, that the popular voice is not in the main 
a fair representation of the popular will—whereas 
15 


162 


England, notwithstanding the extension of eleC-* 
toral suffrage, there is too much reason to believe 
that a very large proportion of the new electors vote 
under dictation of landlords or ol patrons. 

There is another feature of pure democracy with 
which it is reproached. It is the love of change: 
the restless spirit which never can be contented ? 
the fretfulness of which, never can be satisfied, 
because it is always looking for that perfection which 
is confessedly unattainable in human affairs. Per¬ 
haps when this charge is made against democracy, 
even our withers may not be unwrung. There is 
with us, perhaps, too much impatience at the oc¬ 
casional imperfect working of our great machine- 
Some think it would be better for a wheel more or 
less ; and some think it has too much, and others too 
little lever. But the wise among us believe, with 
the sages of the revolution, that it is better to en¬ 
dure while evils are tolerable, than capriciously to 
change our system for every trivial cause. They 
admit that prudence dictates that governments long, 
established, should not be changed for light and tri¬ 
vial causes. To a certain extent, at least, 

’Tis better to endure the ills we have, 

Than hazard those we know not of. 

Fortunately too for us, our system of written con¬ 
stitutions is eminently calculated to protect us from 
rash and unreflected changes of the fundamental 
law. By its provisions, the difficulties in the way of 
amendments, the large majority required to effect a 
change, the dispersed position of the states, their 
consequent want of concert, to say nothing of the 
opposite opinions which are so likely to prevail at 
the remote extremities of a continent, all tend to al¬ 
lay the statesman’s apprehensions of unnecessary 
and precipitate alterations. In our state constitu¬ 
tion there is no provision whatever for amendment, 
and none can be adopted in the federal constitution 
without passing the severe ordeal of two-thirds of 


163 


both houses of congress., and ;three-fourths of the 
legislatures of the states. 

In these remarks I have not had an eye to the fe¬ 
derative character of our government, from which 
some have anticipated the evils of convulsion and 
revolution. For my own part, there is no feature 
in our system which I look upon with more satisfac¬ 
tion. It is that which enables us to extend our as¬ 
sociation over so large a territory, without the ne¬ 
cessity of centralization, or of vesting inordinate 
powers in the hands of government to enable it to 
wield and manage the immense machine. It is that 
which enables us to command the wealth and popu¬ 
lation which is essential for national defence, with¬ 
out exposing us to the danger of absolutism, which 
has throughout the world been so generally the re¬ 
sult of extended empire of consolidated character. 
The division of powers between the state and fede¬ 
ral governments has the effect of lessening power in 
the hands of each, while there is no diminution ot 
the aggregate powers essential for the conduct ol 
affairs. The federal government is largely invested 
with all those powers which are essential for foreign 
intercourse, and against foreign aggression. But 
that government can never penetrate into the priva¬ 
cy of individual interests, which, after all, is one of 
the most fearful actions of tyrannical governments. 
These are under the control of the states which form 
the barrier between the homestead of the citizen and 
the action of the general government; while on 
the other hand, they have themselves no temptations 
to invade the rights of the people, and no induce¬ 
ments to seize upon the limited sovereignty of the 
states, since that sovereignty is shorn of all its prin¬ 
cipal attractions, by the powers which are transfer¬ 
red to the general government. 

It is indeed most grateful to consider in what va¬ 
rious modes this ingenious mechanism is calculated 
to effect the most salutary purposes. Postponing 


164 


for the present the question of the danger of con-- 
solidation and absolutism in the general government, 
let us here observe how perfect is the protection our 
system affords, against an aristocracy or an usurpa¬ 
tion of the powers of the states. As to aristocracy, 
the materials for it have no existence, and it may 
well be doubted whether it could be now created 
even if the government were consolidated. But in 
our confederate character it is impossible. An aris¬ 
tocracy for the union cannot be, for if there were 
no other difficulty, the different states could never 
agree as to the relative rank of their grandees; and 
the derangement of any one state would effectually 
defeat the whole. So that not only is such an aris¬ 
tocracy impracticable under the present constitution, 
but it is also impracticable that it should be ever in¬ 
troduced by amendment while the union lasts. And 
as to the states themselves, even if the constitution 
did not guarantee a republican form of govern¬ 
ment, the state power is so little dazzling, compared 
with that of the general government as to be un¬ 
worthy of usurpation. A Virginia duke would have 
little reason to pride himself on a star and garter 
either in the senate or house of representatives, and 
the arena of the legislature of the state would be 
too humble a theatre for the display of his rank or 
the exhibition of his arrogance and vainglory. The 
dangers of aristocracy, therefore, while the general 
features of our confederation last, may safely be set 
down among the dreams of those gloomy and vi¬ 
sionary predictors who see nothing but calamity in 
the destiny of the nation. 

To the effect of this separation of powers, DeToc- 
queville attributes the most prevailing influence, page 
252 : “ If,” says he, “ the directing power of the Ame¬ 
rican communities had both these instruments of go¬ 
vernment at its disposal, and united the habit of exe¬ 
cuting its own commands, to the right of command¬ 
ing ; if, after having established the general princi- 


165 


pies of government, it descends to the details of 
public business; and if, having regulated the great 
interests of the country, it would penetrate into the 
privacy of individual interest, freedom would soon 
be banished from the New World. 

“Butin the United States the majority which so 
frequently displays the tastes and the propensities of 
a despot, is still destitute of the more perfect in¬ 
struments of tyranny. 

“ In the American republics the activity of the 
central government has never as yet been extended 
beyond a limited number of objects sufficiently pro¬ 
minent to call forth its attention. The secondary 
affairs of society have never been regulated by its 
authority ; and nothing has hitherto betrayed its de¬ 
sire of interfering in them. The majority is be¬ 
come more and more absolute, but it has not increased 
the prerogatives of the central government; those 
great prerogatives have been confined to a certain 
sphere ; and although the despotism of the majori¬ 
ty may be galling upon one point, it cannot be said 
to extend to all. However the predominant party 
in the nation may be carried away by its passions ; 
however ardent it may be in the pursuit of its pro¬ 
jects, it cannot oblige all the citizens to comply with 
its desires in the same manner, and at the same 
time throughout the country. When the central 
government which represents that majority has is¬ 
sued a decree, it must entrust the execution of its 
will to agents, over whom it frequently has no con¬ 
trol, and whom it cannot perpetually direct. The 
townships, municipal bodies, and counties may 
therefore be looked upon as concealed break-waters 
which check or part the tide of popular excitement. 
If an oppressive law were passed, the liberties of 
the people would still be protected by the means by 
.which that law would be put in execution : the ma¬ 
jority cannot descend to the details, and (as I will 
venture to style them.) the puerilities of administra* 
15 * 


166 


tive tyranny. Nor does the people entertain that 
full consciousness of its authority, which would 
prpmpt it to interfere in these matters ; it knows 
the extent of its natural powers, but it is unacquaint¬ 
ed with the increased resources which the art of go¬ 
vernment might furnish. 

“ This point deserves attention ; for if a democratic 
republic, similar to that of the United States, were 
ever founded in a country where the power of a 
single individual had previously subsisted, and the 
effects of a centralized administration had sunk deep 
into the habits and the laws of the people, l do not 
hesitate to assert, that in that country a more insuf¬ 
ferable despotism would prevail than any which 
now exists in the absolute monarchies of Europe; 
or indeed than any which could be found on this 
side the confines of Asia.-’ 

“It profits a people but little to be affluent and 
free, if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged or 
subjugated ; the number of manufactures and the 
extent of its commerce are of small advantage, if 
another nation has the empire of the seas and gives 
the law in all the markets of the globe. Small na¬ 
tions are often impoverished, not because they are 
small, but because they are weak ; and great em¬ 
pires prosper less because they are great than be¬ 
cause they are strong. Physical strength is there¬ 
fore one of the first conditions of the happiness and 
even of the existence of nations. Hence it occurs, 
that unless very peculiar circumstances intervene, 
small nations are always united to large empires in 
the end, either by force or by their own consent; 
yet I am unacquainted with a more deplorable spec¬ 
tacle than that of a people unable either to defend 
or to maintain its independence. De Tocqueville, 142. 

“ The federal system was created with the inten¬ 
tion of combining the different advantages which 
result from the greater and the lesser extent of na¬ 
tions ; and a single glance over the United States of 


167 


America suffices to discover the advantages which 
they have derived from its adoption. 

“In great centralized nations the legislator is 
obliged to impart a character of uniformity to the 
laws, which does not always suit the diversity of 
customs and of districts ; as he takes no cognizance 
of special cases, he can only proceed upon general 
principles ; and the population is obliged to conform 
to the exigencies of the legislation, since the legis¬ 
lation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and cus¬ 
toms of the population ; which is the cause of end¬ 
less trouble and misery. This disadvantage does not 
exist in confederations ; congress regulates the prin¬ 
cipal measures of the national government, and all 
the details of the administration are reserved to the 
provincial legislatures. It is impossible to imagine 
how much this division of sovereignty contributes to 
the well-being of each of the states which compose 
the union. In these small communities which are 
never agitated by the desire of aggrandizement or 
the cares of self-defence, all public authority and 
private energy is employed in internal amelioration. 
The central government of each state, which is in 
immediate juxtaposition to the citizens, is daily ap¬ 
prised of the wants which arise in society ; and new 
projects are proposed every year, which are discuss¬ 
ed either at town-meetings or by the legislature of 
the state, and which are transmitted by the press to 
stimulate the zeal and to excite the interest of the 
citizens. This spirit of amelioration is constantly 
alive in the American republics, without compromi¬ 
sing their tranquillity; the ambition of power yields 
to the less refined and less dangerous love of com¬ 
fort. It is generally believed in America that the 
existence and the permanence of the republican 
form of government in the new world depend upon 
the existence and the permanence of the federal 
system ; and it is not unusual to attribute a large 
share of the misfortunes which have befallen the 


168 


new states of South America to the injudicious erec¬ 
tion of great republics, instead of a divided and 
confederate sovereignty. 

“ It is incontestibly true that the love and the ha¬ 
bits of republican government in the United States 
were engendered in the townships and in the pro¬ 
vincial assemblies. In a small state, like that of 
Connecticut for instance, where cutting a canal or 
laying down a road is a momentous political ques¬ 
tion, where the state has no army to pay and no 
wars to carry on, and where much wealth and much 
honor cannot be bestowed upon the chief citizens, 
no form of government can be more natural or more 
appropriate than that of a republic. But it is this 
same republican spirit, it is these manners and cus¬ 
toms of a free people, which are engendered and 
nurtured in the different states, to be afterwards ap¬ 
plied to the country at large. The public spirit 
of the union is, so to speak, nothing more than an 
abstract of the patriotic zeal of the provinces. Every 
citizen of the United States transfuses his attach¬ 
ment to his little republic into the common store of 
American patriotism. In defending the union, he 
defends the increasing prosperity of his own district, 
the right of conducting its affairs, and the hope of 
causing measures of improvement to be adopted 
which may be favorable to his own interests; and 
these are motives which are wont to stir men more 
readily than the general interests of the country and 
the glory of the nation. 

“ On the other hand, if the temper and the man¬ 
ners of the inhabitants especially fitted them to pro¬ 
mote the welfare of a great republic, the federal sys¬ 
tem smoothed the obstacles which they might have 
encountered. The confederation of all the American 
states presents none of the ordinary disadvantages 
resulting from great agglomerations of men. The 
union is a great republic in extent but the paucity 
of objects for which its government provides assimi- 


169 


Sates it to a small state. Its acts are important, but 
they are rare. As the sovereignty of the union is 
limited and incomplete, its exercise is not incompa¬ 
tible with liberty; for it does not excite those insa¬ 
tiable desires of fame and power which have proved 
so fatal to great republics. As there is no common 
centre to the country , vast capital cities, colossal 
wealth, abject poverty, and sudden revolutions are 
alike unknown; and political passion, instead of 
spreading over the land like a torrent of desolation, 
spends its strength against the interests and the in¬ 
dividual passions of every state. 

“ Nevertheless, all commodities and ideas circu¬ 
late throughout the union as freely as in a country 
inhabited by one people. Nothing checks the spirit 
of enterprise. The government avails itself of the 
assistance of all who have talents or knowledge to 
serve it. Within the frontiers of the union the pro- 
foundest peace prevails, as within the heart of some 
great empire ; abroad, it ranks with the most power¬ 
ful nations of the earth : two thousand miles of 
coast are open to the commerce of the world ; and 
as it possesses the keys of the globe, its flag is re¬ 
spected in the most remote seas. The union is as 
happy and as free as a .small people, and as glorious 
and as strong as a great nation.” 

“ No one can be more inclined than I am myself 
to appreciate the advantages of the federal system, 
which I hold to be one of the combinations most fa? 
vorable to the prosperity and freedom of man. I 
envy the lot of those nations which have been ena¬ 
bled to adopt it; but I cannot believe that any con¬ 
federate peoples could maintain a long or an equal 
contest with a nation of similar strength in which 
the government should be centralized. A people 
which should divide its sovereignty into fractional 
powers, in the presence of the great military monar¬ 
chies of Europe, would in my opinion, by that very 
act, abdicate its power, and perhaps its existence 


no 


land its name. But such is the admirable position 
of the new world, that man has no other enemy 
than himself; and that in order to be happy and to 
be free, it suffices to seek the gifts of prosperity and 
the knowledge of freedom.” 

In my desire to present these striking views of the 
effects of our federal system, I have deviated some¬ 
what from the particular point which I had been en¬ 
gaged in illustrating. That point was the probable 
security of our representative and federative sys¬ 
tem from the dangers of internal commotion, and the 
checks to those dangers which are presented by our 
situation and circumstances, as well as by the nature 
of our government and institutions. 

In returning to the consideration of this topic 
however, one of the most interesting questions re¬ 
lates to the action of the states themselves in their 
sovereign capacities. I will before I proceed, read 
to you De Tocqueville, pp. 146 and 147, and from 
362 to 401. 

I have thus laid before you, young gentlemen, 
the strong and sagacious views of our federative in¬ 
stitutions and of their operation and probable dura¬ 
tion, from the pen of a young man not exceeding 
twenty-five years of age when he travelled in Ame¬ 
rica. His speculations have deservedly extorted the 
admiration and applause of the most sagacious states¬ 
men, on both sides of the Atlantic, and are through¬ 
out most worthy of diligent examination. It may 
seem superfluous after his very forcible reflections to 
add any remarks of my own upon the same topics. 
Yet I must beg leave to pursue somewhat farther the 
question of the tendencies of the union to centrali¬ 
zation on the one hand, or dismemberment on the 
other, and the various and powerful causes, which 
tend to counteract and to restrain these pernicious 
tendencies. 

Of centralization or consolidation as it is usually 
termed by us, I entertain but little apprehensions, \ 


171 


Confess, unless we should be unfortunately engaged 
in wars which threaten our subjugation, and call for 
the united efforts of the nation in the most efficient 
form. Consolidation can only be effected, first, by 
usurpation ; second, by changes of the constitution, 
to which the states shall assent for their own anni¬ 
hilation ; third, by subjugation by overgrown mem¬ 
bers of the union ; fourth, by combination of sec¬ 
tional divisions of the residue of the states. The 
danger of the usurpation of the government by an 
ambitious individual appears to me to be an idle 
dream, unless we should be involved in desolating 
wars, which too often result in investing dictatorial 
powers in the hands of one man. I have already 
adverted to the little hazard we incur of dangerous 
wars ; to the consequent want of pretext for raising 
standing armies ; to the probability, in our present 
circumstances, that the navy will be the arm of de¬ 
fence of the nation, and to the certainty that our 
liberties never can be conquered by it. From these 
considerations, the probability is remote of our train¬ 
ing up military chieftains to our destruction, and still 
less of our supplying them with mercenary troops, to 
secure the great object of their criminal ambition. 
That very extent of our country too, to which I have 
so often adverted, and the existence of six and twenty 
organized governments, each acting upon its own 
impulses, furnish the best security against any at¬ 
tempt upon our liberties. The usurper would en¬ 
counter all the difficulties already portrayed, in the 
attempt to overrun and subjugate a continent. 
Moreover at the sound of the tocsin, every non-con¬ 
forming state would be on the alert. Naturally 
jealous of the inroads of power, and seeing the con¬ 
stitution trampled under foot, they would at once 
prepare for their own security and combine for their 
defence. In such emergency, they would indeed be 
thrown back upon their reserved rights. It would 
offer no question of abstractions, it would present no 


17*2 


tnoot point to be discussed in coteries, or decided in 
political clubs. The constitution would be trampled 
under foot, its bonds torn asunder, and the states 
disenthralled. The government itself would be dis¬ 
solved, by the withdrawal from either house of a ma¬ 
jority of its members, if a majority of the states whe¬ 
ther great or small resisted the usurper, and by this 
simple operation, the sinews of his power be cut and 
his arm rendered nerveless and impotent. This is 
indeed a feature in our constitution, which seems to 
have been but little adverted to, though in the course 
of events it may possibly prove to be very striking 
and important. A union of thirteen small states 
may checkmate the government by withdrawing their 
senators and annihilating the senate ! and the five 
large states of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
Ohio and Massachusetts could effect a similar result, 
by refusing to elect representatives. He, therefore, 
by whom our liberties are cloven down, must effect 
his object by prostrating the constitution, and march¬ 
ing to power by means having no semblance of law, 
or he must have the good fortune to secure to him¬ 
self a majority of states, and among them of those, 
who have a majority of the representatives. 

From these and various other considerations, I am 
persuaded we incur but little hazard of centralization 
from usurpation. If indeed our union be broken up 
by the states, and separate confederacies be estab¬ 
lished, and still more if each state sets up for itself, 
we may fairly expect all the mischiefs of tyranny and 
absolutism sooner or later to visit this now happy 
people. But while the union lasts and its general 
principles are even in the main preserved, I cannot 
fear that the feeble magistrate at the head of the go¬ 
vernment can ever grow up into a stern and ruthless 
tyrant. The patronage so much talked of and so 
properly guarded against, never can be great enough 
to give him dangerous strength, while the great mass 
of the concerns of the nation are managed by the 


173 


states, and the agents for conducting them, are their 
own ministers and servants. As De Tocqueville very 
truly remarks, the states are the 'peculiar objects of 
the affections of their respective people, and all the 
feared and boasted patronage of the federal govern¬ 
ment, will probably ever prove ineffectual to corrupt 
the’pure current of this natural and patriotic feeling. 
See De Tocqueville, 147, 148. 

To prevent misapprehension however, it is proper 
here to remark, that in expressing the opinion that 
so long as we remain united we shall not incur the 
hazard of usurpation or of centralism, I by no means 
intend to be understood, that there are no dangers in 
our government of abuse of power. Far, very far from 
it. So long as it is true, that the heart of man is prone 
lo evil and most desperately wicked, so long must it 
continue true, that the people and the states will be 
exposed to inroads upon their rights, by those who 
hold the power. The tyranny of majorities may be 
felt under the forms of the best constitution, and the 
insidious encroachments of the executive power, and 
the corrupt abuse of the patronage it enjoys, are per¬ 
haps not less to be expected under this, than under 
other systems of government. On these topics it 
will be necessary to enlarge hereafter, and they are 
only mentioned here, to afford opportunity for the re¬ 
mark that the mischiefs to which they refer are in¬ 
deed to be deprecated, and ought to be steadfastly 
resisted, but that under our happy constitution there 
is little reason to apprehend they can be fatal. There 
is a line beyond which they cannot pass ; there is a 
limit to the duration of office both in the legislative 
and executive departments, which serves to check 
them, while the total bouleversement of the ruling 
party and the promotion of their adversaries, destroys 
all their airy visions of enlarged dominion, and leaves 
them in the shades of private life, to lament the dan¬ 
gerous power built up for another. The late expe¬ 
rience of the nation proves, that with all his patron- 
16 


174 


age a president may find himself on a re-election in a 
powerful minority ; as the events of forty years ago 
indeed had fully shewn, in the total overthrow of the 
elder Adams, though sustained confessedly by a 
powerful party of very great ability. And let the 
incumbents in office try it when they will, they will 
find every inroad they make upon the constitution, 
magnified into an importance, and trumpeted through 
the land, with a diligence and success, altogether fa¬ 
tal to their hopes. The states w ill be peculiarly sen¬ 
sitive. They will be ever ready to “ augur malad¬ 
ministration at a distance and scent the approach of 
tyranny in every tainted breeze.” The quietus of 
Mr. Adams was thus found in the sedition law, and 
Mr. Poinsett’s militia bill sealed the fate of Mr. Van 
Buren ; while “ the stocked pack” which, it was in¬ 
sisted, elected the younger Adams, # was unquestion¬ 
ably one of the prominent topics in the animated 
canvass that terminated in his defeat. These are 
salutary correctives of vaulting ambition, and I trust 
they will ever be unsparingly applied ; as they will ev¬ 
er contribute most effectually to arrest the encroach¬ 
ments upon the rights of the people and the states; 
which unobserved might become mischievous, and 
lead to discontents and jars between the states and 
federal government that might end in dissolution. 

2. The second mode in which consolidation may 
be effected is by changes of the constitution with the 
assent of the states by which they will gradually 
effect their own annihilation. But when we reflect 
upon the character'of the human heart, and moreover 
call to mind the extreme difficulty of procuring the 
adoption of any amendment to the constitution,! 
there can surely be no probable ground of apprehen¬ 
sion, of eighteen states consenting to disrobe them- 

* I do not mean to intimate an opinion either way on that 
matter. If there was no foundation for the charge it proves 
but the more strongly the jealousy of the people. 

t These difficulties are strongly presented as to other mat¬ 
ters in the “ Federalist, p. 84. 




175 


selves of all their power and subjugating themselves 
and their sister states to the government of a central 
power. 1 shall therefore without further remark pro¬ 
ceed to the third and fourth considerations. 

3 and 4. Is there reason to apprehend a subjuga¬ 
tion of one section of the union, by another, or by a 
combination of states wielding by their weight and 
influence the powers of the union ? The last of these 
is in some lights a question of the deepest interest, 
and may grow into fearful magnitude if the public 
councils should prove deficient in wisdom, moderation 
and virtue.* It involves the consideration moreover 
of one of the most difficult and interesting problems 
in the science of government. It seems to be the in¬ 
soluble problem, of a thing being, at the same time, 
greater and less ; of power being at the same time, 
superior and inferior ; of the sovereignty being, at the 
same time omnipotent and yet controllable. These 
contradictions which present difficulties in all forms of 
government are not less likely to arise in a representa¬ 
tive democracy than in any other political system. In 
monarchies if the king has unlimited authority, a ty¬ 
ranny is the result ; in aristocracies, if the nobles are 
sufficiently powerful to sustain themselves, their pow¬ 
er proceeds by regular accretions, until they are abso¬ 
lute ; and if in either case to prevent these evils an 
adequate check is placed in the third estate, or in the 
people, that check will sooner or later be destroyed 
or become the master spirits. 

And so it is with a democracy. The fundamental 
principle of that form of government, whether pure or 
representative, is the sovereignty of the people ; and 
the will of that sovereignty is always declared by the 

* As to the notion of an attempt at subjugation by any one 
Mate while the union lasts, it is altogether visionary ; for >t* 
first movement would array the rest of the union against ii 
Divide indeed into separate states, or separate confederacies 
and subjugation will soon become the fate oi the feebler pow¬ 
ers. Union only can protect the weak and chain the towiMfiag 
a nibition of the strong. 



176 


majority. It does not follow indeed that what it doe# 
is right , but, from the very constitution of the sys¬ 
tem, it does follow, that the will of the majority must 
prevail. It could not be otherwise, upon the princi¬ 
ple of equality, than that the greater number should 
rule, since unanimity is impossible. The greater or 
the less must predominate ; and to make the less 
predominate over the greater , would yet more vio¬ 
late right and justice, while nothing would be gained 
in policy, since it is just as probable, and indeed 
more probable, that the few should err than the ma¬ 
ny. As however the majority may err , and what is 
yet more important, as they may tyrannize , it is a 
momentous question how to restrain it within proper 
bounds without impairing those rights which are 
conceded to belong to it. 

Upon this interesting subject the remarks of De 
Tocqueville are peculiarly striking. I cannot do 
better than read them at large. See pages 220,240, 
250, 251. 

After having presented these striking remarks, 
which are calculated to impress us strongly with the 
necessity of vigilance and energy, in preserving our 
institutions from the mischiefs of domineering ma¬ 
jorities, let us endeavor to acquire more distinct ideas 
of the danger on the one hand and of the practical 
checks upon the other, on which we may reasonably 
rely for our security, by considering the matter in a 
twofold view; first, as to the danger of tyrannical 
abuse of their power by majorities, where sectional 
matters are not the objects of action ; and secondly, 
when the great subject of conflict between the par¬ 
ties is altogether sectional. 

in relation to the first, my fears, I confess,fall very far 
short of the vaticinations of our sagacious author. The 
division of power between the states and the federal 
government, and the checks to be found in both, 
upon the powers of the majority, forbid the appre¬ 
hension of mischievous and tyrannical legislation. 


177 


The effect of the division of powers, both on the 
state and federal governments, is to diminish the 
motives to the domineering of majorities, while it 
circumscribes also the spheres of their respective ac¬ 
tions. The federal government has little power over 
the internal concerns of the country. It acts but 
rarely, directly on the people, and is not, therefore, 
to any considerable extent, capable of tyranizing 
over them. The great mass of municipal power is 
exercised by the states, and their power alone is felt 
by the people at their homes and firesides. If a ma¬ 
jority, therefore, in congress, were disposed to ty¬ 
ranny, it would be difficult for them to find legi¬ 
timate and constitutional objects of legislation, 
through which they could oppress the minority.— 
See De Tocqueville, pp. 365, 6, 143, 144. But if 
they could, so long as laws are general in their ac¬ 
tion, they must operate on all—on majorities as well 
as minorities,—on the very men who pass them, who 
in the course of one revolving year, may be return¬ 
ed into the mass of the people, to be the wretched 
victims of their own tyranny and misrule. Although 
therefore, in the natural course of things, a party in 
power may be expected to wield its authority so as 
to keep the reins in their own hands, yet have they 
no motive to pass tyrannical laws which must affect 
themselves, and moreover always will result in the 
downfall of those by whom they are enacted. So 
too in the states. Though the ramifications of their 
authority extend through every portion of society, 
yet as they are shorn of those powers which form 
the great objects of insatiable ambition, there can 
be no motive for encroachment on the rights of the 
people, or for harsh and tyrannical legislation. Their 
.sphere of action is confined to the rights of proper¬ 
ty, the rights of persons and matters of police, all 
of which must press equally upon the majority and 
the minority. Hence it is, that although (as cannot 
&e denied) there are numerous instances of tvranni 
16 * 


178 


cal action in majorities both in our legislatures and 
in congress, yet are they to be found (not in acts of 
general legislation, which alone can be of serious influ¬ 
ence) but in the ephemeral concerns of party poli¬ 
tics, and the dirty tactics of journalists and dema¬ 
gogues. A president in office may confine his pat¬ 
ronage to his suppliant tools, and exclude his oppo¬ 
nents from their equal right, as citizens, to participate- 
in the honors and the emoluments of office, and a 
successful candidate upon receiving the keys of go¬ 
vernment, may corruptly distribute the spoils of vic¬ 
tory. A majority in congress may for a while sup¬ 
press debate, and carry all its favorite measures by 
solid phalanx. But after all, experience has shewn, 
that the great and important rights of public liber¬ 
ty, and the security of the rights of persons and of 
property, are not disturbed by the agitations, (how¬ 
ever alarming) of political parties ; and under all 
the violences we have witnessed, every man has 
continued to sit unmolested under his own vine and 
fig-tree, where there is none to make him afraid. Ex¬ 
perience has proved, that however strong and able 
a party in power may be, the exercise of tyrannical 
legislation inevitably results in their defeat and down¬ 
fall. The cry that the church is in danger, has 
overthrown many a ministry in England, and the 
cry that our liberties are assaulted, has not been less 
successful here. The alien and sedition laws gave 
the coup de grace to one administration, and an ob¬ 
noxious militia law sealed the fate of another. In 
short, though political parties, in their scramble for 
power, and in their pursuit of the loaves and fishes, 
are reckless and unprincipled, yet the mass of the 
people will desert them and throw the majority in 
the scale of their adversaries, whenever they can be 
persuaded, that serious inroads are making upon 
their liberties and the constitution. The interest of 
the mass must always be the same. The interest of 
the majority is, and must always be, identified and 


179 


confounded with that of their fellow citizens. They 
may be deceived or they may be mistaken ; but they 
cannot, in this regard, be faithless and corrupt. A 
majority of the people cannot designedly unite, to 
promote and sustain the fortunes of those whom 
they perceive to be warring against the rights and 
liberties of themselves and their posterity. 

But where the question is of sectional concern, 
the result is more doubtful, and the hazard of ty¬ 
ranny no “coinage of the brain.” Where the in¬ 
terests, the feelings or even the prejudices of two 
different sections of a confederation are distinct and 
conflicting, where one regards as essential, what the 
other looks upon as ruinous, and where the line of 
demarcation is as plain territorially as it unfortunate¬ 
ly is in point of interest or opinion, it may be confi¬ 
dently pronounced that the union of the respective 
portions must speedily be dissolved, unless there be 
co-existing causes of an opposite tendency more than 
adequate to control the repellent principles. Take 
for example, the subject of abolition, which unfor¬ 
tunately now stands forth so prominently on the 
canvass. All the states north of the Pennsylva¬ 
nia line and of the Ohio river, abjure and reprobate 
slavery . The rest of the states—that is to say— 
all south of the Pennsylvania line and of the Ohio 
river, not only tolerate it, but some of them deem 
its existence essential to their prosperity, and all of 
them regard its abolition as fatal to their safety. 
Here then is a point of difference of the most mo¬ 
mentous consequence to the southern states, and 
which their northern brethren (with little reason it 
appears to me) have chosen to consider vitally im¬ 
portant also to them. The antagonizing parties 
are moreover divided by a line, on each side of 
which, they may be regarded as unanimous. Such 
a state of things places the two large divisions of the 
union in dire hostility to each other. They stand 
in the position of separate nations. They are bound 


180 


together in point of form indeed, but in point of 
fact they are conflicting and distinct. What shall 
counteract the effect of these conflicting princi¬ 
ples? What shall restrain a northern majority from 
tyrannizing over the southern slaveholder, by the 
enaction of provisions, and the adoption of mea¬ 
sures ruinous (not to their prosperity only) but, as 
they believe, to their very existence ? Nothing but 
making him pay for the slaves as England has done. 
If abolition be necessary, why should the south bear 
the burden alone of the heavy tax of emancipation ? 
Will they agree to pay their proportion of what we 
lose? It is in this state of things that majorities 
are chiefly to be dreaded; when they are hurried 
on, by their separate interests, their excited feelings, 
or their fanatical prejudices, to enact laws, and adopt 
measures, which do not bear upon themselves but 
upon others only. It has been keenly and sagacious-? 
ly remarked “ with what calm philosophy we can all 
of us contemplate the misfortunes of others ” ; and 
it may be as truly said, that there is little safety for a 
poor minority, where the majority legislates for them 
alone; enjoying, themselves, the comfortable assure 
ance, that however the minority may 'suffer,their (< own 
withers will be unwrung.” There is no safety for the 
governed in such a state of things, or rather there is 
no other safety than in the interests of the majority 
or in their own strong arm and desperate valor. “If,” 
said Mr. Clay in his speech on the veto power, “ a ma¬ 
jority of Congress should put itself in opposition to 
the interests of the south (on the subject of slavery) 
neither presidents nor vetoes would avail to protect it. 
Its own resolution, its own valor, its own indomitable 
determination to maintain its rights against all men, 
these and these alone could in that case uphold the 
southern interests.” Intelligencer January 25, 1842. 
And all this is perfectly consistent with the principles 
of the declaration of Independence, and the views 
presented heretofore, on the right of resistance 


against tyranny and oppression. Ante page 52 
Against an omnipotent power, disposed to tyranny, 
there is no protection except self-defence, and the 
only restraint upon the tyrant whether a monarch or 
a majority , is the fear of the desperation of its victims. 

But is it then to be supposed, that the weaker sec¬ 
tion of the union must succumb to the tyranny of a 
majority, when they have a united and powerful popu¬ 
lation to defend their rights ? By no means. Let 
the time come when it may, and intolerable evil will 
inevitably throw back the oppressed upon their own 
resources, and drive the injured states to the sad al¬ 
ternative ofdissolution. This powerful truth cannot be 
concealed, when we look to the principles upon which 
alone unions can be formed or can be maintained. 
Community of interest, community of feeling, com¬ 
munity of principle, all seem important in connecting 
together the various links of a confederation of repub¬ 
lics. “ One of the circumstances,” says the author so 
often quoted, u which most powerfully contribute to 
support the federal government in America, is that 
the states have not only similar interests, a common 
origin and a common tongue, but that they are also 
arrived at the same stage of civilization, which almost 
always renders a union feasible. A federal compact 
cannot be lasting, unless there exists in the commu¬ 
nities, which are leagued together, a certain number 
of inducements to union, which render their com¬ 
mon dependence agreeable, and the task of govern¬ 
ment light. All the peoples which have ever formed 
a confederation, have been held together by a certain 
number of common interests, which served as the 
intellectual ties of the Association.” It is not indeed 
that all must have the same pursuits, for that might 
make the parties rivals instead of friends. But they, 
must not be hostile in their character. In so far as 
they are so, the bond of union is the more feeble. 
One state therefore may be agricultural another ma¬ 
nufacturing and another commercial, and yet all will 


182 


but subserve the interests of each other. But where 
the existence of a state of things, e.g. as of slavery, 
is interwoven with the very existence of one half the 
states, and its existence in the confederacy is deemed 
burdensome to the rest, the seeds of discord are so 
thickly sown that harmony cannot long be cherished 
except by the most guarded moderation and forbear¬ 
ance. So too with the tariff, which has been so long 
the fruitful occasion of wrangling between the states¬ 
men of the north and south. The duties which the 
north demands, to feed its manufacturers, the south 
considers as a burden upon its industry ; and even 
at the present moment an angry controversy is ap¬ 
prehended on the subject. What can be said but 
that the sister states must settle these discordant in¬ 
terests upon the liberal principles, dictated by a sense 
of the blessings of the union, and of the necessity of 
mutual forbearance for its preservation. We must 
learn to “give and take/’ or it will “dissolve like 
the baseless fabric of a vision and leave not a wreck 
behind.” 

“Meanwhile,” says Mr. Clay in the speech already 
quoted, “ the people of the south have all the requi¬ 
site guarantees. First they have the sacred provisions 
of the constitution ; and then they have the charac¬ 
ter of our government, as a confederacy; and the fact, 
of the existence of these interests (the rights of the 
master over the slave) long before the adoption of 
the constitution, and the rights and duties of the gov¬ 
ernment in regard to them recognized and laid down 
by that sacred instrument. That is the security of the 
south. He felt himself secure in that mutual harmo¬ 
ny which it was alike the interest of all to cultivate; 
in the constitutional securities; in the certainty of 
the disruption of the union as the inevitable result, 
the moment that interest should be assailed ; and in 
the capacity and determination of the south to defend 
herself at all hazards and against all forms of attack 
whether from abroad or at home.” 


183 


Such being the imminent hazard to the union of 
Ihe states, from sectional differences on certain im¬ 
portant topics, it behoves us to consider attentively, 
what counteracting principles are to be found in our 
institutions, and in the interests of the members of 
the confederacy, against the tyranny of a majority, in 
one part of the union, over the minority in another. 
And the first is undoubtedly to be found in the guar¬ 
antee of the constitution. Every officer of the go¬ 
vernment, every member of the two houses of con¬ 
gress takes an oath to support that instrument. In 
that oath, wherever (as for example in relation to sla¬ 
very) the constitution is beyond dispute there is a 
strong security. If it be even admitted that some 
will violate it, whose fanaticism may persuade them 
that there is less guilt in the violation than the observ¬ 
ance, yet, I am persuaded, that a vast majority of our 
northern brethren will respect the constitution in this 
regard, even if they be desirous to change it. The 
solid phalanx of the south, (the slave states fall short 
but few in number, and as no change can be made 
without the consent of three fourths of the states 
there can be no danger of any regular, constitution¬ 
al change.) sustained by the calm and reflecting in 
the northern states, will always offer a successful re¬ 
sistance to the schemes of abolition on the floor of 
congress. And so on other topics of sectional diffe¬ 
rence. There is much reason to hope moreover from 
the past, that there will generally be found within 
the body, a portion of the union, so far disinterested 
in the local questions which may occasionally arise, 
as to hold the scales between the contending parties, 
and to adjust the balance upon fair and equitable 
principles. 

There are however more efficient guarantees for 
the rights of the respective portions of the union than 
the sanction of the oath to support the constitution. 
Unhappily the seductions of interest are oftentimes 
too strong for the obligations of conscience : or rather 


184 


the pliant opinions of the mass of mankind, are too 
easily moulded into a perfect conformity with what 
they deem for their personal advantage. So long, 
however, as the public mind can be preserved in an 
honest and devoted attachment to the union, even 
sectional majorities, or the more sober portion of them 
at least, may be expected to abstain very carefully 
from any measures which may lead to its dissolution. 
I do not mean to say that they may not abuse their 
power. I do not mean to deny that they may not 
often act oppressively and unjustly. So long as hu¬ 
man nature is unchanged that must be apprehended. 
But I do mean to express the hope that the deep 
stake which every portion of this confederation have 
in the continuance of the union, will ever prove suffi- 
ceint to restrain even a sectional majority from gross 
and continued abuses ; from such abuses as cannot 
be borne; from such abuses as will throw back the 
oppressed minority upon their natural rights, to re¬ 
sist at all hazards the encroachments of despotism, 
under the forms of democracy, and law, and drive 
them in self defence, to the necessity of dissolution. 
Extreme cases alone indeed could justify it: but ex¬ 
treme cases might compel it; such as the general 
emancipation of the slaves of the south, which would 
place a dagger in the hand of every domestic. 

Let us advert then very cursorily to some of the 
motives, which are calculated to bind the respective 
portions of our country to the union, and which may 
safely be relied on as holding back a sectional majo¬ 
rity, from an outrage upon the rights of other por¬ 
tions, which might lead to dissolution. 

And first, let us take the north. I allude parti¬ 
cularly to the manufacturing and commercial states. 
To them it would seem that the union must be more 
important than to the south or west. So long as the 
union continues, they will be the carriers and the 
manufacturers of the south. Their ships will export 
our flour, our tobacco and our cotton, and their looms 


185 


will clothe our people. Their industry is thus en¬ 
couraged and paid; and their people are better fed 
by far than they could be by tillage of their sterile 
rocks and barren strands. But let the union be dis¬ 
solved, and their tariff is repealed forever, and theit 
ships will be rotting at their wharves. The looms 
of England would flood the south with her produc¬ 
tions, and her commercial marine would successive¬ 
ly compete for its trade, with unfeeling brethren, who 
had rioted in their power, and trampled upon their 
rights. Depend upon it, the keen and sagacious 
statesmen of the north, are well aware of these deep 
stakes. They know full well that there is a point 
beyond which, forbearance ceases to be a virtue, and 
that when that point is transcended, the union will 
be but a rope of sand. The cool and reflecting 
of that acute and sagacious people, will throw their 
weight into the lighter scale, rather than put at hazard 
their deep interests in the preservation of the union. 

Take next the case of the west, who are destined 
in half a century, if this happy union continues, to 
fill to overflowing one of the most fertile and beauti¬ 
ful valleys on the habitable globe. It is hemmed in 
by the Alleghany to the east, and the rocky moun¬ 
tains on the west, and watered by the great father of 
rivers and his noble tributary streams. But they 
have but one estuary. United, they enjoy that no¬ 
ble outlet for the export of all their superabundant 
products, while the passes of the mountains and the 
internal improvements of the atlantic states, afford 
them easy access to the eastern cities, and conveni¬ 
ent routes for transportation to the interior, of fo¬ 
reign and home-made fabrics and productions. They 
repose in perfect security, and dream of no danger 
from without and no peril from within. The atlan¬ 
tic states are their broad barrier against attack on the 
side of the sea, and the shipping manned by their 
eastern brethren are the natural carriers of all the 
products of their industry. Separate them by dis- 
17 


186 


solution, and they become our masters in their own de* 
fence or must ask on the score of courtesy what they 
now enjoy by right. In the event of war they would 
be cut off from the world, and their boasted Mis¬ 
sissippi would be hermetically sealed by the navies 
of the east. 

Now turn to the south. I am perhaps too much 
of a southron to see in proper lights that weak¬ 
ness which is attributed to the southern states. 

I might perhaps, with more propriety, let others 
speak for me. De Tocqueville remarks, “ the inha¬ 
bitants of the southern states are of all the Ameri¬ 
cans, those who are most interested in the mainte¬ 
nance of the union : they would assuredly suffer 
most from being left to themselves.” But I should 
assuredly be under the dominion of the blindest pre¬ 
judice, if I were to close my eyes to the vastly su¬ 
perior resources and population of the northern 
states, and to the incubus of slavery which crushes 
and overwhelms our strength. One half our popu¬ 
lation can never be our defenders ; but intrigue and 
tampering of northern fanatics, when no longer 
withheld by the trammels of the constitution and 
the ties of brotherhood, might make them our dead¬ 
liest foes. These considerations alone are sufficient 
to induce every southern man to hug the union to 
his heart, so long as the constitution is carried out 
in its fair and proper spirit. The benefits which we 
derive from it are not so much in having car¬ 
riers of our produce and manufacturers of our ne¬ 
cessary fabrics. These we might have without the 
aid of our northern brethren by retracing the steps 
of our forefathers and submitting to be once more 
tributary to Great Britain, or by entering into une¬ 
qual treaties with that grasping and ambitious pow¬ 
er. But our great advantage is that we escape the 
ruin, disunion would bring upon us. We escape 
the danger of desolating wars with those who are 
now our friends ; we escape the necessity of stand- 


187 


ifig armies, to which neighboring nations not united it* 
confederacy, must sooner or later resort; we dimin¬ 
ish the dangers of servile wars by having auxiliaries 
provided by the constitution for the suppression of 
insurrections; we escape the danger of formidable 
inroads from the great northern hive whose vastly 
superior power might, in the language of Mr. Jav, 
'“be often tempted to gather honey in the more 
'blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and 
less hardy neighbors we escape the hazard of fall¬ 
ing into absolutism, the too common lot of nations 
whose position subjects them to perpetual collision 
and strife, and lastly, we escape the burdens and 
the misery which would fall heavy upon us when 
our ploughshares and pruning hooks shall of neces¬ 
sity be changed jinto the sword and the bayonet, and 
we shall be found in thick array, with glittering arms, 
opposed to <mr pristine brothers, with whom in two 
heroic and glorious wars we successfully fought, 
shoulder to shoulder, against the enemy of our com¬ 
mon liberties. We are loud at the present moment 
against the fanatics of the north for their mistaken 
zeal for abolition. What would repress their vile 
attempts if the shackles of the constitution were 
rstricken from their hands ? What would prevent the 
success of some Peter the hermit in his attempts to 
stir up a crusade in the holy cause of abolition ? 
What would restrain misguided multitudes from 
flocking to his standard and spreading all the hor¬ 
rors of a servile war in these now peaceful and 
happy states ? With these views of our state and 
condition, though I do not question the right of 
a portion of the union to throw off its obliga¬ 
tions when it is openly, plainly, and ruinously vio¬ 
lated by another portion ; yet I do hold it to be as 
important to this as to any other part of this con¬ 
federation that we should submit to evils where 
evils are tolerable and temporary, or where they may 
liuve respited from false judgment or the delusions 


188 


of interest which may be succeeded by juster views 
rather than venture upon the untried; experiment of 
rival confederations. Mischiefs must be great in¬ 
deed to justify our calling in disunion as our great 
catholicon. The times must be truly out of joint 
before it can safely be affirmed “ Tali auxilio tem- 
pus eget .” Try it when we may, we shall find the 
remedy worse than the disease, unless some impor¬ 
tant part of the constitution has been attacked in. 
its recesses, or its vitals been impaired by systematic 
violation. 

I have touched upon these general topics merely 
to shew how deeply all are interested in the union 
and the strong motives which thence arise for for¬ 
bearance and moderation on the part of those who 
have the power in their hands lest they destroy by 
tyrannous exercise, the very source of their autho¬ 
rity. I proceed now to another protection against tlm 
disposition of sectional majorities, which may occa¬ 
sionally present itself in the administration of the 
federal government. It is the veto power, so much 
the theme of approbation or censure, according to 
the exigencies of the moment. I do not mean at 
this time to enter into the question which now agi¬ 
tates the public mind as to the wisdom of the clause 
of the constitution which has conferred it. Nor do 
I mean to affirm that it may not happen that the 
president may entertain the same sectional views as 
the majority of congress. But I do mean to say 
that this may not always be the case,—that it will 
on the contrary rarely be the case in relation to im¬ 
portant matters, and that when the coincidence does 
not exist, the protection will be effectual. The his¬ 
tory of the past will illustrate the two first positions. 
There has probably never been a president since the 
foundation of the government, not even the Adams’s, 
who could have been persuaded to sanction a bill 
for the promotion of the schemes of the fanatical 
friends of abolition. Washington, Jefferson, Madi- 


189 


son, Monroe, Jackson, Van Buren and Tyler would 
certainly ail have negatived a bill for emancipation 
in the District of Columbia, had it been possible to 
have found a majority, who would have passed this 
favorite measure of the abolitionists. This, indeed, 
results from the simple fact that a president never 
has, and perhaps never will be elected by a party 
purely sectional. Every candidate or nominee looks 
for aid to his cause from every quarter of the union. 
Parties are more divided upon general politics than 
on sectional questions, and hence he who succeeds 
will owe his success to troops of friends in the remo¬ 
test corners of the states. He has his supporters, 
not only on Cape Cod and Nantucket, where slavery 
is an abomination, but in Charleston, Savannah and 
New Orleans, where it is recognized and even che¬ 
rished. There his friends and supporters must not 
be outraged by the heresy of abolition, or they will 
fall off from his standard. They must therefore be 
conciliated by a just attention at least to what is due 
to their peculiar interests and to the constitution. 
Moreover, geographical causes will conspire to give 
a preference to those for this high office who occupy 
the middle portion of the union, and to this cause, 
perhaps, may in part, be attributed the fact that in 
fifty-eight year*, the presidential chair will have been 
filled forty-six years by five Virginians and one Ten¬ 
nessean. So long, therefore, as political calcula¬ 
tions must rest on probabilities which can only be 
judged of by the past, we may reasonably hope that; 
the president of the United States will not be 
found to combine with a congressional majority 
for the oppression of the south. But if the veto 
be exercised in our favor it must serve as a shield, 
since the obnoxious law must then be rejected un¬ 
less repassed by two-thirds of both houses of con¬ 
gress, of which the probability is remote.—See Cal¬ 
houn’s and Buchanan’s speeches on the veto. 

In the estimate of the checks upon an arbitrary 

17 * 


190 


sectional majority, wc must not forget that which is 
in some degree afforded by the senate. Here, 
indeed, the south is in a minority, but the difference 
is so small that with an undivided vote of her rep¬ 
resentatives, there would always be ground of hope 
that one or more of their opponents would yield to a 
sense of justice, and unite in protecting her from 
the tyranny of their opponents. Past events have 
furnished some striking evidences that this is no Uto¬ 
pian calculation, for numerous occasions have occur¬ 
red and are now occurring of conscientious and high 
minded northern members siding w ; ith the south on 
questions of the deepest concern in relation to her 
interests. 

Nor must we omit here to mention the very 
important check upon the tyranny of the ma¬ 
jority, whether upon sectional or general questions, 
which is afforded by an independent judiciary. That 
body, though like other men under the influence of 
political feelings, from which it is impossible in a go¬ 
vernment like ours that any should be wholly ex¬ 
empt, are nevertheless deserving of the highest con¬ 
fidence, from the manner of their appointment, the 
elevation of character which is secured by it, the 
tenure of their offices, and their solemn oaths to 
support the constitution. Invested with the power 
of deciding what is and what is not law, they possess 
by consequence the power of declaring a law to be 
unconstitutional, and of refusing their aid in carry¬ 
ing it into execution ; so that whenever a law can 
only be enforced through the courts of justice, their 
veto upon it is absolute and final. If therefore a law¬ 
less sectional majority should transcend the consti¬ 
tution, they would most probably find an efficient 
check in the purity, the calmness and the indepen¬ 
dence of the bench, if their acts were passed under 
their review. We have recently had a most inte¬ 
resting instance of the capacity of great minds in 
the pursuit of truth, to elevate themselves above the 


191 


influence of their prejudices and their feelings when 
discharging the responsible duties of the bench, f 
allude to the recent case of Prigg against the state 
of Pennsylvania, in the supreme court, in which that 
court pronounced the law of Pennsylvania, passed 
for the protection of fugitive slaves, and securing to 
them the right to a trial by jury unconstitutional and 
void—Judge Story delivered the opinion of the 
court, and the rest of the judges concurred in the 
main question which was decided ; thus exhibiting 
the gratifying evidence of the entire independence 
of the northern judges, of those fanatical opinions 
which are so rife among our northern brethren. Sto¬ 
ry from Massachusetts, McLean from Ohio, and 
Baldwin from Pennsylvania, all concurred in the 
judgment which annihilates the obnoxious law. 

In what I have said on the subject of sectional ma¬ 
jorities, I have principally had a reference to that sub¬ 
ject so interesting to ourselves—the subject of out 
black population. But whilst I am not blind to the 
existence of the folly and fanaticism of many of the 
people of the eastern states in regard to abolition, I 
am well persuaded that the cool and reflecting and 
intelligent of that thinking people can never seriously 
meditate a revolution in society here, which would 
not only spread devastation and bloodshed through 
the land, but would cripple that agriculture and those 
valuable resources which are and must always be a 
main spring of their own prosperity. I have there¬ 
fore no serious apprehensions on this subject, and 
there is none other which can be set down I think as 
altogether sectional. The tariff indeed has been a 
subject of vehement contention. The struggle on 
the part of the eastern states to lay discriminating 
duties with a view to the encouragement of their ma¬ 
nufactures has been unremitted ; and its success has 
been the subject of loud complaints among the south. 
I disclaim any profound knowledge of this interest 
ing subject, and shall therefore only briefly remark. 


192 


upon the supposed merely sectional character of the 
tariff party. I incline to think we are much mista¬ 
ken if we attribute its success only to sectional votes. 
On the contrary very many of the northern and eas¬ 
tern votes are always found in the anti-tariff scale, 
while southern and western men, from views of na¬ 
tional policy are zealously instrumental in building 
up what they call the American System. Thus it is 
that Mr. Clay has ever been its distinguished leader; 
representing an agricultural state in the valley of the 
Mississippi whose immediate interests are to “ buy as 
cheap and sell as dear” as they can, whether with 
friends or foreigners. And so with us ; there are 
many wise and patriotic men, who think it better to 
increase the import for a time on foreign articles for 
the encouragement of domestic fabrics, by which 
means a more abundant and cheaper market at home 
will be created in the end, while at the same time the 
wealth and strength and the ties of union and the 
bonds of brotherhood will be incalculably increased. 
It was a measure first suggested by Hamilton and 
recommended by Washington, neither of whom could 
in these opinions have been swayed by the feelings of 
sectional prejudice. It is not then to be looked up¬ 
on as a measure forced on us by sectional majorities 
but as adopted by the general suffrage of a large por¬ 
tion of all divisions of the nation except perhaps the 
extreme south. But though their views may not 
prevail, there can be no danger of oppression in any 
tariff measure which shall command the votes of Vir¬ 
ginians and Kentuckians, or even Philadelphians, 
or New Yorkers, or of the commercial and mari¬ 
time cities of the eastern states. The south have the 
assurance at least that these will not lay grievous 
burdens on themselves for the sake of oppressing 
them, and without the aid of many of the members 
from those states no oppressive tariff ever can be past, 
On the other hand, if onerous measures are adopted 
through the influence of our own votes we have no 
one to complain of so justly as of ourselves. 


193 


With these remarks upon the dangers of centrali¬ 
sation or consolidation, I shall content myself for the 
present, and pass on to the dangers of dismember¬ 
ment and the operative causes which may tend to 
counteract any centrifugal tendency of the states. 

In treating of this matter I shall not here enter 
into the question of the right of the states or of any 
one or more of them to dissolve the bond which 
unites them, and to form other confederations or to 
assume the character of separate and independent 
sovereignties. Nor shall I touch upon the question 
of their power to take the half way, incongruous 
step of annulling the laws of the Union at pleasure. 
These are topics which will be the subject of com¬ 
mentary in another part of these lectures. Nor shall 
I at this time go at large into the subject of the vast 
importance to the states in general of this admirable 
union which will be found to be so well treated in 
the letters of the Federalist. I shall confine myself 
to a few cursory remarks on the hazard of dismem¬ 
berment on the one hand and the motives and causes 
which may tend to counteract it on the other. 

Firmly persuaded as I must always be of the value 
of this union to the states of which it is composed, I 
must still admit that there may be many who look 
'upon it, with very different feelings, and that occa¬ 
sions may occur in which particular states and even 
large portions of the confederacy may become res¬ 
tive under its restrictions and impatient of its author¬ 
ity. We are not to believe ourselves totally exempt 
from the infirmities which belong to our nature, nor 
*to suppose that we shall always exhibit an halcyon 
^alm, while other nations of the world are the victims 
of rebellion and civil war. We must expect occa¬ 
sional ebullitions of ill humor and dissatisfaction. 
The south and the north have antagonizing points* 
and the east and the west may be found to be bound 
together by less powerful interests than a patriot 
might desire. The one or the other may regard its 


194 


peculiar wants as unattended to, and its prosperity 
sacrificed to the advantage of a more favored por¬ 
tion. Legislation may occasionally trample as they 
may think, upon their rights or harshly violate their 
notions and their feelings. Dissatisfaction may grow 
up accordingly, and the factious may be willing to see 
all the elements of the union broken up rather than 
submit to some petty evil in conflict as they believe 
with the spirit of the constitution. Such things have 
been already, in the half century that has elapsed 
since the adoption of the constitution. The early 
resistance to an obnoxious law in the back parts of 
Pennsylvania which was quelled by the vigor of ge¬ 
neral Washington who called fifteen thousand men 
into the field for the purpose, may be mentioned as 
the first and the most open defiance of the authority 
of the union. In no other instance indeed has then* 
been a resort to arms by the disaffected. But othef 
occassions have occurred on which great dissatisfac¬ 
tion has been expressed, and the sovereignties of the 
states themselves have remonstrated against the 
measures of the government, and sometimes in a tone 
and spirit which seemed to threaten the most seri¬ 
ous consequences. During the unpopular adminis¬ 
tration of the elder Adams, the alien and sedition 
laws which were passed by a majority of Congress in 
pursuance of his recommendations, gave rise to a 
great and general excitement through some of the 
states. The constitution having declared that con¬ 
gress should make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the sedition law having 
been enacted in direct violation of this express inhi¬ 
bition, the states of Kentucky and Virginia entered 
into strong resolutions declaratory of the rights of 
the states and condemnatory of the measures of the 
government. The resolutions of Virginia and Mr, 
Madison’s report will hereafter be laid before you, 
and I trust it will be seen that they promulgate no-i 
thing whicji is not truly orthodox. But the legislature 


195 


t>F Kentucky in 1799 when acting on the same*sub- 
ject would have gone a bowshot beyond us if they 
had really declared (as has been incorrectly alledged*) 
not only that the federal states have a right to judge 
of any infraction of the constitution but that “ a 
nullification by those sovereignties of all unauthor¬ 
ized acts done under colour of that instrument, is 
the rightful remedy. }> Here indeed we might have 
found the germ of South Carolina nullification. But 
in truth there is no such language in the Kentucky 
resolutions ; though they go to the extent of declar¬ 
ing the laws not only unconstitutional but void and 
of no force, and that in every case “ each state has 
a right to judge for itself as well of infractions as of 
the mode and measure of redress.” But Virginia 
went not so far. Though she exerted with most 
powerful effect the force of argument and the moral 
influence of her character in the union to put down 
the obnoxious laws and to overturn the administra¬ 
tion by which they were enacted, she asserted no 
right to nullify them. Though she declared them 
unconstitutional, as of right she might do, she re¬ 
fused to declare them “ not law, but utterly null, 
void, and of no force or effect.” Those words were 
stricken out by general consent on the motion of the 
mover of the resolutions.” See Debate, page 203. 
Thus while she was shaking the foundation of the 
power of Mr. Adams by enlightening the people and 
appealing to her sister states, against the invasion of 
the constitution, she calmly submitted to the en¬ 
forcement of a statute which is now universally ad¬ 
mitted to have grossly violated the express provis¬ 
ions of the charter of our liberties. Calender was 
tried, convicted, and punished in the metropolis of 
the state and his imprisonment in the jail of the com¬ 
monwealth completed the evidence of her submission 
to the law until it was repealed, and of herdisclaim- 

* 1 Story’s Common Law, 288, in note citing North Ame¬ 
rican Review, 503. 




196 


tor of the right to nullify an unconstitutional act 
while she continued to be a constituent member of 
the union. Thus may she ever act! Thus may she 
ever sustain the great and important truth that an ar¬ 
dent love of liberty is perfectly compatible with a love 
of order, and a respect for the regular action of con¬ 
stituted authority. 

Notwithstanding this forbearance however, it is 
abundantly manifest that although evils may be borne 
as long as evils are tolerable, rather than that the 
foundations of government should be upturned, yet 
in the event of “ an accumulation of usurpations and 
abuses rendering passive obedience and non resis¬ 
tance a greater evil than resistance and revolution,” 
there may be danger of the states “ recurring to” the 
last resort of all; “ an appeal from the cancelled ob¬ 
ligations of the constitutional compact to original 
rights and the law of self preservation, the ultima ra¬ 
tio of all governments whether consolidated, confe¬ 
derated or a compound of both.”—Madison to Ev¬ 
erett.—Our history since the commencement of the 
century has furnished instances yet more startling of 
the exercise of the reserved power of the state to 
question the course of federal administration. In 
the year 1807, a law laying an embargo for an in¬ 
definite term was passed by congress on Mr. Jeffer¬ 
son’s recommendation, and it excited as might well 
have been expected a most angry and embittered 
feeling among the people of the eastern states, whose 
commerce was withered by its influence. I have not 
the command of documents shewing the irritation 
and disposition to resist, which prevailed during its. 
continuance ; but my own recollections are distinct, 
that though the law was enforced and submitted to 
under a judgment of the supreme court affirming its 
constitutionality, yet it was the general sentiment of 
the day, that its continuance would have endangered 
the duration of the Union. So too, as to the pre¬ 
vailing feeling among a portion of the eastern people 


197 


during the late war; evidenced as it was by the 
Hartford convention so well known in our political 
annals. Whether that celebrated body have or have 
not merited the censures which have been cast upon 
them, they cannot but be regarded as affording evi¬ 
dences at least of a state of feeling in the east very 
dangerous to the union. Lastly let me mention the 
most alarming of all the events which have threaten¬ 
ed the permanence of our institutions and the peace 
and happiness of our land. I allude to the course 
of South Carolina in relation to the tariff. The con¬ 
stitution having provided that congress should have 
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and 
excises, and that body having regulated the tariff of 
taxes so as to aid the home manufacturer by raising 
the price of foreign fabrics, the state of South Caro¬ 
lina declared the law unconstitutional and void, and 
that measures would be taken by that state to pre¬ 
vent its being carried into effect. A proclamation 
was thereupon issued by the president,* to which 
the governor of South Carolina responded. Troops 
moreover, were sent by the United States to the 
fort in the vicinity of Charleston, and the state mi¬ 
litia were called out on the other hand to resist any 
attempts to enforce the laws. Fortunately, con¬ 
gress being in session, a compromise was made by 
which the duties were reduced, and quiet, though 
not complete, harmony was restored. This subject 
will be taken up hereafter, and it is only mentioned 
here to exhibit the dangers of dismemberment and 
civil commotion to which we have been exposed. 

The instances which have been given bring forci¬ 
bly into view the power of the organized govern¬ 
ments composing the confederacy, at any time at 
their pleasure to raise the standard of their separate 
sovereignty and assert their right to secede from the 


# See Procl. Enquirer, Dec. 13. Haynes’ Procl. Enq. Dec. 
28, 1832. 


18 



198 


union and set up for themselves. This is one of the 
momentous consequences of the government being 
composed in effect of independent states. In go¬ 
vernments of centralization the march of usurpa¬ 
tion on the other hand cannot readily be stayed for 
want of organized opposition. At the first appear¬ 
ance of organization, the energies of the govern¬ 
ment are put forth to suppress and extinguish it. 
But in a government like ours, composed of six and 
twenty organized and legitimate powers, each wield¬ 
ing very large portions of sovereignty within its re¬ 
spective bounds, nothing is more easy than to orga¬ 
nize opposition, nothing more feasible than to 
place a separate people in array against the central 
power—provided only they are unanimous. Hence 
it is, that while on the one hand, the states stand 
like sentinels upon the watch-tower—whilst they 
ever will be vigilant spies and jealous scrutineers of 
the acts of federal authority, and whilst their legiti¬ 
mate organization will make them felt in every con¬ 
test with the general government, they are enabled on 
the other, if so disposed, to shake the union by their 
dissention, and to withdraw from its bonds whenever 
their temerity or ill-judged feeling shall so advise. 
And should several unite in such fatal councils it 
is obvious that the result must be disunion or civil 
war. 

What then are the securities and guaranties that 
have been provided by the constitution, or which 
grow out of the system itself to preserve us from 
these lamentable consequences. The framers of the 
constitution, among other things, provided that not 
only the senators and representatives and all execu¬ 
tive and judicial officers of the United States should 
take the oath to support the constitution, but also 
that the members of the several legislatures and all 
executive and judicial officers of the several states 
should take a similar oath. By this means a very 
large portion of the leading and intelligent men 


199 


throughout the union—of those through whose in¬ 
fluence and agency alone there would be any rea¬ 
sonable ground to apprehend disaffection to the uni¬ 
on—are bound by the most solemn engagement to 
support the constitution, and by consequence to pre¬ 
serve the union. Unfortunately, however, the judg¬ 
ment is so often perverted—the eyes are so often 
blinded ; the feelings are so often influenced by 
our passions and our prejudices, that it is much to 
be feared no great confidence should be placed in 
the efficiency of this buttress for the support of our 
constitution. How many are there who in the bit¬ 
terness of political feeling salve over their consciences 
with the plea that the violations of the instrument, 
by the general government is their justification for 
their alienation. How many are there who are rea¬ 
dy to say that rather than see this or that measure, 
which they deem unconstitutional, persevered in by 
the government, they would go for a dissolution of 
the union. Call ye that supporting the constitution? 
Call ye that backing your friends ? Because the bond 
of union has been violated, or rather has been sup¬ 
posed to be violated in some particular—probably by 
no means vital—shall we dissolve the whole ? Is that 
to support it ? shall we sunder all its obligations and 
destroy it altogether because others from mistaken 
views or even ruinous designs have assailed someone 
or more of its less essential principles ? I opine not. 
So far from its annihilation we should exert our¬ 
selves to repair the breach—and that by constitution¬ 
al means—by elections—by change of rulers, by re¬ 
monstrances and appeals to our sister states, by the 
moral influence of truth and the sanative operation 
of time itself. Look at our history ! The alien 
and sedition laws, which after forty years, appear to 
me as violent outrages on the constitution as they 
did in 1800, hurled one administration from the 
seat of power, and promptly were repealed. Suppose 
Virginia, instead of addressing herself to her sister 


200 


states, with all the energy of argument and the resist¬ 
less influence of truth, had caught at the obvious vio¬ 
lation of the constitution, and declared herself ab¬ 
solved from the federal bond ! I ask not what would 
now be our condition. I ask not whether we should 
have been more happy and more prosperous as a 
people,—but I ask in direct reference to the oaths, 
which her legislature had taken, whether she would 
have better “supported the constitution of the Uni¬ 
ted States,” by dissolving the union, than by the 
peaceful influence of constitutional measures ? The 
question presents at once an answer in the negative. 
I hold, therefore, that it is a sacred duty on the part 
of every man who has taken this solemn oath, if the 
constitution be violated in part, to hold on strenuous¬ 
ly and faithfully to the rest, and to strain every 
nerve to restore it to its integrity and purity. This , 
is in my judgment, to support the constitution, and 
not, because others have violated it, to abandon it 
forever. As well might those, whose duty it is to 
uphold this noble edifice, unite to pull down its 
stately columns and its lofty dome, because a frag¬ 
ment of its cornice had been broken by the rude 
hand of some ruthless vandal. 

Let it not be supposed, however, from what is 
here said, that I am an advocate for passive obedi¬ 
ence and non-resistance to all unconstitutional le¬ 
gislation. I have already declared with sufficient 
distinctness, I hope, in the language of a truly wise 
and distinguised politician, that “ in the event of an 
accumulation of usurpations and abuses rendering 
passive obedience and non-resistance a greater evil 
than resistance and revolution, the members of this 
confederacy will have a right to recur to the last re¬ 
sort of all; an appeal from the cancelled obligations 
of the constitutional compact to original rights and 
the law of self-preservation ; the ultima ratio of 
all governments, whether consolidated or confedera¬ 
ted or a compound of both,” and admitted and re- 


201 


cognized not by the disciples of a republic alone, 
bat by the most strenuous supporters also of a mo¬ 
narch’s throne.—Paley and Blackstone. See Ha¬ 
milton’s 28th No. in the Federalist. All I contend 
for is, that we should never permit the petty and oc¬ 
casional deviations from our own notions of constitu¬ 
tional law or abuses of the constitution, which a suc¬ 
ceeding administration may remove, to fret us into 
impatience with our noble institutions, and to prompt 
a wish to throw away our peace, our prosperity and 
our happiness, by a dissolution of this glorious union. 

To return, however, to our subject. It is not 
alone in the oath of the legislator or of the judge, 
of the officers of the states whether military or civil, 
that we confide for an honest, a faithful and zealous 
support of the union of the states. It is a senti¬ 
ment that has sunk deep in the hearts of the peo¬ 
ple. It has been planted there by our patriots, and 
above all, by him who was first in the hearts of his 
countrymen. Permit me to read to you those 
passages from his farewell address, which bear di¬ 
rectly on this interesting topic. Any disputation on 
the nature and character of our government must 
indeed be imperfect, which does not avail itself of 
the parting advice of the father of his country on 
this {important subject.—See 5 Mar. 689 to 695. 

Such were the sentiments of General Washing¬ 
ton, and though I am aware that from the strong 
current of party feelings that prevailed at the close 
of his administration, there were parts of the fare¬ 
well address that were not acceptable to many, yet 
his paternal admonitions on the subject of the union, 
sunk deep in the hearts of all. The sentiments 
and feelings of the great mass of our population re¬ 
sponded to his ; and to this day, I am persuaded, 
that however a doubt of the value of the union may 
exist in the bosom of the ambitious or disappointed, 
it has never yet found its way to the great body of 
tjie people. 

18 * 


202 


That I am not mistaken in this opinion, is suffi¬ 
ciently manifest by occurrences before our eyes. 
The sensitiveness which is displayed by leading men 
and aspiring politicians, the indignation with which 
they repel every imputation of the spirit of disunion, 
can leave no doubt of their convictions of the state 
of popular sentiment. They may be fairly looked 
upon as barometers of popular feeling, for they can 
ride into power only upon popular favor ; and it 
would be difficult, I doubt not, to find at this time,, 
within the limits of this confederacy, a single lead¬ 
ing individual who would avow himself a triend of 
the dissolution of the uuion. If there be such an 
one, he would soon find the policy of locking up his 
opinions within the recesses of his own heart, lest 
they should put him in Coventry with the great body 
of his countrymen. 

If I am not then in an error in this interesting 
matter, there are consequences from it of a most im¬ 
portant character in reference to the remote proba¬ 
bility of the secession of any state or number of 
states from this confederacy. For not only would 
it follow from the devotion of the people of every 
state to what has recently been so justly called our 
wonderful and sublime constitution, (Mr. Calhoun’s 
veto speech,) that there would be little probability 
of securing a majority in any state in favor of a pro¬ 
position to secede, but it may be also confidently 
affirmed, that if such a majority could be command¬ 
ed, it would be manfully resisted by a numerous and 
determined minority, devoted to the union, and in-, 
dignant at what they would freely denounce as trea¬ 
son to the constitution. Looking too with confident 
reliance to the support of the other states, their spi¬ 
rit would be sustained, and their opposition invigo¬ 
rated to the revolutionary movements of their own 
countrymen. Hence, let secession come when it 
may-even though it be the result of “ usurpations 
and abuses no longer tolerable, and of a character 


203 


to justify resistance and revolution/’ yet the unhap¬ 
py state who may be driven to the step or may rash¬ 
ly adopt it, will most probably find her own bowels 
torn by civil dissensions within, while pressed by 
enemies from without. Reason as we may, about 
the right of peaceable secession, peaceable seces¬ 
sion is scarcely within the ordinary laws of human 
action. If oppression and usurpation have given 
rise to it, what reason have we to suppose that they 
would be appeased or propitiated by what they 
would regard as treason in the seceding party to the 
constitution of the union ; and if it has sprung not 
from wrong , but from fretful impatience and res¬ 
tiveness in the seceding state, from a temper cap¬ 
tious about trifles, and admitting the justice of no 
views and no opinions but its own, how can it be ex¬ 
pected that five and twenty members of this great 
confederacy would tamely submit to the destruction 
of the great and majestic arch by striking out its 
keystone, or even pulling away its least important 
fragment. Depend upon it, friends once turned 
to foes are ever the bitterest enemies; and the in¬ 
stant of secession of one state would, right or wrong, 
place five and twenty sister states in hostile array 
against her. The staunch and persecuted adherents 
of the broken constitution in the seceding state 
would naturally look to the friends of union every 
where for comfort and support; and these would be 
most ready to extend protection to others who, in 
their view of the matter, would be suffering only 
for <e righteousness sake.” Thus it seems to me in¬ 
evitable, that come when they will, disunion and se¬ 
cession must result in civil wars, and end at last, 
perhaps, in ruthless despotism ; for that, all experi¬ 
ence shows, is the waveless calm into which the 
troubled ocean of civil discord usually sinks with 
deceitful and fatal repose. 

Blessed be God, we have yet escaped these horri¬ 
ble catastrophes. Yet we have seen enough to 


204 


know, that unanimity of sentiment is not to be ex¬ 
pected among the people of a state which places it¬ 
self in opposition to the union. Look only to what 
has happened of a less serious character. In every 
instance in which a member of the union has even 
remonstrated or protested, she has done so with a di¬ 
vided population. Great as was the provocation in 
1798-99, and dignified as was the appeal to their sis¬ 
ter states against the alien and sedition laws by Ken¬ 
tucky and Virginia, their resolutions were sanctioned 
by no triumphant majorities ; in Virginia 100 to 63. 
Had Virginia at that day fallen back upon her reserv¬ 
ed rights, and renounced any further submission to 
the violated constitution, one-half of her people 
would have been in rebellion against, her authority, 
with Patrick Henry,* and John Marshall, and George 
Keith Taylor, and James Breckenridge at their head. 
Had the western insurrection in Pennsylvania in¬ 
fected one-half the state, the other would have ta¬ 
ken arms to suppress it. Had the unhappy distur¬ 
bances with South Carolina proceeded, some of her 
noblest sons and a large portion of her population 
would have adhered to the union; and when the 
Hartford convention seemed to threaten treason and 
rebellion, it but gave vigor and indomitable spirit to 
the staunch patriots and faithful adherents of the fe¬ 
deral constitution, who swarmed throughout that 
disaffected land. Let it then enter into the sober 
calculations of every state withdrawing from the uni¬ 
on, that in doing so, she hazards civil discord with¬ 
in her borders, and desolating wars with former 
friends. 

Let me next advert to another consideration which 
strongly fortifies our hopes of long continued union. 
No one can look with any fear of disaffection to any 
portion of our unambitious yeomanry unless misled 
by disappointed and ambitious demagogues. How 

* Mr. Henry died in that year. 




205 


is it with them ? How is it with the great and aspi- 
ring men who lead the people and whose eyes are 
fixed with steadfast gaze upon the presidential chair ? 
Can we believe them blind to the imposing difference 
between the presidency of this great republic and the 
chief magistracy even of its most important mem¬ 
ber ? Can we believe they would willingly pull down 
the elevated seat for which they have so often panted ? 
Believe it not. Disappointment and vexation may 
sometimes curdle the veins of a defeated statesman, 
and in the moment of his excitement he may talk 
big of dissolution ; but let the heavens clear away 
and his prospects brighten and he will be found once 
more the most zealous champion of “ the beauti¬ 
ful and profound system of our federal constitution.” 
(Mr. C’s speech.) And so is it also of all the other 
posts and places under the general government. As 
a “ saint in crape is twice a saint in lawn” a member 
of congress, or a judge of the supreme court, or any 
other of the high dignitaries of federal authority are 
looked upon, as to political elevation, as far above the 
corresponding stations in the more limited theatre of 
state authority. The ambitious will ever be loth to 
pull down the government that offers the most at¬ 
tractive lures to their eager pursuit of greatness. In¬ 
deed but for the powerful checks already adverted to, 
the real danger would be of the influence of federal 
patronage in winning over the corrupt to the exten¬ 
sion of the powers of the general government beyond 
the legitimate bounds prescribed by the constitution. 
In conclusion of these crude views of the federa¬ 
tive principles of the government and of the power¬ 
ful motives which should bind the states to the zealous 
support of the union, I cannot do better than to 
recall the recollection of the class to the very able 
papers which they have so recently perused from the 
pens of Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Madison and Mr. Jay. 
Those papers have been, with great propriety, made 
n manual for our youth, and l have only to express 


206 


a hope that their wise and wholesome councils have 
made a due impression upon your hearts, and that 
that impression may be as indelible as it is salutary. 

I will conclude this lecture by reading to you De 
Tocqueville, pp. 369 to 401. 


LECTURE XII. 


In the attempt to lay before you the true princi¬ 
ples of government, young gentlemen, you will re¬ 
collect it has been my effort to shew you that the 
happiness of the people which is the only legitimate 
object of all political institutions is only to be found 
in a mixed government; that public virtue the main 
ingredient to be sought for, is to be expected only 
in those in which the democratical principle is largly 
infused, and that our own affords, perhaps, a fairer 
prospect than any other of permanence and stability, 
and of accomplishing the great purposes for which 
it has been established. It has been admitted, how¬ 
ever, that the democratical principle has certain im¬ 
perfections and unfavorable tendencies which should 
be vigilantly watched and carefully counteracted. 
Some of these have already been alluded to and 
some suggestions have been offered as to the salu¬ 
tary checks which our system affords to its irregular 
and extravagant action. There yet remain, however, 
some matters touching the weak points in our insti¬ 
tutions which ought not to be entirely pretermitted. 

The origin and root of all evil in governments 
partaking strongly of the democratic character, is 




the want of knowledge and of good principles in 
the mass of the people. When they are rude and 
uninformed, reckless of the rights of persons and of 
property, prone to disorder and violence and con¬ 
temners of law and regular government, their influ¬ 
ence in publicaffairsmustbe mischievous instead of sa¬ 
lutary, and men will soon learn to sigh for the calm 
of despotism as a refuge from the hourly perils of a 
licentious and ungovernable populace. If the peo¬ 
ple are to govern through the medium of representa¬ 
tives, if their will is to be the law, either mediately 
through the effect of their influence or directly by 
the exercise of the right of instruction, it is obvious 
that they should be thoroughly imbued with good 
principles, and as far as possible, with some know¬ 
ledge of the general character of their institutions, 
and the great interest and concerns of the country. 
Education, therefore, is of primary importance;— 
in its broadest sense, if you please, as far as that is 
practicable, consistently with the undeniable and ir- 
versib’e destiny of our race ; “ In the sweat of thy 
face shalt thou eat bread until thou return unto the 
ground.” The wants and necessities of man must 
forever require that a large portion of the species 
should be devoted to the workshop or the field, to 
the loom or to the plough. All cannot be Solons, or 
Solomons, or Newtons, or Laplaces. All cannot be 
mathematicians and philosophers, men of literature 
or jurists. But all may acquire what the necessities 
of their condition demand ! It does not follow 
that they are unfit to select from the cultivated por¬ 
tion of their countrymen, those who are fit to be en¬ 
trusted with their concerns, because they cannot cal¬ 
culate an eclipse or master the differential calculus. 
It does not follow that they are unfit to choose, be¬ 
cause they may be unfit to be chosen. If we ad¬ 
mit with Jesus the son of Sirach, “ that the wisdom 
of a wise man cometh by opportunity of leisure,” 
and ask with him, “how he can get wisdom who 


208 


holdeth the plough, who glorieth in his oxen and 
whose talk is of bullocksif we agree that such 
should not be sought for in public counsel, nor set 
high in the congregation, are we therefore to admit 
that they are to be degraded from the rank of free¬ 
men, and made the slaves of a tyrant’s will ? God 
forbid ! They may all be taught what is necessary 
for their station—what is essential to enable them 
well to play their part in that state of life to which 
it has pleased God to call them. 

What are their first lessons and when to be in¬ 
stilled ? These first lessons are obedience and sub¬ 
mission to lawful authority; the love of country, 
and of virtue and its holy principles ;—principles 
adapted to the capacity of every living soul; respect 
for the rights of others, whether of person or of pro¬ 
perty ; command of their passions, and the habit of 
appealing to reason and the law as their director and 
v their guide. These are the rudiments of that edu¬ 
cation with which every man (even the poorest and 
most ignorant) may be imbued. It begins with the 
cradle, and its precepts must be first taught by a 
mother’s lips, and enforced by a father’s influence 
and authority. As youth progresses, he may learn 
to know and estimate his rights and what is not 
less important, to know and estimate his duties. He 
must learn to respect order, to venerate the law T as 
his only sovereign, to regard as traitors to its au¬ 
thority those who take the power into their own 
hands, and to be ever ready to vindicate and protect 
it from assault. He must learn in the exercise of po¬ 
litical rights to act with a single eye to his country’s 
good, and to eschew the baneful influence of party 
as ruinous to free institutions. He must learn too 
some forbearance and moderation—some modesty 
in the avowal of his opinions ; some backwardness 
in undertaking, in matters of which he knows no¬ 
thing, to instruct those w ho are better informed, and 
in whom he has already reposed his confidence. With 


209 


such lessons instilled into the mind of youth, the 
most ameliorating influence would soon be felt in 
public affairs. And if to these lessons, which are 
fitted to every capacity, are added the advantages 
of liberal education, and of elevated principles for 
that portion of the people, whose situation or whose 
means will afford them the acquisition of wisdom 
from “ opportunity of leisure,” we might look to 
our free institutions as possessing the fairest claims 
to happiness and stability. In such a state of so¬ 
ciety, we should cease to tremble at the shaking of 
every leaf, from the fear of mobs, and rioters: we 
should soon rest in quiet when there would be none 
to make us afraid. Nay, more —not only would 
peace and order prevail throughout society, but we 
should soon see the political bodies moving in their 
respective orbits, harmoniously and with dignity. 
We should cease to feel anxieties for the safety of 
our union, and to apprehend its dissolution from 
the hoarse jarring of contentious factions on the floor 
of congress, or from their rash and reckless action 
under momentary impulses. We should have no rea¬ 
son to anticipate a dangerous secession of a large 
body of the representatives, such as well nigh oc¬ 
curred but a few years ago : " A practice subversive 
of all the principles of order and regular govern¬ 
ment, a practice which leads more directly to pub¬ 
lic convulsions and the ruin of popular institu¬ 
tions, than any other which has yet been displayed 
among us.” 

There are indeed other sources of anxiety which 
may well disturb the patriot breast in relation to the 
affairs of the union. The general government is not 
only liable, like every other, to disturbance in its 
own concerns, but its relative situation towards the 
states may seriously involve it in any domestic vio¬ 
lence which may exist among them. It is provided 
in the constitution that the United States shall guar¬ 
antee to every state in the union a republican form 
19 


210 


of government, and shall protect each of them 
against invasion; and on application of the legisla¬ 
ture (or of the executive, when the legislature can¬ 
not be convened) against domestic violence.” While 
human nature remains the subject of the same pas¬ 
sions, and frailties, and vices which have marked its 
career from the days of Adam, we must expect oc¬ 
casional disturbances in relation to the internal con¬ 
cerns, and the struggle for power in six and twenty 
separate and independent states. To say nothing 
of the delicate question as to what is to be consi¬ 
dered as falling within the meaning of a “ republi¬ 
can form of government,” let us ask ourselves what 
is to be done, if a portion of the people of a state, 
considering themselves oppressed, and denied their 
just and equal rights should demand a change of the 
constitution of the state which should be resisted by the 
authorities, and that they should call upon the general 
government to suppress a “ domestic violence,” in 
which nine-tenths of the people may be involved ? 
I do not ask what the government is to do, but what 
may be the consequences of its action ? The case 
seems to be about to present itself at the present 
moment. The state of Rhode Island is in a state 
of commotion, which, without great prudence on 
the part of the people, and her rulers may lead to 
civil broil and insurrection. Her constitution is the 
musty charter of Charles II., and by its provisions, 
a large portion of her people are disfranchised. 
They have asserted their rights—insisted on a new 
constitution, while those who have the power, grasp 
it with a tenacity very natural to man, though very 
reprehensible. The militia have been called out, 
but it has been like calling spirits from the vasty 
deep. They will not come when they are called. 
Suppose the large majority of the people persist in 
their efforts, and the constituted authorities call up¬ 
on the general government to protect them from do¬ 
mestic violence ? What would be the consequence 


211 


of interference ? Take a larger state. In 1816, the 
western people of Virginia, restless under the gross 
inequality of representation in the legislature which 
gave them but four out of twenty-four members in 
the state senate, and a very inadequate number 
in the house of delegates, called a convention 
which assembled at Staunton, for the purposes of 
taking measures to correct the evil. Some were of 
opinion that that body should at once call a conven¬ 
tion to form a new constitution. It was my lot to 
be among them, and then as now, I was of opinion, 
that moderate and temperate measures should al¬ 
ways be pursued for correcting evils in the existing 
state of things less fearful than civil war. That must 
have been the result when two authorities would be 
up, neither supreme, and both contending for the 
upperhand. These peaceful counsels prevailed, and 
a respectful memorial was adopted, earnestly re¬ 
questing of the legislature to call a convention, which, 
after some years, was done, and a new constitution 
was adopted. Suppose a different course had pre¬ 
vailed, and the governor of Virginia had called for 
troops to put down the new constitution, formed by 
the western people ? What would have been the 
awful consequences of such a step ? Who knows, 
save heaven ? Even recently, new difficulties seem 
to be arising between the western and the eastern 
people, and the protest of the former, through their 
delegates, against the rejection of their pretensions 
is already before the public. Can we not all per¬ 
ceive the delicacy of the measure on the part of the 
federal government, of raising troops for the purpose 
of upholding one party against another in the state. 
General Washington, indeed, called out 15,000 
men to suppress an insurrection against the govern¬ 
ment, but who since his day, could have exercised 
such a power without shaking the union to its cen¬ 
tre. However certain it may be, (as in the case of 
South Carolina,) that there were many opposed to 


212 


the measures of the state, yet it is not easy to cal¬ 
culate the reflux of feeling, when the inhabitant of 
the state should see a powerful army marching 
through his native land, and reducing its proud and 
gallant people to submission. Still more difficult 
would it be, to foresee the effect upon adjoining 
states. A general war might be the fatal conse¬ 
quence, and a general war among the states would 
shake to pieces this noble fabric, which is so admi¬ 
rably adapted to provide for our prosperity and pro¬ 
mote our happiness. 

With all my confidence then, in the permanence 
of our institutions, I frankly confess, that it is not a 
confidence in their being able to stand the shock 
of civil war* but only in their tendency, and the 
tendency of our situation and our people to avoid 
it. If, forgetting the dictates of justice, moderation, 
and the great interests of the nation, the people of 
these states should once excite the tempest of war 
between themselves, the constitution under which 
we live would go to pieces in the storm. It would 
be submerged inevitably amid the waves of civil dis¬ 
cord, and an universal despotism or jarring confede¬ 
racies would take its place, and spread themselves 
over our desolated land. Against such events it is 
impossible to say that we shall always be protected. 
The prudence and good sense of the nation is our 
best security. No form of government can always 
avoid or control what the bad passions of our nature 
may give rise to. For “ as to those mortal feuds which 
in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through 
a whole nation, proceedingeither from weighty causes 
of discontent given by the government or from the con¬ 
tagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not 
fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When 

* The whole of the remarks in the Federalist (No. 16, pp, 
85, 86, 87,) as to the danger of civil commotion under the 
old confederation, have strong application to the present 
union, if once the tocsin should be sounded. 



213 


they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions 
or dismemberments of empire. It is in vain to 
speculate or to attempt to guard against events too 
mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it 
would be idle to object to a government, because it 
cannot perform impossibilities.” 

There is yet another subject of momentous con- 
sequence which I deem it proper to touch upon, 
though in doing so, I may seem perhaps to wander 
from my proper sphere. It is the subject of the 
public credit, and the duty of providing liberally for 
the public defence, the public prosperity, and the 
general welfare. 

In the government of the people, the purse-strings 
of the nation are held by itself. Supplies for ar¬ 
mies and navies, for fortifications and munitions of 
war, can only be raised by its consent. Now we 
have seen that the first of all duties to our country 
is its defence against a foreign enemy. Our first 
obligation, then, upon all occasions, is to advance, 
without a murmur, what its necessities may require, 
and to foster the means of commanding its ample 
resources in the day of difficulty and need. Unfor¬ 
tunately, however, there is a general propensity, ma¬ 
nifested in those who have the power over the purse 
in a popular government, to resist the imposition of 
taxes, except in cases of dire extremity, to decline 
the creation even of necessary burdens, and to ha¬ 
zard the safety of the state from a false apprehen¬ 
sion of the oppression of the people. Economy, 
indeed, in the public expenditure, cannot be too 
much commended, but a liberal supply of what is 
demanded by the necessities of the nation, is not 
less worthy of all approbation. The wanton waste 
of the public monies, or their unwise appropriation 
to injudicious and visionary schemes, will always me¬ 
rit the reproaches of the nation ; but the generous 
patriotism which will pour out its treasures as freely 
as its blood, in defence of all that is dear to the 
19* 


214 


heart of man, cannot fail to extort the approbation 
of the people, as it never fails to command the ad¬ 
miration of the world. It is then the unquestiona¬ 
ble duty of the representative to vote supplies, in¬ 
stead of niggardly withholding them from the abso¬ 
lute wants of the government; and it is just as im¬ 
perious a duty to impose a tax when demanded by 
the exigencies of the state, as to be vigilant in pro¬ 
tecting society from unnecessary burdens. 

To be enabled, however, to effect the great ob¬ 
ject of commanding and providing the resources ne¬ 
cessary for war and for other extraordinary emer¬ 
gencies of the state, there are certain principles to 
which we should, as far as possible, most steadfast¬ 
ly adhere. In the first place, it should be our 
maxim and our practice, to accumulate no debts 
in time of peace. There is no sentiment which 
can better deserve the attention of the legislators of 
any country, than that expressed by Gen. Washing¬ 
ton, in his message to congress in 1795, which indi¬ 
cates the danger to every government from the pro¬ 
gressive accumulation of debt. A tendency to it, 
is perhaps, the natural disease of all governments; 
and nothing is more calculated to lead to great and 
convulsive revolutions. Money has, from all time, 
been the fruitful source of discord, and the debtor 
and creditor, when the prize is great, are always 
placed in a position of natural hostility. 

This tendency to accumulation of debt, arises 
from the ordinary course of human events. “On 
the one hand, the exigencies of a nation, creating 
new causes of expenditure as well from its own, as 
from the ambition, rapacity, injustice, intemperance 
and folly of other nations, proceed in increasing and 
rapid succession. On the other hand, there is a ge¬ 
neral propensity in those who administer the affairs 
of a government, founded in the constitution of 
man, to shift off from the present to a future day, 
the pressure and the burden—a propensity which 


215 


may be expected to be strong, in proportion as the 
form of the state is popular.” For the natural pro¬ 
pensity to get what we can, and to hold fast to what 
we get, is often far too strong for the commands of 
duty or the dictates of patriotism ; and the people 
holding the purse-strings, are backward in taxing 
themselves;—in giving to the necessities of the 
state by taking the smallest scruple from their own 
comforts or their own luxuries and enjoyments. 
Hence, although to extinguish a debt which exists, 
and to avoid contracting more, are ideas always fa¬ 
vored by public feeling and opinion, yet to pay taxes 
for the one or the other purpose, (which after all, 
is the only means of avoiding the evil,) is generally 
more or less unpopular. These contradictions, in¬ 
deed, are in human nature, and happy would be the 
lot of any country where there are none disposed to 
turn them to sinister account. It is, however, no 
uncommon spectacle, to see the same men clamor¬ 
ing for occasions of expense, which chance for the 
moment to be popular, yet vehement against every 
plan of taxation, which is proposed for the discharge 
of subsisting debts or for avoiding new ones, by 
raising necessary revenue, to defray the necessary 
expenses of the government as they arise. “ Hence, 
the evil day is put off; borrowing , instead of tax¬ 
ing is resorted to, even in profound peace, and 
a debt is created in its halcyon days, which sits like 
an incubus upon the nation, when the hour of her 
trouble cometh. Millions are suffered to accumu¬ 
late upon the state, rather than an additional far¬ 
thing should be extracted from the pockets of the 
people. Members of the representative body with¬ 
out other merit, seek to ingratiate themselves with 
the narrow-minded among the people, by drawing 
tight the purse-strings, and voting against every 
scheme for levying money by taxation. These un¬ 
handsome acts throw artificial embarrassments in 
the way of the administrators of the government; 


216 


and even they are themselves too apt to feel also 
a disposition to conciliate public favor by decli¬ 
ning to lay even necessary burdens, or to avoid 
the loss of it by imposing them with firmness; and 
thus they serve to promote the accumulation of 
debt by leaving that which exists without adequate 
provision for its reimbursement, and by preventing 
the levying, with energy, of new taxes when new oc¬ 
casions of expense occur. The consequence is, that 
the public debt swells, till its magnitude is enormous, 
and the burdens of the people gradually increase till 
their weight becomes intolerable. Of such a state 
of things, great disorders in the whole political eco¬ 
nomy, together with convulsions and revolution are 
the natural offspring, and there can accordingly be 
no more sacred obligation on the public agents of a 
nation, than to guard against such a mischief with 
steadfast and inflexible constancy. Public debts in 
time of peace should then be scrupulously avoided. 
Borrowing in time of peace should be always dis¬ 
countenanced ; for borrowing is with us the chief re¬ 
source in war ; and that resource should not be sap¬ 
ped for the expenses of a peace establishment, which 
taxes would defray, almost without being felt. In 
peace at least, the evil of the day should be borne by 
itself. | Pay as you go should be our maxim.j Justice, 
fair dealing, love of country and true policy forbid 
our transmitting our own burdens, and a debt arising 
from our sordid selfishness to the shoulders of our 
posterity, 

The propriety of these principles will be more ap¬ 
parent when we reflect upon the difficulties and ne¬ 
cessities to which particular exigencies of the state 
may give rise. What are to be our resources in the 
event of foreign war ? War, whether of offence or 
defence,cannot be successfully waged without means. 
Tens of thousands engaged in the wasteful business 
of arms, dissipate the treasures of the state with most 
fearful rapidity. Hundreds of thousands taken from 


217 


the business of production,from the workshop and the 
plough, from the loom and from the harvest, and de¬ 
voted to the work of destroying and cutting throats, 
soon eat out the hoarded riches, and the hard-earned 
contributions of the suffering people. To what re¬ 
sources then can the nation look? To her customs ? 
Take our own country. War cuts off our commerce, 
and annihilates our customs. During the last war 
the revenue from that source was reduced to little 
more than four millions, though in the year after it 
ended they mounted up to thirty six. Shall we resort 
to excises and direct taxes ;—to the most expensive, 
unproductive and vexatious impositions known to our 
system ? to a source to which we would not resort 
sufficiently in time of peace to keep down our 
debt ? We may do so—we must do so, but yet it 
will not suffice. In war we must borrow also. 
<( Loans in foreign wars are found an indispensible 
resource even to the wealthiest nations 1 In a country 
like ours possessed of but little monied capital, the 
necessity for that resource must be in such emergen¬ 
cies proportionably urgent; and as on the one hand 
the necessity for borrowing is undeniable, so on the 
other it is equally evident that to borrow upon good 
terms whether at home or abroad, it is essential that 
the credit of the nation should be firm and well-es¬ 
tablished. Now one of the first and most essential 
means of enabling us to borrow in time of war, is to 
bave no debts in time of peace. With nations, as 
with individuals, cceteris paribus , those which are 
out of debt, can borrow upon the easiest terms. Eng¬ 
land indeed, with her immense debt, can neverthe¬ 
less borrow advantageously ; but she owes her power 
to do so, to her inviolable good faith in performing 
her engagements, and to the immense and redundant 
capital of her people, which is always seeking invset- 
ment. To us it is of no little moment to add to our 
command of money in the market, by going into war 
unincumbered by a debt. 


218 


Bat other principles must also be adopted for sus¬ 
taining public credit and enabling the nation to bor¬ 
row upon good terms. We must establish its credit 
by the observance of the most scrupulous good faith. 
For when the credit of a country is in any degree 
questionable, it is always obliged to give an extrava¬ 
gant premium, in one shape or another upon all the 
sums it has occasion to borrow. Nor is the evil con¬ 
fined to borrowing. The same disadvantage must 
be also sustained upon whatever is bought on cre¬ 
dit. From this constant necessity of borrowing and 
buying dear, it is easy to conceive how immensely 
the expenses of a nation in a course of time will be 
augmented by an unsound state of public credit. 
During the late war, United States loans fell to 62, 
making a dollar paid for sixty two cents received. 
To attempt to enumerate the complicated variety of 
mischiefs in the whole system of the social economy, 
which proceed from a neglect of the maxims which 
uphold public credit, would lead me too far were I 
even capable of the task. It is however rendered 
indubitable by experience, that on their due observ¬ 
ance depends the individual and aggregate prosper¬ 
ity of the nation ; their relief from difficulty in great 
emergencies, their character as a people and the cause 
of good government. 

“ If the maintenance of public credit then be truly 
so important, the next enquiry which suggests itself 
itself is; by what means it is to be effected. The 
ready answer is “ by not abusing it;—by good faith— 
by punctual performance of contracts.” States are 
like individuals ; if over head and ears in debt, few 
will like to trust them ; and on the other hand, those 
who owe nothing can borrow what they want. More¬ 
over, those who will observe their engagements faith¬ 
fully are respected and trusted ; while the reverse is 
the fate of those who palter with their faith. To de¬ 
lay, and still more to refuse payment when due, to 
seek ingenious pretexts and subtle devices for evad- 


219 


ing public engagements, and to exert the powers of 
sovereignty in wronging our creditors , will ruin our 
credit and destroy our capacity for borrowing forev¬ 
er ; while at the same time it sinks us in the eyes of 
our own people and degrades us in the estimation of 
the world. Look to Great Britain. With her thou¬ 
sand millions of debt, she can borrow ad libitum, 
because she pays at the stipulated hour. By her 
punctuality her debt becomes a sort of property or 
estate in the hands of individuals, which they buy 
and hold and enjoy as they would hold a real estate. 
They have no more doubt of it than of the title to 
their lands. It thus holds out a convenient subject 
for investment for all who have capital otherwise un¬ 
employed—for all who have retired from the per¬ 
plexities of business, and desire to pass the evening of 
their days at ease, and for widows and others whose 
situation forbids their engaging their scanty means 
in active commerce. It is like bank stock, which 
every man may buy with confidence, when he has any 
thing (however small) to invest. By this ingenious 
means, sustained by faith inviolate, all the loose and 
unemployed capital of the kingdom is thrown at its 
pleasure into the hands of the government; and thus 
it is rendered capable, in moments of imminent na¬ 
tional danger, of those gigantic efforts by which in 
the last fifty years it has astonished the world ! 

Look now to our own history:—I mention it not 
as a reproach to ourselves (for our situation during 
the revolution was peculiar) but as a warning and a 
salutary lesson. From various causes unnecessary 
to be enumerated, the United States, and the indivi¬ 
dual states, in the prosecution of the war of Indepen¬ 
dence, were compelled to contract immense debts, 
by borrowing or by purchases on terms of future pay¬ 
ment. These debts they were unable to discharge, 
and the consequence was that they fell in the market 
to about two and sixpence (I think) in the pound. In 
that state of things and in the uncertain condition of 


220 


our political concerns, further borrowing was imprac¬ 
ticable. But when the Union was established , when 
the debts created in the struggle for liberty had been 
assumed, and when provision was made for their pay¬ 
ment, those very debts shot up above par. Credit 
at once was re-established. Money could be had by 
the government on terms as reasonable as by indivi¬ 
duals. It came out of its hiding places—for it is al¬ 
ways hoarded when it cannot safely be invested. 
But the system for supporting public credit gave 
confidence to the holders, and above all the union, 
a firm and well adjusted government, giving assur¬ 
ance, of permanence, of order, of public faith, of 
safety and of ability to comply with its engagements, 
spread confidence throughout the land and opened 
the purses of the timid, and even the strong box of 
the miser. 

Simul alba nautis Stella refulsit, 

Defluit saxis agitatus humor; 

Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes, 

Et minax (quod sic voluere) ponto 
Unda recumbit. 

It is not wonderful indeed that money lenders 
fear to trust a faithless state. They know full well 
there are no courts and juries made for them,—no 
casa’s for their bodies, or elegits for their lands. If 
they lend to individuals, the strong hand of the law- 
will extort fulfilment of their engagements, but the 
sovereign power must be trusted on its faith alone. 
It may even pledge its funds, but if it have not faith 
it will not heed the pledge, and thus the pledge itself 
is nought. 

“ From these considerations, it is clear, that every 
breach of the public engagements whether from choice 
or necessity is (though in different degrees) most 
hurtful to public credit. When such a necessity does 
truly exist, the evils of it are only to be palliated by 
a scrupulous attention (on the part of the govern¬ 
ment) to carry the violation no farther than the ne¬ 
cessity absolutely requires; and to manifest (if the 


2*21 


nature of the case admits of it) a sincere disposition 
to make reparation whenever circumstances shall 
permit. Moreover to leave no room for doubt in the 
mind of the capitalist, to make to him “ assurance 
doubly sure,” it has long ago been suggested and 
has usually been wisely practised in our administra¬ 
tion, that we should regard it as a fundamental max¬ 
im in the system of public credit in the United 
States, that the creation of the debt should always 
be accompanied with the means of its extinguish¬ 
ment , and the pledge thus given, should be invio¬ 
late. “This is the true secret,” said Mr. Secretary 
Hamilton, “ for rendering public credit immortal , 
and, it is the secret which has rendered that of Bri¬ 
tain, so. It clothes the debt with the character of 
private property, and by making the pledge of funds, 
a part of the contract with the lenders,” removes 
all reasonable apprehension of loss by them. “ Hap¬ 
pily, (as Mr. Hamilton observes,) the United States 
have a large field of resource yet unexplored. Their 
youth, their large tracts of unsettled lands , says he, 
(and land in the infancy of improvement,) assure 
them a great and rapid increase of means.” These 
lands and their proceeds, present at once an ample 
fund for the security, in times of difficulty, of the 
principal and interest of money borrowed for na¬ 
tional defence. So too with our revenues from 
commerce. They are large and growing, and though 
interrupted in time of war, yet, by the restoration of 
peace, their increasing productiveness is resumed 
with renovated vigor. Such as has been already ob¬ 
served, was the effect of the late war. Depressed 
during its continuance, to four millions of dollars, 
the customs rose at once on the return of peace to 
thirty-six; and though that was much above the 
average amount, yet ever since, the produce of them 
has usually exceeded twenty millions. 

I conclude these crude suggestions on this most 
20 


222 


important topic, with the remark that they apply 
with not less force to the states themselves than to 
the United States. For though as members of the 
confederacy, their limited concerns can never re¬ 
quire them to incur a debt in time of peace, yet, in 
time of war, when every nerve is strained, and eve¬ 
ry limb of the body politic is brought into action, 
their credit, their efforts may be demanded to save 
the sinking state. Nay, more, as the natural re¬ 
sources from customs must always be impaired, and 
a direct tax resorted to in time of war, a state with 
well established credit, may be enabled to assume 
its quota of the tax, and relieve its people from 
pressure, (when they are least able to bear it) by a 
loan to its amount. Credit thus may be as necessa¬ 
ry to the states as to the general government, and it 
should therefore be cherished with the most watch¬ 
ful care. It is a tender plant, and by the slightest 
frost is withered and cut down. 

I have now concluded, young gentlemen, in my 
poor way, the few remarks on the subject of the na¬ 
ture and objects of government, and of the charac¬ 
ter of its several forms which I have deemed wor¬ 
thy of your consideration, and which my limited 
leisure has enabled me to throw together. After 
enquiring into the original formation of society and 
government, into the effect of its structure upon the 
natural rights of man, we have proceeded to con¬ 
sider the nature of sovereignty, and the forma¬ 
tion or organization of governments, whether found¬ 
ed on force, acquiescence under superior power, or 
express consent. We next pointed out the great 
objects of government, and went into a cursory ex¬ 
amination of the three simple forms, with a view 
of ascertaining, in which we were most likely to find 
the principles calculated to promote and sustain 
those indispensible objects. Disappointed in our 
hopes of discovering any one which would answer 


223 


the great purposes of political institutions, we next 
turned our thoughts to mixed governments with the 
expectation of combining the tendencies of the sim¬ 
ple forms so as to secure the advantages of each. 
To enable us to arrive at just conclusions on this in¬ 
teresting topic, we passed in review the British con¬ 
stitution, and dwelt with no little satisfaction on the 
democratical principles which seem to be infused 
into it. But finding the powers of the crown and 
the nobility yet too great for the happiness of the 
people, we advanced to the examination of represen¬ 
tative democracy and our own institutions. Allow¬ 
ing to this form of government all its alleged advan¬ 
tages, and giving to it as we do, a most decided pre¬ 
ference, w r e have not thought it wise to “ wink so 
hard” as not to see its defects, or to be utterly insen¬ 
sible to its weak points or to the hazards which are 
inseparable from its very nature. We have stated 
and examined these, I trust, with fairness and candor, 
and have then proceeded to present the strong checks 
and counteracting principles in our system and in 
our situation. In pursuing these enquiries, we were 
unavoidably led to turn our eyes to our federal insti¬ 
tutions. Finding in them the happiest effects in 
remedying and supplying the deficiencies, which, but 
for them we should have much reason to apprehend, 
we have been naturally led to an examination in its 
turn, of the tendencies and imperfections, of the fede¬ 
ral government, and to some deeply interesting specu¬ 
lations as to its probable permanence and stability. 
This has brought before us the dangers of centrali¬ 
zation and dissolution, from both of which we fondly 
hope, we shall long be free. And we have brought 
ourselves to indulge the consoling belief that though 
the shock of domestic war would probably shake the 
fabric to its centre, yet that the interests and the sa¬ 
gacity, and the patriotism of our people will long pro¬ 
tect us from the fatal calamity. One of the most ef- 


224 


ficient modes of preventing it I deem to be that which 
it has been my object to pursue : to imbue the minds 
of those who are at some future day to be the legis¬ 
lators of the land, and the leaders of the democracy, 
with a just sense of the dangers to which our insti¬ 
tutions are exposed, and the weighty duties which will 
devolve upon them for their prevention. 



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